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ABSTRACT 
 
  
Crime victims once played a prominent role in the criminal justice system. 
Historically, victims who sought to bring their wrongdoers to justice conducted their 
own investigations and argued their own cases or employed others to do so. As time 
passed, a distinction was drawn between offences against the social order and disputes 
between individuals. Crime control became a function of government and the state 
increased its responsibility for the investigation and punishment of criminal conduct. 
Gradually, the victim was removed from the proceedings and relegated to serving as a 
witness for the state. The assumption was that the state, whilst representing the 
interests of society, would represent the interests of the victim also. This fallacy 
provided the foundation for a criminal justice which, until recently, encouraged victim 
exclusion.  
 
In recent years, there has been a clear trend towards re-introducing the right of victims 
to participate in the criminal justice process. This international trend has been labelled 
the „return of the victim‟. In South Africa, the Constitution and, in particular, the Bill 
of Rights contained therein underscore the move towards procedural rights for victims 
of crime. Moreover, the South African government has taken significant legislative 
steps to ensure that victims have formal rights in criminal justice proceedings. 
However, to date, comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of 
whether or not victims should be allowed a meaningful role in the process of plea and 
sentence negotiations. One of the aims of this study is to determine whether victims‟ 
rights are properly understood, defined and implemented within the criminal justice 
system. In particular, this study aims to clarify the rights of victims who find 
 
 
 
 
   ix 
themselves affiliated with a specific stage of criminal prosecution, namely, negotiated 
justice.  
 
Negotiated justice has been introduced formally by the statutory amendment 
contained in section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act and accepted as a facet of 
criminal procedure in South Africa. This practice represents a movement away from 
the traditional adversarial system which requires that the conflict between the state 
and the accused be settled through verbal confrontation before an impartial 
adjudicator. Instead, negotiated justice proposes that the conflict be settled through 
negotiation and compromise, largely between the state and the accused. However, a 
criminal offence is not only a violation of the laws established by the state but also a 
conflict which has arisen between the accused and the victim. Although statutory plea 
and sentence agreements make provision for victim participation during the 
negotiation and sentencing stages, there are qualifications to such participation. This 
study examines these qualifications in an effort to establish whether the measure of 
victim participation proposed by section 105A is adequate, in the light of South 
Africa‟s commitment to the development of justiciable victims‟ rights. 
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DEDICATION 
 
The Undefended Victim 
For me, no gavel, hammers The Scales were never weighted. 
My Crime was that of a victim, My life, was the price I paid. 
And when my life was taken, Why weren't my rights read?  
And the Statement, "overruled" When they pronounced me dead? 
I'll never hear my rights, Nor take the witness stand, 
No attorney to defend me, My fate was in a killer's hand. 
Now the courtroom's crowded As the defendant pleads the case. 
With just the glimmer of a tear, Cold eyes on a straight face  
 
But oh, if I could take the stand... If they could witness my last breath, 
Could they live with the terror that I went through in death? 
If they could hear my pleading cries, and see the hatred in that face, 
Then At last, we'd know, the scales had "Been balanced" in this case.  
 
If I could, I'd tell the jury exactly how it was, 
The fear and pain that I went through, Struck down without a cause. 
Did the jury carefully weigh it all as they listened to the plea? 
There were no emotions, showing now, just the hope of going free... 
The final verdict now is in as the defendant stands in tears, 
If only I had done as well... Given ten to twenty years. 
 
Just another bereaved mother... 
 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to those who have suffered needlessly and whose 
suffering is unnecessarily prolonged because of ignorance about crime victims and a 
lack of commitment to them. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
   
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
The commission of a crime produces at least two victims, namely, society which 
suffers a violation of its laws, and the actual victim who suffers an injury to his person, 
property or personality interest.
1
 Yet, the criminal justice system allows only the state 
to play a meaningful role in the prosecution of crime.
2
 While the state, representing 
the interests of society, takes centre stage in criminal proceedings, the victim 
traditionally is viewed as nothing more than a source of information and routinely is 
relegated to the role of witness.
3
  
 
Commentators have observed that despite the importance of their cooperation, both in 
reporting offences and in assisting with the prosecution of crimes, victims largely are 
excluded from the criminal justice process.
4
 The victim is an outsider to the legal 
process from the moment the decision is made to prosecute to the end of the criminal 
trial, when the sentence may be imposed. According to Christie, this is because the 
victim is so thoroughly represented by the state that he is pushed out of the arena.
5
 
Until recently, the South African criminal justice system had afforded little attention 
                                                 
1
   Kennard (1989: 417).  
2
    See Christie (1977: 7) who explains that it is the Crown that comes into the spotlight, not the 
 victim, it is the Crown that describes the losses and not the victim and it is the Crown that gets 
 a chance to talk to the offender, not the victim. See also Camerer (1996: 3) who states that „in 
 effect the state is allowed to “steal” the conflict from the victim and the offender making  
 crimes committed crimes against the state.‟ Camerer‟s view finds support by referring to  
 section 179(2) of the Constitution which provides that the prosecuting authority has the power 
 to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state (emphasis added) and to carry out any 
 necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings.  
3
   See Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 163) and Snyman (2005: 3). 
4
   Kennard (1989: 417). 
5
  Christie (1977: 3). 
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to victims of crime.
6
 For decades the focus was on the conduct and rights of the 
accused.
7
 This excessive concern for the accused not only frustrated crime victims but 
also intensified the movement towards empowerment of victims.
8
 
 
The demand for procedural rights for victims of crime has gained momentum over the 
last decade. The advent of democracy and the Bill of Rights contained in the South 
African Constitution accelerated the acknowledgement, in South African legal 
discourse, that crime violates the human rights of victims.
9
 The South African 
government purports to acknowledge the vulnerability of victims and has committed 
to protecting them, through ratification of international instruments and the 
development of national policies and legislation.
10
 In 2001, the government identified 
the fight against crime and victimisation as areas of concern and increased the annual 
expenditures for the safety and justice sectors. Also, measures such as the Service 
Charter for Victims of Crime in South Africa (Victims‟ Charter) have been introduced 
in accordance with the Constitution, to promote the recognition of victims‟ rights in 
the criminal justice process.
11
   
                                                 
6
   Snyman (2005: 3).  
7
    Snyman (2005: 3). See further Camerer (1996: 3). 
8
  The feminist movement which emerged in 1960 and the establishment of the World Society of 
 Victimology in Germany initiated the global movement towards empowerment of victims. See 
 Clarke, Davis & Booysen (2003: 43) and also Snyman (1992: 473) for their discussions of 
 the victims‟ rights movement for the last two decades. See further Camerer (1996: 3) for her 
 discussion of the frustrations felt by victims of crime.    
9
   See Snyman (2005: 3). 
10
   Artz & Smythe (2005: 131). Policies such as the Integrated Victim Empowerment Policy and 
  legislation such as the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 have been developed to protect 
  victims.        
11
   Section 234 of the Constitution provides that Parliament may adopt Charters of Rights  
  consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. 
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1.2 Focus and significance of the study  
The acknowledgement that crime violates the rights of victims is in itself insufficient. 
To be effective, this acknowledgement must be reflected appropriately in legislation. 
On 14 December 2001 plea and sentence agreements obtained statutory recognition in 
South Africa.
12
 Section 105A, which makes provision for negotiated justice, was 
inserted into the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) by the Criminal Procedure Second 
Amendment Act.
13
 The amendment is significant because it proposes a measure of 
victim participation at the negotiation and sentencing stage of the agreement. The 
main question that this study will attempt to address is: Does section 105A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act adequately recognise the rights of victims in the light of 
South Africa‟s commitment to victims‟ rights? 
 
There are many facets of negotiated justice worthy of academic discussion, as the 
practice is an important part of our criminal justice system.
14
 It is a movement away 
from the traditional adversarial trial system.
15
 However, the defined focus adopted in 
this study is significant because, in addition to the acceptance of these agreements, 
there is the recognition that crime is not only a violation of the interests of society in 
the abstract, but also an injury or wrong inflicted on the victim.
16
 It is estimated that 
                                                 
12
   See Government Gazette of the Republic of South Africa No. 22933 of 14 December 2001. 
  The amendment was assented to on 7 December 2001. 
13
   Section 105A was inserted by section 2 of Criminal Procedure Second Amendment   
  Act 62 of 2001. 
14
   De Villiers (2000: 153).  
15
   See North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape)1999 (2) SACR 
  669 (C) at 678 paragraph c-d where the court explained that these agreements are a movement 
  away from the traditional theory of settling the lis between the state and the accused through 
  verbal confrontation before an impartial adjudicator. Instead, the lis is settled through  
  negotiation and compromise between opposing parties. 
16
   See the preamble to The Service Charter for Victims of Crime in South Africa. This  
  recognition is not exclusive to South African jurisprudence. See, for example, the publication 
  by Kennard (1989: 417).   
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there are more than one billion victims of crime each year.
17
 Despite these numbers, 
victims are still treated as the forgotten persons of the criminal justice system and 
little has been done to improve their predicament. Negotiated justice has the potential 
to further the trend towards alienating victims from the criminal justice system. It is, 
therefore, important that the role of victims be identified and defined in this context.  
 
This study is limited to the rights of victims in plea and sentence agreements. It does 
not intend to provide a general analysis or historical overview of victims‟ rights. It is 
not limited to certain categories of victims based on age, gender, ethnicity or the like. 
Instead, it considers the rights of all victims who find themselves affiliated with a 
specific stage of the prosecution, namely, the plea and sentence agreement.  
 
1.3 Literature review 
There is, in the available literature, a discemible failure to examine the role of the 
victim in the context of South African plea and sentence agreements. The main reason 
for the failure arguably lies in the fact that the victims are denied a prominent role in 
the prosecution of crime.
18
 Since the emphasis is primarily on the rights of the 
offender, it is not surprising that, upon codification of plea and sentence agreements 
in South Africa, the accused should remain the centre of academic discourse.  
 
Most of the work done in this area has placed emphasis on the impact of plea and 
sentence agreements on the rights of the accused, or on the role of the prosecutor and 
defence counsel. Furthermore, the legality of these agreements sparked heated debate 
among academics and this contributed towards the failure to consider the role of the 
                                                 
17
  See the World Society of Victimology report to the United Nations Commission on Crime 
 Prevention and Criminal Justice on 27 April 2006.       
18
   Clarke, Davis & Booysen (2003: 43). See also Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 158).  
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victim in this context.
19
 South African victimologists continue to focus on the general 
role of the victim in the criminal justice system or on certain categories of victims, 
without due consideration for their specific role in negotiated justice.
20
 
 
1.3.1 Bekker: ‘Plea bargaining in the United States of America and South 
Africa’ (1996) & 'American plea bargaining in statutory form in South 
Africa’ (2001) 
The 1996 contribution by Bekker compares plea and sentence agreements in the 
United States of America (USA) with the then informal plea agreement system in 
South Africa.
21
 These agreements are practised extensively in the USA.
22
 It is 
predictable, therefore, that when South African scholars discuss the practice they rely 
to a large extent on the developments in the USA.
23
    
 
According to Bekker, a victim of crime in the American criminal justice system has 
two main interests. The first is restitution and the second is retribution.
24
 He explains 
that a victim can protect these interests by participating in plea negotiation.
25
 He notes 
that some states and the federal government of the USA have recognised victims‟ 
interest in plea negotiations and have granted victims a right to participate in the 
                                                 
19
   See, for example, Burchell (2005: 16). See also De Villers (2004: 244) and further Clarke 
  (1996: 143). See chapter 3 below for an analysis of the academic debate regarding the legality 
  of these agreements.  
20
   See, for example, the recent compilation by Davis & Snyman Victimology in South Africa and 
  further the article by Clarke, Davis & Booyens (2003: 43). Both works were compiled after 
  the enactment of section 105A, yet the authors fail to consider the role of the victim in the 
  context of plea and sentence negotiations. 
21
   Bekker (1996: 168). See chapter 3 below for discussion of the informal plea agreement  
  system in South Africa. 
22
   Uphoff (1995: 74) explains that over 90% of all criminal convictions in the USA are based on 
  plea and sentence agreements. 
23
   De Villers (2000: 244). 
24
   Bekker (1996: 208).  
25
   Bekker (1996: 208). The author uses the term „plea negotiation‟ to denote both plea and  
  sentence  negotiation. 
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negotiation process.
26
 To facilitate this right to participate, Bekker approves of the 
following proposal made in the context of USA plea negotiation: the prosecutor 
should be required to notify the victim, at least ten days before the plea bargaining 
hearing, of the proposed terms of the plea bargain.
27
 In addition, the prosecutor should 
advise the victim of his right to participate at the hearing by being present or filing a 
sworn statement.
28
 This study aims to determine, inter alia, whether the South African 
prosecutor should have a positive duty to notify the victim of the intended agreement 
and thereby afford the victim the opportunity to make representations regarding the 
contents of the agreement.  
 
Bekker‟s 1996 article provides a useful example of the role of the victim in the 
context of plea and sentence agreements. However, it was written prior to the 
enactment of section 105A. The 2001 article, which was written after the South 
African Law Reform Commission
29
 proposed the enactment of section 105A, is 
essentially a repetition of the 1996 article.
30
 The later article omits a discussion of the 
role of the victim in favour of a discussion of the proposed enactment of section 105A. 
One of the objectives of this study is to address this omission. This will be achieved 
by comparing critically Bekker‟s 1996 contribution with the provisions of section 
105A insofar as victim participation in the negotiation process is concerned.  
                                                 
26
   Bekker (1996: 208). 
27
   Bekker (1996: 209). 
28
   Bekker (1996: 209). 
29
   In 2002 the Judicial Matters Amendment Act amended the South African Law Commission 
  Act 19 of 1973 to alter the Commission‟s name from the South African Law Commission to 
  the South African Law Reform Commission.  
30
   Bekker (2001: 319-321). 
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1.3.2 The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) 
The SALRC has made significant contributions towards improving the role of victims 
in the criminal justice system. In its Issue Paper on Sentencing: Restorative Justice 
the SALRC proposes that victim impact statements be admissible at sentencing 
hearings.
31
 The proposal was repeated in the SALRC‟s Draft Sentencing Framework 
Bill (Sentencing Framework Bill).
32
 According to the SALRC, it found sufficient 
justification for the formal recognition of victim impact statements at sentencing.
33
 
The Bill requires the prosecutor to produce a victim impact statement when 
addressing the court on the appropriate sentence to impose.
34
 This proposal could be 
classified, easily, as the most significant work in the area of victims‟ rights in South 
Africa. The SALRC has also recommended that victims or their representatives be 
allowed to make representations to the prosecutor during the negotiation of a plea and 
sentence agreement.
35
 
 
This study critically assesses the recommendations made by the SALRC and the 
extent to which they have been incorporated into section 105A. In addition, this study 
will seek to determine whether the SALRC recommendation on the use of victim 
impact statements can be incorporated into the structure of negotiated justice. 
                                                 
31
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Issue Paper 7 paragraph 4.7.  
32
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Issue Paper 7 paragraph 4.7. See further SALRC (2000) Project 
 82: Discussion Paper 91 Appendix B Part 1 paragraph 4.7.  
33
   SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 3.4.24. 
34
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report: The Draft Sentencing Framework Bill 2000 clause 47. 
35
  See SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.33. 
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1.3.3 The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) 
Prior to its enactment, the SAHRC evaluated section 105A from a victim‟s 
perspective.
36
 It recommended that the section be used to promote a victim-centric 
approach to the criminal justice system in South Africa. This recommendation is 
motivated with reference to the rights contained in the Victims‟ Charter. 
 
The SAHRC states unequivocally that victims must be allowed to participate in plea 
and sentence negotiations.
37
 To ensure victim participation, it recommended that 
section 105A place a positive duty on the prosecutor to provide the victim with an 
opportunity to be involved in the negotiations. The SAHRC opined that if the 
prosecutor has discretion to receive representations from the victim then the rights 
contained in the Victims‟ Charter fail to be recognised.38 According to the SAHRC, 
there are only two instances in which victim participation in negotiated justice may be 
excluded, namely, where the victim does not want to participate in the process or 
where the victim is not available to participate.
39
  
 
This study will add to the SAHRC‟s contribution by interrogating critically the 
recognition of victims‟ rights in negotiated justice. 
                                                 
36
   SAHRC (2001: 1). 
37
   SAHRC (2001: 5). 
38
   SAHRC (2001: 5). 
39
   SAHRC (2001: 5). 
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1.3.4 Du Toit et al: Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
The authors of the Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act view section 105A as 
a section which promotes victim participation.
40
 They emphasise that victim 
participation in the negotiation process will cultivate and strengthen society‟s 
acceptance of plea and sentence agreements.
41
 The work stresses that this kind of 
participation is necessary to promote the acceptance of the idea that an adversarial 
trial can be replaced by a plea and sentence agreement as contemplated in section 
105A.
42
 
 
In the light of this submission, this study will assess critically whether victim 
participation in plea and sentence negotiation should be conceptualised as a means to 
achieve acceptance of the practice. Also, it will identify and assess the type of rights 
which victims require to become active participants in negotiated justice. 
 
1.3.5  Davis & Snyman: Victimology in South Africa 
The recent work by Davis & Snyman places victimology in South Africa in its proper 
context. Their contribution consists of a compilation of writings by authors considered 
to be experts in the field of victimology.
43
 This compilation incorporates a number of 
issues ranging from defining and analysing key concepts in victimology to specific 
forms of victimisation and the future of victimology.  
 
Secondary victimisation is analysed in the context of the South African criminal 
justice system and the need for victim participation in the criminal justice process is 
                                                 
40
   Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12). This loose-leaf publication is revised and updated regularly in 
 accordance with changes made to the CPA. 
41
   Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12).   
42
   Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12).  
43
   See the preface to Davis & Snyman (2005). 
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emphasised throughout the work.
44
 However, none of the contributors considers 
secondary victimisation and the need for victim participation in the context of section 
105A. Therefore, this research will analyse critically the application of the general 
guidelines provided by the authors in the circumscribed context of plea and sentence 
agreements. 
 
1.3.6 Du Toit & Snyman (2001) ‘Plea-bargaining in South Africa: The need 
 for a formalized trial run’ 
This work was compiled by the authors pursuant to a workshop on plea negotiation 
held by the University of the Free State.
45
 Despite having been written prior to the 
enactment of section 105A, the article provides useful guidelines insofar as the role of 
the victim in plea and sentence negotiation is concerned. According to the authors, the 
victim frequently is neglected in the process of plea negotiations and, as a result, may 
harbour understandable objections towards the practice.
46
 In addition to indicating 
approval of a dispensation which enables victims to voice their opinion to the trial 
judge prior to the acceptance of a plea agreement, the authors list the following 
suggestions:  
a) that the victim be afforded an opportunity to be heard; 
b) that the victim be informed of the planned plea bargaining proceedings and 
the possible contents of those proceedings, as well as his/her right to be 
heard;  
c) that should that right be disregarded, a complaint can be lodged; and 
d) that the victim will have no right of appeal against the decision of the court 
in accepting or rejecting the plea agreement.
47
 
 
The viability of these suggestions will be compared critically with section 105A. 
  
                                                 
44
   Bruce (2005: 102) and especially Louw & Pretorius (2005: 76). 
45
    Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 144). 
46
    Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 154). 
47
   Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 154). 
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1.3.7 International works 
The works of authors such as Welling and Kennard provide a useful foundation for 
this study. Welling‟s work identifies the right to participate in the plea agreement 
decision as the most significant right which might be accorded to victims in the 
context of negotiated justice.
48
 Kennard discusses the nature and extent of a right to 
participate. She also proposes that victims have a right to veto a plea and sentence 
agreement.
49
   
 
While earlier work done by academics focused on crime and the victim‟s role in it, a 
new focus for the study of victims has taken shape. Davis rightly argues that we have 
come a long way since the first seminal works of von Hentig and Mendelsohn in the 
1940s and 1950s which dealt primarily with victim precipitation.
50
 South Africa is 
currently in a sharp developing curve as crucial issues such as the key concepts and 
the scope of victims‟ rights are debated. 51  The theoretical framework which has 
resulted from these debates is valuable in determining the rights of victims during 
their encounters with the criminal justice system. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
A critical-analytical approach will be adopted in this research. Reliance will be placed 
on primary and secondary sources relating to victimology and the practice of plea and 
sentence agreements. This literature-based study will be accompanied by a normative 
analysis of section 105A of the CPA. 
 
                                                 
48
  Welling (1987: 307). 
49
  Kennard (1989: 438).  
50
  Davis (2005: 352). 
51
  Snyman (2005: 3).  
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1.5 Overview of chapters 
The study consists of six chapters. This chapter provides the framework for the study. 
It outlines the basis and structure of the study. The second chapter will provide an 
overview of key concepts which are to be used throughout this study. It will provide 
also a basic introduction to the victims‟ right movement in South Africa and it will 
analyse critically the status of victims‟ rights under the South African Constitution. 
Chapter three will analyse the development of plea and sentence agreements. In this 
regard, the informal plea agreement system will be considered as well as the 
recommendations made by the SALRC for codification of this system. Thereafter 
section 105A will be evaluated. The fourth chapter will identify and analyse those 
victims‟ rights which require emphasis during plea and sentence negotiations. Chapter 
five will consider victim impact statements as a means of improving the role of 
victims in negotiated justice. Chapter six will operate as a conclusion to the study.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
SETTING THE SCENE: AN OVERVIEW OF BASIC CONCEPTS AND OF 
THE VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences by defining the key concepts which are to be used 
throughout the research. This is followed by a basic introduction to the victims‟ rights 
movement in South Africa. It will reflect upon the rampant victimisation experienced 
during the apartheid era and upon the importance of South Africa‟s transition from 
apartheid to a democracy for victims‟ rights. The legal platform for the development 
of victim-based legislation and policies provided by the UN Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the South African 
Constitution will be discussed. In this regard, the fight for constitutionally recognised 
procedural rights for victims of crime will be considered.  
 
The chapter will conclude with an analysis of government‟s response to the need for 
victim-based legislation, namely, the adoption of the Service Charter for Victims of 
Crime in South Africa and Minimum Standards on Services for Victims of Crime. 
The significance and effectiveness of these instruments will be analysed. 
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2.2 Definitions and basic concepts 
2.2.1 Negotiation 
Negotiation has been defined as a process whereby opposing parties attempt to 
resolve their dispute by reaching an agreement on a course of action which serves 
their conflicting interests.
1
 In the context of plea and sentence negotiations the 
opposing parties are the state and the accused. Here the negotiation is aimed at finding 
a solution which is satisfactory to both parties.
2
  
 
Bargaining is used often as a synonym for negotiation. However, the word „bargain‟ 
is rich in connotation and provides a frequent source of misunderstanding of the 
negotiation process.
3
 The public perception of a bargain is associated with its ordinary 
meaning, namely, „a thing obtained cheaply‟.4 Bargaining is interpreted, therefore, to 
mean that justice may be bought, and cheaply to boot.
5
 It may suggest also that the 
criminal justice system condones the conduct of the offender because it has reduced 
his accountability.
6
 The fact that it may reduce the current backlogs in criminal courts 
often is overlooked when this concept is used. Instead, bargaining with an accused is 
perceived as a sign of weakness in the criminal justice system. The cumulative effect 
of these misconceptions leads to the inference that bargaining reduces the worth of 
justice and is the result of an inadequate criminal justice system. The word is, 
                                                 
1
    Bekker (1996: 173). 
2
   See North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) 1999 (2) SACR 
  669 (C) at 674 paragraph c. The court describes negotiation as a mutually acceptable  
  compromise. 
3
   Bekker (2001: 310). The author describes the word „bargain‟ in the phrase plea bargaining as 
  misleading, inflammatory and pejorative, rather than descriptive of what actually occurs.  
4
   The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus (1996: 36). 
5
   Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 152). See also Bekker (2001: 310) who states that the word bargain 
  suggests the idea of bargain basement justice and white sales day at the  courthouse. See  
  further SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 5.9. The SALRC opines 
  that the term „plea bargaining‟ is not an appropriate description of the process because justice 
  is seen to be something that can be purchased at a bargaining table. 
6
   Bekker (2001: 311).   
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therefore, an unfortunate choice to describe a process in which both the state and the 
accused make concessions.
7
  
 
The term „negotiation‟ is preferred and used in this study, because it averts the 
inference of weakness or condonation on the part of the state. Furthermore, it defines 
more accurately a situation in which opposing parties could benefit from the 
compromise reached.
8
 
 
2.2.2 Plea and sentence negotiation 
A definition of the concept of plea negotiation has not been settled.
9
 Attempts to 
explicate the term have resulted in a number of definitions and, in some cases, 
noticeable contradictions.
10
 This divergence is illustrated in the SALRC‟s Discussion 
Paper 94 where no fewer than four possible definitions are listed.
11
 Thus, a plea 
negotiation may denote: 
1. any agreement by the accused to plead guilty in return for the promise of some 
benefit,
12
  
2. the exchange of official concessions for the accused‟s act of self-conviction,13 
3. any agreement by the accused to plead guilty in return for the prosecutor‟s 
agreeing to take or refrain from taking a course of action,
14
 and  
4. the practice of relinquishing the right to go to trial in exchange for a reduction 
in charge and/or sentence.
15
 
                                                 
7
   Bekker (1996: 173).  
8
   Bekker (1996: 173). See also North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP  
  (Western Cape) at 674 paragraph c. 
9
   Bekker (2001: 310).  
10
   See, for example, Bekker (1996: 172) who explains that given the central importance of plea 
  bargaining in the administration of criminal justice in the USA, it is surprising to find  
  divergence and confusion over what constitutes plea bargaining.   
11
   SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraphs 2.3 - 2.6. In this discussion the 
  SALRC uses the term plea bargaining as opposed to plea negotiation. 
12
   Alschulser (1979: 5) as cited in SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 
  2.4 
13
   Law Reform Commission of Canada (1975) Criminal Procedure: Control of the Process  
  Working Paper 15 at 45, as cited in SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94  
  paragraph 2.4. 
14
   SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 2.5. 
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It is submitted that none of the above definitions accurately defines plea negotiation 
because each fails to give effect to the proper meaning of the concept. Firstly, since 
the negotiation precedes the actual agreement, to refer to plea negotiation as an 
agreement obviously is flawed. Hence, the definitions quoted by the SALRC fail to 
distinguish between the term „plea negotiation‟ (referred to as plea bargaining) and 
the term „plea agreement‟. Secondly, plea negotiation is not a synonym for sentence 
negotiation. As is demonstrated below, they are distinct concepts. 
 
A suitable starting point for any definition of plea negotiation would be to 
acknowledge that it entails a negotiation of the charge against the accused and the 
plea to be entered by the accused.
16
 In a plea negotiation the legal representative of 
the accused uses a guilty plea as his negotiating tool while the prosecutor uses his 
discretion to reduce the charge against the accused as his negotiating tool. The 
accused may offer additional benefits to the prosecutor, such as restitution to the 
victim, providing information to the police or testifying against others.
17
 At this stage 
both parties have knowledge of the facts set out in the police docket, as well as of 
their respective likelihoods of success should the matter go to trial.
18
 The legal 
representative of the accused may offer a guilty plea to a less serious charge, with or 
without the additions mentioned above, subject to the prosecutor dismissing the more 
                                                                                                                                            
15
    Isakow & Van Zyl Smit (1985: 173) as discussed by the SALRC (2001) Project 73:  
  Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 2.6 and approved by Uijs AJ in North Western Dense  
  Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) at 679 paragraph e. 
16
   SAHRC (2001: 4).    
17
   Bekker (2001: 315). 
18
   Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 146). See further Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaal   
  & others 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC) at 790 paragraph c. In this case the Constitutional Court 
  held that an accused person is entitled to have access to the documents in the police docket 
  which are exculpatory (or which are prima facie likely to be helpful to the defence) unless, in 
  very rare cases, the state is able to justify the refusal of such access on the grounds that it is 
  not justified for the purposes of a fair trial. Prior to this decision information contained in a 
  police docket was privileged in favour of the state.        
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serious charge. By contrast, the prosecutor will attempt to secure a guilty plea to a 
charge embodying the moral blameworthiness of the accused‟s unlawful conduct.19 
 
Thus, the term „plea negotiation‟ is used in this study to denote negotiations regarding 
the charge against the accused and the plea to be entered by the accused. Although 
this may influence the sentence finally imposed, plea negotiation does not include any 
reference to sentence negotiation.
20
  
 
Sentence negotiation differs from plea negotiation. In a sentence negotiation, the 
accused would offer a guilty plea in exchange for the prosecutor recommending 
leniency when sentencing is considered by the court. Alternatively, the accused may 
offer his guilty plea subject to the court imposing the sentence negotiated between the 
parties.
21
 The latter finds application when the negotiation is aimed at concluding a 
statutory plea and sentence agreement provided for in section 105A of the CPA.
22
 It is 
important to note that the court is not bound by a negotiated sentence because 
sentencing is regarded as the domain of the courts. The court therefore retains its 
sentencing discretion.
23
 
 
While sentence negotiation is generally an accompaniment to plea negotiation, there 
may be instances where the charge against the accused is not reduced. A reduction in 
charge may not occur if the state aims to secure a guilty plea in exchange for its 
lenient sentence recommendation, or where the accused aims to secure a non-
                                                 
19
   Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 146).     
20
   See, for example, Bekker (2001: 318) who states that in most instances a guilty plea   
  will be viewed as a sign of remorse and will in itself lead to some reduction in sentence.  
21
   Bekker (2001: 313).  
22
   See chapter 3 below for discussion of section 105A agreements. 
23
   See SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 3.23 and also Clarke  
  (1996: 162). 
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custodial sentence or a specified term of incarceration in exchange for his guilty plea. 
These negotiations would not necessarily include negotiating a reduction in charge. 
 
2.2.3 Plea and sentence agreements 
In this study the term „plea agreement‟ is used in its strictest sense. It denotes the 
agreement finally concluded between the state and an accused whereby the accused 
enters a guilty plea in exchange for being able to plead to a reduced charge.
24
 As 
explained above, the agreement may include additional benefits for the state such as 
the accused compensating the victim, providing information to the police or giving 
testimony against other accused.
25
  
 
The SALRC has identified two types of sentence agreements.
26
 The first involves the 
prosecutor, in exchange for a guilty plea, undertaking to recommend a particular 
sentence to the court or agreeing not to oppose the sentence proposed by the 
defence.
27
 The second entails the accused agreeing to plead guilty provided that the 
sentence negotiated between the parties is accepted by the court.
28
 The second type of 
sentence agreement is regulated by section 105A of the CPA. The difference between 
the two types of agreements lies in the consequences of rejection by the court. If the 
court ignores the recommendation or proposal in the first agreement, and instead 
imposes a sentence it considers just, then the accused may not withdraw his guilty 
plea.
29
 However, if the court rejects the second agreement the accused will be 
                                                 
24
   SAHRC (2001: 2). 
25
   Bekker (2001: 315). 
26
   SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 5.16. 
27
   SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 5.16. See also Bekker (2001: 313 
  & 323). 
28
   SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 5.17. 
29
   SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 5.16. 
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informed thereof.
30
 The accused then has a choice. Either he may withdraw his plea 
and a trial will commence de novo before a different presiding officer, or he may 
abide by his plea and accept the sentence which the court intends to impose.
31
  
 
South African courts have developed a concise and combined definition of plea and 
sentence agreements. According to the courts, plea and sentence agreements may be 
summarised as: 
 The practice of an accused relinquishing the right to go to trial by offering a 
 plea of guilty in exchange for a reduction in both charge and sentence.
32
  
 
This definition is both acceptable and accurate because it incorporates all the facets of 
plea and sentence agreements explained above. 
 
2.2.4 Negotiated justice  
The term „negotiated justice‟ may be used to denote plea and sentence negotiations as 
well as plea and sentence agreements.
33
 Due to its versatility it may be used when the 
negotiation or agreement pertains to: 
 a guilty plea to a lesser charge and a reduced sentence recommendation, or  
 a guilty plea to a lesser charge without a reduced sentence recommendation, or  
 a reduced sentence recommendation without a reduction in charge.  
                                                 
30
  Section 105A(9)(a). 
31
   Section 105A(9)(b) read with subsections (c) and (d). For discussion see SALRC (2001)  
  Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 5.17. 
32
   See North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) at 670 paragraph 
  c and also  S v Armugga & Others 2005 (2) SACR 259 at 265 paragraph b.  
33
   See, for example, Isakow & Van Zyl Smit (1985: 173-174). 
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2.2.5 Victimology  
Victimology is the scientific study of victims of crime.
34
 It is defined by the World 
Society of Victimology as: 
The scientific study of the extent, nature and causes of criminal victimisation, its 
consequences for the persons involved and the reactions thereto by society, in 
particular the police and the criminal justice system as well as voluntary workers 
and professional helpers.
35
 
 
 
The systematic study of victims began only in the late 1940s, rendering victimology a 
relatively young discipline.
36
 This may be attributed to the fact that the criminal 
justice system for decades had focused on offenders.
37
 In 1956 Mendelsohn coined 
the term „victimology‟.38 The first twenty years of the new discipline was restricted to 
the victim‟s contribution to the commission of the crime. In other words, most 
research between 1940 and 1960 was founded on the notion of victim precipitation.
39
 
This position was vigorously attacked by the feminist movement which emerged 
during the 1960s.
40
 The feminist movement and establishment of the World Society of 
Victimology shifted the focus of this discipline from victim precipitation to that which 
forms the foundation of this thesis, namely, the promotion of victims‟ rights in the 
criminal justice system.  
                                                 
34
   Schurink (1992: 5). 
35
   Snyman (2005: 4).  
36
   Schurink (1992: 7). In 1948, Von Hentig‟s The Criminal and his Victim put the study of the
  victim in the spotlight. This publication paved the way for victimology discourse and is today 
  regarded as the seminal text in the development of victim studies. 
37
   See Karmen (1994: 8) who opines that at that time the main current within criminology was 
  offenderology‟.  
38
   Karmen (1994: 10). See also Snyman (2005: 5). However, it should be noted that Fattah  
  (2000: 2) disagrees with most authors. He claims that the American psychiatrist, Wertham, 
  first coined the term victimology.   
39
   Schurink (1992:9). 
40
   O‟Connor (2004: 2). See also Zedner (2003: 4). 
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2.2.6 The general concept of the victim  
The term „victim‟ has undergone a fascinating metamorphosis over the centuries.41 
According to Karmen, its original meaning lies in the religious notion of sacrifice, the 
term being used to refer to a person or animal put to death to satisfy a supernatural 
power or deity.
42
 Over the centuries „victim‟ came to have additional meanings when 
the ideas of personal injury, loss and suffering developed.
43
 Interestingly, the 
definition in the Oxford English Dictionary & Thesaurus reflects both the original 
meaning and the expansion thereon in that it defines a victim as „a person injured, 
killed or made to suffer or a creature sacrificed to a god‟.44 It may be concluded, 
therefore, that the historical meaning has been retained. However, contemporary 
society places emphasis on the notion of the victim as one who suffers personal injury 
or loss as opposed to one who is sacrificed in accordance with religious rituals. 
 
The explanation above renders the concept exceptionally broad. It permits 
indiscriminate use of the term because it includes multifaceted categories of victims.
45
 
These categories include, inter alia, victims such as cancer victims, accident victims, 
holocaust victims and even hurricane victims.
46
 It is, therefore, necessary to state that 
hereinafter reference to the term „victim‟ will be limited to victims of crime or the so-
called „crime victim‟, as defined below. 
                                                 
41
   Schurink (1992: 5). 
42
   Karmen (1994: 2). See Schurink (1992: 5) for discussion. 
43
   See Schurink (1992: 5).  
44
   The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus (1996: 570). 
45
   O‟Connor (2004: 1). According to the author, all these usages have in common an image of 
  someone who has suffered injury and harm by forces beyond his or her control. This statement 
  demonstrates the broad nature of the term.  
46
   O‟Connor (2004: 2).  
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2.2.7 The victim of crime  
This concept has multiple definitions and selecting a suitable definition is not an easy 
task. Victims of crime are defined by the United Nations Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (UN Declaration) as: 
Persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in 
violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, including those 
laws proscribing criminal abuse of power.
47
  
 
The UN Declaration further states that:  
A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of 
whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted 
and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the 
victim. The term „victim‟ also includes, where appropriate, the immediate 
family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm 
in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation.
48
 
 
The UN definition is broad in that it includes next of kin, descendents, direct and 
indirect victims. Yet, at the same time it identifies and defines the victim as the one 
who has suffered harm either directly or indirectly, and the offender as the one who 
has inflicted the harm unlawfully.
49
  
      
The SALRC, with the exception of moderate adjustments, has relied on the UN 
definition in its discussion of compensation for victims of crime.
50
 According to the 
SALRC: 
Victims are persons who, individually or collectively have suffered harm, 
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or 
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions 
                                                 
47
   Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
  and Abuse of Power Adopted by the General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 
  1985. The UN Declaration has been ratified by the South African government. Thus, reliance 
  on the provisions contained therein is not imprudent. 
48
    Article 2 of the UN Declaration. 
49
   Article 1 of the UN Declaration. 
50
   SALRC (1997) Project 82: Issue Paper 7 paragraph 1.7. 
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that are in violation of criminal laws. The term therefore includes direct 
victims (the person who was directly prejudiced by the commission of the 
crime) as well as indirect victims (persons who were not directly involved in 
the crime, but who were directly prejudiced as a result thereof, for example, 
the family of a victim of a murder).
51
 
 
Against this background and for the purposes of this study, a victim of crime may be 
defined as a person who has suffered harm directly or indirectly as a result of the 
commission of a crime.   
 
2.2.8 Victimisation  
Victimisation is a broad concept in that, like the term „victim‟, it permits a 
multifaceted and inclusive understanding of the range of persons within its 
parameters.
52
 For the purposes of this study, the scope of victimisation will be limited 
to crime victims as defined above. The definition provided by Pretorius & Louw 
reflects this restricted scope:  
Victimisation refers to the process whereby a person suffers harm through the 
violation of national criminal laws or internationally recognised norms relating 
to human rights.
53
 
 
By identifying four stages which determine whether victimisation has occurred, 
Snyman clarifies the „process of victimisation‟ referred to by Pretorius & Louw.54 The 
first stage of this process requires that the individual suffer an injury which has been 
caused by a person or institution.
55
 The second stage requires that the injured view his 
suffering as unjust and unwarranted.
56
 The injured therefore views himself as victim. 
In the third stage the injured looks towards the criminal justice system for recognition 
                                                 
51
   SALRC (1997) Project 82: Issue Paper 7 paragraph 1.7. 
52
   Snyman (2005: 7). 
53
   Pretorius & Louw (2005: 74). 
54
   Snyman (2005: 9). 
55
   Snyman (2005: 9). 
56
   Snyman (2005: 9). 
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of the fact that he has become a victim.
57
 The final stage requires the recognition and 
acknowledgement of the community that the injured has been victimised.
58
  
According to Snyman, victimisation is apparent if the injured proceeds through all 
four stages.
59
  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed critique of the four stages of 
victimisation when the injury to the victim is inflicted by the offender. This is known 
as primary victimisation. Instead, the study focus is on the potential injury to the 
victim caused by the criminal justice system and, more specifically, the injury caused 
by victim exclusion in the context of negotiated justice. This is known as secondary 
victimisation.    
 
2.2.9 Secondary victimisation 
In addition to the victimisation caused by the conduct of the offender, victims often 
experience distress in their encounters with the criminal justice system and criminal 
justice officials.
60
 Difficulties, such as insensitive treatment by criminal justice 
officials and being kept on the periphery (because criminal cases are conducted as a 
matter between the state and offender), are frequent sources of distress for the 
victim.
61
 Often, therefore, victims are victimised twice, first by the offender and then 
by the criminal justice system.
62
 Secondary victimisation denotes the additional 
wound inflicted upon the victim by the criminal justice system.
63
 
                                                 
57
   Snyman (2005: 10). 
58
   Snyman (2005: 10). 
59
   Snyman (2005: 9). 
60
   Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 163). 
61
   Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 163). See also Bruce (2005: 102) and further Camerer (1996: 2) 
62
   Snyman (2005:3). 
63
   Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 163). See further Bruce (2005: 102). 
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2.3 South Africa’s transition to constitutional democracy 
South Africa‟s transition from apartheid to a constitutional democracy provided the 
impetus for the establishment of victims‟ rights. 64  In order to develop a proper 
appreciation of the victims‟ rights movement in South Africa, a basic understanding 
of the origin of the movement is required. 
 
Under the apartheid state the criminal justice system served as an instrument of 
oppression against most South Africans.
65
 Far-reaching laws such as the Group Areas 
Act
66
 and Immorality Act
67
 shaped the most intimate forms of social interaction, 
including where one lived and whom one married.
68
 The 1993 Constitution brought 
an end to the racially-qualified constitutional order which had accompanied nearly 
three hundred years of colonialism, segregation and apartheid.
69
 However, the 
rampant victimisation experienced during this time rendered a newly democratised 
South Africa particularly sensitive to the plight of victims of crime.  
 
In the aftermath of apartheid, South Africa diligently focused on the gross human 
rights violations associated with the former repressive regime.
70
 During 1995 the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established.
71
 One of the functions 
of the TRC would be to provide amnesty to the perpetrators of human rights 
violations in exchange for full disclosure of the crimes they had committed.
72
 During 
                                                 
64
   See Artz & Smythe (2005: 131) and further Bruce (2005: 100). 
65
   Bruce (2005: 101).  
66
   Act 41 of 1950. 
67
   Act 5 of 1927. 
68
   See Artz & Smythe (2005: 132) for discussion. 
69
   Act 200 of 1993. See Currie & de Waal (2005: 2). 
70
   Garkawe (2003: 334).  
71
   Garkawe (2003: 334). According to the author „the establishment of truth commissions is a 
  dominant means by which states “in transition” and the international community have dealt 
  with perpetrators of gross violations of human rights‟. 
72
  Garkawe (2003: 334).  
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this process victims and their families were allowed an opportunity to communicate 
the effect of the harm inflicted by the perpetrator. Though it is outside the scope of 
this thesis to analyse the TRC proceedings, it must be acknowledged that the TRC 
gave prominent recognition to victims of crime in South Africa and raised the rights 
of crime victims from a secondary consideration to the forefront of the criminal 
justice system.
73
  
 
The transition to democracy, combined with the momentum created by the TRC 
process, spawned a new trend in South African victimology. For the first time, 
victimologists were able to use the law to address both primary and secondary 
victimisation.
74
 They relied on the Constitution and the government‟s ratification of 
international instruments such as the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. It was argued that these instruments provide a 
legal platform for the development of victim-based legislation and policies.
75
  
 
2.4 The UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime  
and Abuse of Power 
The UN Declaration is regarded as the most important victim-orientated international 
instrument ratified by South Africa.
76
 It is based on the philosophy that victims should 
be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity, and that they are entitled to 
access to the criminal justice system and to prompt redress for the harm which they 
have suffered.
77
   
                                                 
73
   Garkawe (2003: 334). See further Snyman (2005: 6). 
74
   Artz & Smythe (2005: 132). 
75
   Artz & Smythe (2005: 132). 
76
   Artz & Smythe (2005: 134). 
77
   See Article 4 of the UN Declaration and for discussion see Pretorius & Louw (2005: 78) and 
  further Snyman (2005: 5). 
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It instructs States Parties to develop judicial and administrative processes which 
facilitate a responsive criminal justice system.
78
 Article 6 explains that a responsive 
criminal justice system is achieved by keeping victims informed of the progress of the 
matter, allowing their views and concerns to be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages, and by providing proper assistance to victims throughout the legal 
process.
79
 Pretorius & Louw summarise the rights contained in the UN Declaration as 
follows: 
In an effort to facilitate the establishment of minimum service standards for victims, 
the UN Declaration emphasises the following victims‟ rights, namely, 
 the right to be treated with respect and dignity, 
 the right to offer and receive information,  
 the right to legal advice, 
 the right to protection, 
 the right to restitution and  
 the right to compensation.80  
 
It should be emphasised, however, that the UN Declaration does not confer rights on 
crime victims. Instead, it places emphasis on the identification and affirmation of 
victims‟ rights which exist already in the state‟s criminal justice system. 81  States 
Parties, such as South Africa, were required to develop their legal process in 
accordance with the principles established by the UN Declaration. Thus, South 
Africa‟s ratification of the UN Declaration placed a duty on the state to act in 
fulfilment of the obligations contained therein.
82
  
 
 
                                                 
78
   See Article 5 of the UN Declaration. For discussion see Pretorius & Louw (2005: 79).  
79
   See Article 6(a), (b) & (c) of the UN Declaration. 
80
   Pretorius & Louw (2005: 78). 
81
   See Snyman (2005: 5) who explains that despite the foundation that the UN Declaration  
  provides for the development of victimology internationally it does not bestow rights. 
82
   See Artz & Smythe (2005: 133). Section 231 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that the 
  Republic is bound by international agreements which have been ratified by the national  
  executive. 
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2.5 The role of the South African Constitution in determining the rights of 
victims 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is regarded by many as the most 
ambitious and liberal constitution in the world.
83
 In its founding provisions the 
Constitution describes the Republic of South Africa as a sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.
84
 Section 7 states that the Bill of Rights, 
contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution, is the cornerstone of democracy because it 
enshrines the rights of the people and affirms the democratic values of the state.
85
 The 
phrase „the rights of the people‟ is significant because the Bill of Rights goes on to 
entrench rights of certain groups of people such as women, children, employees, 
employers and accused, arrested and detained persons. The victim of crime does not 
feature in these groups.
86
 Hence, the Constitution does not contain a specific provision 
dedicated to determining the rights of crime victims. It is significant that, 
notwithstanding its classification as ambitious and liberal, the Constitution fails to 
establish basic rights for victims of crime. 
 
2.5.1 Circumlocutory rights 
The absence of a dedicated constitutional provision for victims has caused some to 
look to provisions from which the constitutional rights of victims may be construed.
87
  
                                                 
83
  See, for example, Kgosimore (2000) paragraph 2. 
84
   Section 1(a). 
85
   Section 7(1). 
86
  See Kgosimore (2000) paragraphs 2 & 3. 
87
   See, for example, Pieterse (2002: 27). At 34 the author, states that the rights to life, dignity 
  and freedom and security of the person are interdependent because the state‟s duty to prevent 
  victimisation may be construed from all of these rights. 
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In this regard, the constitutional rights to equality,
88
 human dignity,
89
 life
90
 and 
freedom and security of the person
91
 have been viewed as circumlocutory rights
92
 for 
victims of crime.  
 
 
The right to equality is premised on the idea that every person possesses equal human 
dignity and is entitled to equal protection of the law.
93
 In its report on a new 
sentencing framework, the SALRC explained that equal protection of the law, 
promised by section 9(1) of the Constitution, means that the rights of victims must be 
reflected in criminal justice procedures.
94
 The Constitutional Court has stated that the 
right to dignity provides the foundation for the right to equality.
95
 In the 
groundbreaking decision of Makawanyane, O‟ Regan J explained that the right to 
dignity entails the right to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.
96
 Inherently, 
both primary and secondary victimisation entails an absence of respect and concern 
for the victim. Thus, all acts of victimisation are infringements of the right to dignity. 
In addition to the above, all too frequently, acts of violence destroy the victim‟s 
constitutional right to life.
97
  
 
                                                 
88
  See section 9(1) of the Constitution which provides that everyone is equal before the law and 
 has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
89
  See section 10 which provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
 dignity respected and protected. 
90
  See section 11 which provides that everyone has the right to life. 
91
  See section 12(1)(c) which provides that everyone has the right to freedom and security of the 
 person which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or 
 private sources. 
92
   For the pupose of this study the term „circumlocutory rights‟ is used to explain the  
 constitutional rights of victims of crime.     
93
   De Waal, Currie & Erasmus (2001: 232). 
94
    SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 1.4. 
95
   See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 
  at paragraph 30, S v Makawanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paragraph 144 and also De Waal, 
  Currie & Erasmus (2001: 230) for their discussion of the central role of human dignity in the 
  Constitution. 
96
   See S v Makawanyane at paragraph 328. 
97
   See, for example, Combrinck (2005: 173-174) who discusses the provisions in the Bill of  
  Rights which are infringed by acts of violence against women. 
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The right to freedom from all forms of violence, contained in section 12, is viewed as 
particularly appropriate for victims.
98
 According to Artz & Smythe the scope of this 
right extends beyond a due process guarantee against arbitrary arrest and detention, to 
a more substantial guarantee applicable to victims of crime.
99
 This „substantial 
guarantee‟ is classified by Pieterse as a justiciable right which is capable of 
enforcement not only against the state but also against private individuals.
100
  Pieterse 
explains that, in terms of this provision, both the state and its citizens have a duty to 
refrain from violent behaviour.
101
 This is because the provision is violated by acts of 
violence or omissions to prevent acts of violence.
102
 Thus, the right to be free from all 
forms of violence provides a fundamental basis for victims‟ rights.  
 
The Constitution places a further duty on the state in relation to victims of crime. 
Section 7(2) requires the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights. The significance of this section was acknowledged by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
Duivenboden.
103
 The SCA stated that while there might be no similar constitutional 
                                                 
98
   Combrinck (2005: 173). See also Artz & Smythe (2005: 135), the authors‟ state that the South 
  African constitution is unique in its inclusion of this right and the inclusion of the words  
  „private‟ violence.  
99
   Artz & Smythe (2005: 135). See also Combrinck (1998: 683) who explains that the wording 
  of section 12(1)(c) may be seen as „eliminating any suggestion that the right to security should 
  only apply in a due process context‟. This has been also the approach of the Constitutional 
  Court. In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) 
  paragraph 47, the court explains that the right to freedom and security of the person is  
  additional to and not a substitute for the due process guarantee.   
100
  Pieterse (2002: 28).    
101
  Pieterse (2002: 31). See also 28 where the author states that „section 12(1)(c) seems to create 
  positive duties which are enforceable directly against both the state and private individuals‟.  
102
  Pieterse (2002: 31). The author adds that „it would be safe to assume that courts would be 
  called upon to vindicate this right after physical violation thereof had already occurred‟. Thus, 
  vindication or rather the enforcement of section 12(1)(c) occurs ex post facto. For an example 
  of state omissions to prevent violence see Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and 
  Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) & 2003 (2) SA 
  656 (C).        
103
  Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA). The significance 
  of this section for victims of crime has been acknowledged by authors such as Pieterse  
  (2002: 29), Combrinck (1998: 683) and Artz & Smthye (2005: 135).   
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imperatives in other jurisdictions, in this country the state has a positive constitutional 
duty to act in protection of the rights in the Bill of Rights.
104
 Combrinck argues, 
convincingly, that the section actually expands the ambit of constitutional rights well 
beyond the immediate implication that the state (and its organs) should refrain from 
committing acts of violence.
105
 It also imposes a duty on the state to be proactive and 
take steps to ensure the realisation and protection of these rights.
106
 The state, 
therefore, has a constitutional duty not only to respect but also to protect, promote and 
fulfil the victim‟s right to equality, human dignity, life and freedom and security of 
person.
107
  
 
The conclusion that victims of crime have constitutional rights is evident from the 
discussions above. However, the problem with a theoretical argument which supports 
the notion that victims‟ rights are included in the Constitution by implication is that it 
loses substance when translated into practice. The argument is inadequate when 
applied to victims who encounter the criminal justice system on a daily basis. A more 
meaningful approach to constitutional rights for victims requires an express 
declaration of such rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104
  Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden at paragraph 20. 
105
  Combrinck (2005: 174). See also Artz & Smthye (2005: 136). 
106
  Combrinck (2005: 174). See also Pieterse (2002: 28-29) who states that legislative steps  
  should be taken to enforce section 12(1)(c). 
107
  Section 7(2) read with sections 9, 10, 11 and 12.  
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2.5.1 The fight for procedural rights  
There is a lack of ambition to entrench procedural rights for crime victims. The 
human rights order created by the Bill of Rights entrenches several procedural rights 
which apply to detained, arrested and accused persons.
108
 Yet, it does not contain 
procedural rights for victims of crime.
109
 This has resulted in the realisation that, 
within the criminal justice system, there is an imbalance between the rights of the 
victim and those of the accused.
110
  
 
Whereas the Bill of Rights provides the accused with an instrument with which to 
claim his right to justice, it has failed to ensure the same for victims of crime. Some 
authors believe that this omission is due to the constitutional framers taking the 
position that allowing victims constitutional rights will infringe on the rights of 
accused persons.
111
 This position is not justifiable because it contradicts the promise 
of equality before the law. Equality is not a principle which lives in abstraction.
112
 It 
requires comparison.
113
 For example, if the Constitution had entrenched 
organisational rights of employees without considering the rights of their adversaries, 
the employers, there would have been discrimination against the latter.
114
 Similarly, 
the rights of the victim should be taken into account and catered for when providing 
for the rights of an offender. Failure to extend the notion of equal treatment to victims 
                                                 
108
  See section 35 and also SALRC (2003) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 at paragraph  
 40.3.1 the Project Committee states that section 35 entrenches a plethora of rights to arrested, 
 detained and accused persons. 
109
   See, for example, Camerer (1999: 1). After discussing the rampant criminality in South  
 Africa, the author states that „ironically, while our Constitution contains two-and-a-half pages 
 on the rights of suspects and the accused, it is silent on the rights of victims of crime‟. 
110
  Camerer (1997: 4) See also Kgosimore (2000) paragraph 2 where the author classifies the 
  Constitution as „offender-friendly‟. 
111
  Kgosimore (2000) paragraph 2. 
112
  See Van Wyk (1994: 196). 
113
  Van Wyk (1994: 196). 
114
  See section 23 of the Constitution and Kgosimore (2002) paragraph 2 for discussion. 
 
 
 
 
   33 
of crime has caused a visible imbalance between the rights of the victim and those of 
the offender. 
 
The need to rectify this imbalance is apparent and is motivated, further, by the fact 
that South Africa is considered to be one of the most violent societies in the world.
115
 
The transition to democracy has been characterised by rising crime levels.
116
 This has 
resulted in the belief that fundamental rights and freedoms facilitate criminal 
conduct.
117
 Meintjies-van der Walt explains that, in some quarters, there is a belief 
that the victimisation being experienced today is a consequence of the new human 
rights order.
118
 The author warns that this is a dangerous fallacy because the very 
essence of human rights demands that the law be respected.
119
 Although academics 
like Meintjies-van der Walt have presented sound legal arguments to counter these 
beliefs, their arguments have not stemmed the growing perception that the criminal 
justice system places undue emphasis on the rights of suspected criminals while 
displaying insufficient concern for the rights of law-abiding people who become 
crime victims.
120
  
 
It is submitted that the constitutional imbalance between the rights of the accused and 
those of the victim can be rectified only by amending the Constitution. The 
                                                 
115
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 157).  
116
  Camerer (1997: 1). At 2 the author explains that the increase in crime in South Africa is  
  consistent with other countries undergoing similar transitions to democracy. 
117
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 158). 
118
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 158). 
119
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 158). 
120
  See Camerer (1997: 2). The author states that „since the enactment of the interim Constitution 
  and the consequent promulgation of the final Constitution, both of which entrenched several 
  procedural rights of detained, arrested and accused persons, there has been the public  
  perception that there is undue emphasis on the rights of suspected criminals‟. See also the 
  SAHRC  (2001: 8). According to SAHRC there is a perception amongst the public that human 
  rights and the criminal justice system favour the criminal at the expense of the victim and by 
  excluding the victim from the criminal justice process, the perception is further enhanced. 
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amendment should provide for the constitutional recognition of procedural rights for 
victims of crime. The need for a constitutional amendment which entrenches the 
rights of victims combined with the enactment of appropriate victim-based legislation 
is patent. In this regard, the proposal recently submitted by Naude to the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) is useful.
121
 According to Naude, victims‟ 
rights which require constitutional recognition include the right to be treated with 
dignity and respect by the criminal justice system, the right to receive protection, 
assistance and treatment, the right of access to information about the criminal 
proceedings, the right to receive restitution and compensation, and the right to submit 
a victim impact statement to court which would draw judicial attention to the harm 
suffered.
122
 It was recommended that the PMG Constitutional Review Committee 
refer the proposal to the relevant Portfolio Committee to consider the appropriate 
amendment.
123
  
 
The African National Congress (ANC) has objected to the proposal. According to the 
ruling party „this is a policy decision and a political matter and not a subject for 
constitutional amendment‟.124 It is difficult to find merit in the ANC‟s objection. 
Firstly, the issue of victims‟ rights cannot be dealt with adequately by policies. 
Policies are effective only if the purpose is to buttress a law or right which is certain. 
Hence, they are a means with which to enforce victims‟ rights and not a means with 
which to establish such rights. Secondly, classifying victims‟ rights as „a political 
matter‟ is absurd. The need for pre-announced, clear and general rights for victims of 
                                                 
121
  See PMG Constitutional Review Committee Minutes of a meeting held on 15 August 2008.   
122
  See PMG Constitutional Review Committee Minutes of a meeting held on 15 August 2008.    
123
  See PMG Constitutional Review Committee Minutes of a meeting held on 15 August 2008. 
 The state‟s legal advisor, Advocate Adhikarie, supported the appeal by recommending that 
 victims‟ rights be under a specific heading and not generally included in the Constitution. 
124
  See PMG Constitutional Review Committee Minutes of a meeting held on 15 August 2008.  
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crime to be enforced in accordance with fair procedures is not a political issue. It is a 
legal issue which requires legislative intervention. It is, therefore, inappropriate to 
classify the issue of victims‟ rights as matters of policy and politics. 
 
For the time being, politicians have succeeded in relegating the issue of constitutional 
rights for crime victims to the political battlefield.
125
 It is apparent that transformation 
in the area of victims‟ rights is dependent on transformation in the political arena. 
Strong leadership and political will are needed to move the issue of victims‟ rights 
from the policy and political sphere to the constitutional and legislative sphere. 
 
2.6 The Service Charter for Victims of Crime and Minimum Standards on 
Services for Victims of Crime  
South Africa‟s international obligations, created by the UN Declaration, combined 
with its need to realise constitutional guarantees, resulted in the adoption of the 
Victims‟ Charter.126 The Charter was adopted in accordance with section 234 of the 
Constitution. In terms of this section Parliament may adopt Charters of Rights 
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution in order to deepen the culture of 
democracy established by the Constitution.  
 
The Charter is a consolidation of rights and services to be provided to victims of 
crime.
127
 It aims to ensure that victims become central to the criminal justice process. 
                                                 
125
  See, for example, the speech delivered by Helen Zille of the Democratic Alliance at the  
 Victims  of Crime Imbizo held in Durban on 2 August 2008 and also the Democratic Alliance 
 (2007) discussion document on the rights of victims of crime in comparison to the ANC‟s 
 approach to victims‟ rights. 
126
  The Victims‟ Charter was signed and accepted by Parliament in November 2004. Countries 
  such as the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Wales, Jamaica, Australia and Hong 
  Kong have adopted similar Charters in compliance with the UN Declaration. 
127
  See the preamble to the Victims‟ Charter. 
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The Charter proposes that this be achieved by eliminating secondary victimisation, 
clarifying the standards of service to be accorded to victims and providing recourse 
when these standards are not met.
128
 It identifies seven rights
129
 which may be 
demanded by victims in their encounter with the criminal justice system, namely:  
 the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for dignity and privacy, 
 the right to offer information, 
 the right to receive information, 
 the right to protection, 
 the right to assistance, 
 the right to compensation, and  
 the right to restitution.130 
 
 
The content of the rights is elaborated in the Minimum Standards on Services for 
Victims of Crime (Minimum Standards).
131
 The Minimum Standards is an 
informational document which not only explains the rights contained in the Charter 
but also facilitates the implementation of the Charter by specifying in detail how the 
state must respond to victims of crime.   
 
2.6.1 Assessing the effectiveness of the Victims’ Charter  
Despite the Charter representing an important aspirational shift in the state‟s approach 
to victims, its effectiveness has been questioned. For example, Artz & Smythe state 
that „the extent to which it will shift entrenched criminal justice attitudes and practices 
is arguable‟. 132  The authors explain that their main reason for being somewhat 
sceptical is that the guidelines contained in the Charter already exist in a range of 
                                                 
128
  See the website of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development for its  
  discussion on the Victims‟ Charter.  
129
  The rights listed in the Victims‟ Charter are identical to those contained in the UN  
  Declaration. See section 2.4 of the text above. 
130
  Articles 1-7 of the Victims‟ Charter. For further discussion see Artz & Smythe (2005: 137) 
  and Hubschle (2007: 2). 
131
  See the website of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development for its  
  discussion on the Minimum Standards on Services for Victims of Crime.  
132
  Artz & Smythe (2005: 137).   
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sector-specific policies and regulations.
133
 They state that „it is unlikely that 
reiteration of these guidelines in the Charter and Minimum Standards document will 
result in increased compliance‟.134  
 
In response to the concern raised by Artz & Smythe, it is submitted that an important 
distinction exists between sector-specific policies and the Charter. Sector-specific 
policies are directed towards justice officialdom, such as the police or prosecution, 
who encounter victims of crime. A sector-specific policy cannot confer rights on 
victims. Instead, it specifies the manner in which victims are to be treated by the 
officials concerned. Although, sector-specific policies may contain guidelines which 
are the same as or similar to the Charter provisions, the Charter is unique because it 
provides the philosophical framework for victims‟ rights.135 It is submitted, therefore, 
that a „reiteration of guidelines‟ has not occurred because the Charter does not contain 
victim treatment guidelines. It contains victims‟ rights.  
 
A more legitimate concern has been raised by the SAHRC. According to the SAHRC, 
to invoke and fully appreciate the nature of their rights, victims would have to gain 
sufficient knowledge of the Charter.
136
 A victim who lacks knowledge of the Charter 
will not demand that the rights contained therein be observed. Thus, the effectiveness 
of the Charter may be questionable where the victim lacks knowledge of his Charter 
rights. 
                                                 
133
  Artz & Smythe (2005: 137). The only sector-specific policy the authors use to support their 
  view is the minimum standards expected from the South African Police Service for  
  investigation of sexual offences contained in the National Instruction No.22/1998, Sexual 
  Offences: Support to Victims and Crucial Aspects of the Investigation. This instrument  
  includes guidelines for investigation of rape cases and treatment of rape victims. It specifies 
  that such victims should be given immediate attention, be treated with respect and courtesy, 
  provided with information and referred to victim services.   
134
  Artz & Smythe (2005: 137). 
135
  See Hubschle (2007: 1).  
136
  SAHRC (2001: 4). 
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It is submitted that the enforcement of victims‟ rights undoubtedly requires victim 
awareness. In addition, consistent implementation at the various stages of criminal 
proceedings is required. However, these factors do not render the Charter ineffective. 
Firstly, in an attempt to facilitate victim awareness it is required that copies of the 
Charter and Minimum Standards be available at institutions likely to encounter 
victims of crime.
137
 Secondly, the victim‟s ability to educate himself about the basic 
rights to which he is entitled should not be underestimated. Insofar as consistent 
implementation of victims‟ rights is concerned, Karmen explains that the more 
victims become aware of their rights and begin to exercise them, the more they will be 
accepted and honoured by the criminal justice system.
138
      
 
2.6.2 Significance of the Victims’ Charter and Minimum Standards  
The Charter and Minimum Standards have been described as South Africa‟s first 
attempt to empower victims by redesigning the criminal justice system.
139
 These 
instruments constitute an important aspirational shift in South African criminal 
procedure because they require the justice system to be responsive to an interest 
which is separate from the „amorphous public interest‟, namely, the interest of the 
victim.
 140
  
 
                                                 
137
  The Victims‟ Charter lists the following institutions: Courts, Offices of the Department of 
 Correctional Services, Offices of the Directors of Public Prosecutions, Prisons, Police Stations 
 and Investigation Units, Offices of Social Services or agencies, Offices of the Metropolitan 
 Police Service and Public Health Facilities. 
138
  Karmen (1994: 330). Karmen adds that this will encourage victims and their allies to raise 
 new demands for further rights. 
139
  See paragraph 1 of the Victims‟ Charter Consultative Draft.   
140
  See Goldstein (1984: 247) who opines that effective victim-orientated legislation requires the 
  prosecutors and judges to be responsive to an interest now being separated from the  
  amorphous public interest and deserving special consideration. It is submitted that the  
  Victims‟ Charter and Minimum Standards comply with the legislative profile envisioned by 
  Goldstein. 
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The Charter is particularly significant because the rights contained therein are 
justiciable.
141
 Victims, therefore, are able to enforce these rights to combat secondary 
victimisation which may result from their encounter with the criminal justice system. 
If used optimally, the Charter not only provides recognition to the role of victims in 
the criminal justice system, but also allows the victim to play a more meaningful role 
in the prosecution of crime. The latter may be achieved where the victim, for example, 
invokes his rights to offer and receive information. In addition, both the Charter and 
Minimum Standards are weighty instruments because they provide a definite measure 
against which to test existing and future legislation. More specifically, these 
instruments, arguably, provide the only standard by which to assess critically the role 
of victims in section 105A agreements.   
 
The Charter and Minimum Standards may be classified, therefore, as significant 
documents. However, this does not necessarily mean that they offer sufficient 
protection to and recognition of victims‟ rights. The legislature should not become 
complacent in the field of victims‟ rights. Although these documents are encouraging, 
they would be more meaningful and carry more weight if victims‟ rights were 
reflected in the Constitution and if the purpose of the Charter and Minimum Standards 
were to protect the victim‟s constitutional rights.142 
 
 
 
                                                 
141
  This is apparent because, firstly, the Victims‟ Charter repeatedly advises victims that they are 
  entitled to exercise the rights contained in the Charter. Secondly, it provides that where the 
  victim‟s rights have not been observed he may appoint a lawyer of his choice and at his own 
  expense. These are indications that the rights contained in the Charter are capable of  
  enforcement. See also Hubschle (2007: 3) who explains that the Charter seeks to advise  
  victims of the recourse available when their rights are not observed.  
142
  See, for example, Kgosimore (2002) paragraph 2. 
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2.7  Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a basic introduction to the victims‟ right movement in 
South Africa by analysing the origin of the movement. It has accredited the TRC with 
raising the rights of victims from a secondary consideration to the forefront of the 
criminal justice system.  
 
This study accepts that the Constitution does not contain a dedicated constitutional 
provision for victims of crime. The absence of such provision has caused some to 
identify existing provisions from which constitutional rights of victims may be 
extrapolated. In this regard, it was submitted that a more meaningful approach to 
constitutional rights for victims requires a clear expression of such rights; that the 
Constitution be amended to provide for constitutionally recognised procedural rights 
for victims of crime; and that such amendment is necessary to uphold the principle of 
equality and remedy the noticeable imbalance between the rights of victims and the 
rights of offenders.  
 
The legal platform provided by the general provisions of the South African 
Constitution, combined with the obligations created by the UN Declaration, resulted 
in the South African government adopting a Victims‟ Charter. An analysis of the 
Charter and the accompanying Minimum Standards document reveals that these 
instruments constitute an important aspirational shift in South African criminal justice. 
However, a constitutional amendment is encouraged still because these instruments 
would be more meaningful if their purpose were to protect the victim‟s constitutional 
rights. 
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Whereas the Victims‟ Charter does not provide adequate recognition of and protection 
to victims‟ rights, it does constitute a basic standard against which to assess whether 
section 105A of the CPA provides adequate recognition to the rights of victims in 
negotiated justice. However, this assessment needs to be preceded by a consideration 
of the development and operation of plea and sentence agreements in the South 
African criminal justice system. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF PLEA AND SENTENCE 
AGREEMENTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences with an assessment of the informal plea agreement system. 
In this regard, the categories of informal plea agreements and recognition of this form 
of negotiated justice are discussed. This is followed by a detailed account of the 
recommendations made by the SALRC in which it proposes codification of sentence 
agreements. Thereafter, section 105A of the CPA, which provides statutory 
recognition to both plea and sentence agreements, is introduced.  
 
The procedural regime of the statutory enactment may be divided into two stages: 
firstly, the negotiation procedure; secondly, judicial scrutiny and approval of the 
agreement. At the negotiation stage the reader‟s attention is drawn to the procedure 
prescribed by section 105A and the Directives issued by the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions (NDPP) which supplement this procedure. The judicial scrutiny 
stage examines the role of the presiding officer. The chapter concludes with 
discussions of the differences between informal negotiated justice and statutory 
negotiated justice, as well as the controversy surrounding these forms of negotiation.   
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3.2 Informal plea agreements 
3.2.1 Categories of informal plea agreements 
There are various categories of informal plea agreements. The most common is where 
the prosecutor and accused negotiate a guilty plea to an offence which may be a 
competent verdict for the offence charged or an alternative charge.
1
 Thus, an accused 
charged with murder may offer a plea of guilty to culpable homicide.
2
 Alternatively, 
the accused may offer a guilty plea to the main charge but on a different basis to that 
alleged by the state. An example would be where an accused charged with murder 
committed with dolus directus offers a plea of guilty on the basis of dolus eventualis 
instead.
3
 Here the agreement is aimed at reducing the moral blameworthiness of the 
accused. A reduction in moral blameworthiness would serve as a mitigating factor 
when the court considers the sentence to impose.
4
  
 
A further category of informal plea agreements may find application where there are 
two or more co-accused. Where there are two co-accused, an agreement could be 
reached wherein one of the accused agrees to plead guilty in return for the withdrawal 
of the charge against the other.
5
 The prosecution would be inclined to conclude such 
an agreement when there is doubt as to the guilt of one accused but the other is 
undoubtedly guilty.
6
 
                                                 
1
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 199). The authors use the term „traditional plea bargaining‟ 
 to denote informal plea agreements. 
2
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 199).  
3
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 199).  
4
  See North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) 1999 (2) SACR 
 669 (C) at 673 paragraph d. 
5
  Supra at 673 paragraph j. 
6
  Supra at 674 paragraph a. 
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In all categories of informal plea agreements the prosecutor and the accused reach an 
agreement on the facts to be placed before the court. This is aimed at justifying a 
conviction on the basis agreed to by the parties.
7
 
 
3.2.2 Recognition of informal plea agreements 
In the decade or so which preceded the enactment of section 105A, authors analysed, 
criticised and some categorically denied the existence of informal plea agreements.
8
 
The uncertainty surrounding the legality of these agreements resulted in most 
commentators regarding the practice with disfavour.
9
 However, the SALRC, as part of 
its investigation into the simplification of criminal procedure, concluded that plea 
negotiations and agreements, however informal, do take place in South Africa and are 
considered legal.
10
 At this stage of its investigation the SALRC recommended that 
these agreements be regulated by legislation.
11
 
 
3.2.3 Judicial recognition 
Subsequent to the SALRC investigation, judicial recognition was afforded to informal 
plea agreements in the case of North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v 
Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape).
12
  In this case the first applicant (a 
close corporation) and the second applicant (a member of the close corporation), as 
well as one Mostert (the production manager of the close corporation), had been 
charged in the regional court.
13
 The applicants where charged with culpable homicide 
                                                 
7
  Supra at 673 paragraph h. 
8
  For analysis see Bekker (1996: 222). For criticism see Clarke (1996: 141). For denial see  
 Trichardt & Krull (1987: 444). 
9
  See Kriegler & Stafford (1993: 259). 
10
   SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 at paragraph 5.7. See also SALRC (2001) 
 Project 73: Fourth Interim Report at paragraph 5.1. 
11
  See SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report at paragraph 5.1. 
12
  North Western Dense Concrete CC  and Another v DPP (Western Cape) at 673 paragraph h. 
13
  Supra at 671 paragraph c. 
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as well as further substantive and alternative charges, while Mostert was arraigned on 
a charge of culpable homicide only.
14
 The legal representative of the applicants 
advised the prosecutor that Mostert would plead guilty to culpable homicide if the 
respondent agreed to withdraw all the charges against them.
15
 The prosecutor, after 
having being authorised to do so by the respondent, accepted the deal and Mostert 
was duly convicted.
16
 Then an undisclosed third party applied to the respondent for a 
certificate nolle prosequi.
17
 The respondent considered the application but decided 
instead to reinstitute the charges against the applicants.
18
 In response to this, the 
applicants sought an order directing that the respondent abide by the terms of the plea 
agreement, as well as an order interdicting the respondent from proceeding with the 
prosecution against them.
19
 
 
In this landmark decision, Uijs AJ stated that he was not „filled with joy‟ at the 
prospect of being the first South African judicial officer to acknowledge that plea 
bargaining is an integral part of criminal justice in South Africa.
20
 According to the 
court, the process of negotiating a plea takes place daily and at every level of the 
criminal justice system.
21
 The court concluded that plea negotiations are entrenched in 
South African law, to the extent that the criminal justice system would probably break 
down if the procedure were not followed because of judicial disapproval.
22
 It was held, 
further, that a basic rule of the procedure was that the state abides by the undertaking 
                                                 
14
  Supra at 671 paragraph f. 
15
  Supra at 671-672 paragraphs i-a.  
16
  Supra at 672 paragraphs b-d. 
17
  Supra at 672 paragraph d. 
18
  Supra at 672 paragraphs e. 
19
  Supra at 672 paragraphs f-g. 
20
  Supra at 683 paragraph f. 
21
  Supra at 674 paragraph e. 
22
  Supra at 676 paragraph f and 678 paragraph c. 
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given during negotiations leading to the plea agreement.
23
 The court, accordingly, 
granted the orders sought by the applicants. 
 
It should be noted that the court disagreed with the SALRC finding that legislation 
was needed to regulate informal plea agreements.
24
 Instead, the court held that section 
112 of the CPA is „virtually tailor-made for such agreements‟.25 In terms of section 
112(2), an accused may submit a written statement to the court wherein he sets out the 
facts on which he bases his guilty plea. The subsection further provides that the court 
may then convict the accused on the strength of this statement. Section 112(3) makes 
provision for evidence to be led or a statement to be made with regard to sentencing. 
At this stage, the prosecutor and defence could recommend the sentence they consider 
just. This recommendation would form part of the agreement concluded between the 
parties. According to Uijs AJ, these provisions, combined with the constitutional law 
of South Africa, adequately regulated informal plea agreements.
26
  
 
Despite disagreeing with the SALRC recommendation, it is probable that the North 
Western Dense decision motivated the finalisation of section 105A.
27
 Notwithstanding 
the decision by Uijs AJ, uncertainty as to the legality of this form of negotiated justice 
still prevailed.
28
 The problem with the judgment in North Western Dense is that 
section 112 regulates guilty pleas and not plea agreements. To say that a plea 
agreement may be regulated by procedural rules which govern guilty pleas is to deny 
                                                 
23
  Supra at 670 paragraphs f-g. 
24
  Supra at 677 paragraph f. See section 2.2.2 above for the initial recommendation made by 
 the SALRC. 
25
  Supra at 677 paragraph c. 
26
  Supra at 677 paragraph f. 
27
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-6). 
28
  Scholars such as Burchell (2005:16) and De Villers (2004: 255) continue to question the  
 legality of plea and sentence agreements. 
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the true nature of this type of agreement. It denies the existence of negotiations and 
concessions made by the state and the accused which preceded and, in most cases, 
motivated the guilty plea. In addition, it is submitted that the agreement in North 
Western Dense would not have been the subject of judicial scrutiny were it not for the 
state attempting to renege on its undertaking. In other words, the fact that Mostert‟s 
guilty plea was the result of a plea negotiation would never have formed part of the 
official court record if the state had upheld its undertaking. Thus, section 112 clearly 
fails to provide transparency and hence legal certainty to the practice of informal plea 
agreements. 
 
3.3 The SALRC recommendation  
In its report on the simplification of criminal procedure, the SALRC, noticeably 
influenced by the North Western Dense decision, found that informal plea agreements 
were sufficiently provided for in the CPA.
29
 According to the SALRC, these 
agreements „did not require regulation since there is no evidence of abuse of these 
provisions‟.30 However, perhaps there was no record of abuse because the practice 
was not regulated. The negotiating parties were under no obligation to disclose that an 
informal plea agreement had been concluded, much less the manner in which such 
agreement had been reached. It is difficult, therefore, to establish a source of the 
supposed lack of „evidence of abuse‟ referred to by the SALRC.   
 
                                                 
29
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.15. The SALRC had initially 
 recommended that informal plea agreements be regulated by legislation (see section 2.2.2 of 
 the text above). Subsequent to the North Western Dense case, the SALRC revised its initial 
 recommendation.   
30
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.15. The „provisions‟ referred 
 to by the SALRC are undoubtedly those contained in section 112 of the CPA.  
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On the basis of its conclusion, the SALRC limited its study to sentence agreements.
31
 
It identified and considered two types of such agreements.
32
 In the first type, the 
prosecutor undertakes to recommend a specific sentence to the court, or agrees not to 
oppose the proposal of the defence.
33
 The SALRC stated that this type of agreement is 
known in our law and, because it did not require any particular action from the court, 
it did not require regulation.
34
 The court could implement or ignore the agreement, 
and the accused would be sentenced accordingly. It is submitted that this type of 
agreement generally accompanies an informal plea agreement and is made possible by 
section 112(3), as explained above.
35
 The second type of sentence agreement 
identified by the SALRC could not be negotiated in accordance with the informal plea 
agreement system.
36
 With this type of agreement the accused pleads guilty on 
condition that an agreed sentence is imposed by the court.
37
 The SALRC 
recommended that the legality of these agreements should be confirmed and regulated 
by legislation.
38
  
 
The recommendations made by the SALRC for codification of sentence agreements 
played a significant role in the drafting of section 105A.
39
 Ultimately, most of the 
recommendations were incorporated into section 105A.
40
   
                                                 
31
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.15. 
32
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.16. 
33
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.15. See section 2.2.3 of the 
 text above. 
34
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.17. 
35
  See section 2.2.3 of the text above. 
36
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.17 and further SALRC (2001) 
 Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 5.15. 
37
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.17   
38
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 5.17. 
39
  See appendix B below for the SALRC recommendations. 
40
  See, for example, De Villiers (2004: 244) where the author confirms that the   
 recommendations contained in the SALRC Fourth Interim Report found their way into section 
 105A. A comparison between Appendix A and B demonstrates that recommendations (m) and 
 (i) were the only ones omitted from section 105A.  
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3.4 Section 105A: statutory plea and sentence agreements  
The enactment of section 105A, on 14 December 2001, resolved the uncertainty 
surrounding the legality of plea and sentence agreements in South Africa. In terms of 
section 105A(1)(a), a prosecutor, authorised thereto in writing by the NDPP, and a 
legally represented accused may negotiate and conclude a plea and sentence 
agreement. However, the agreement must be concluded before the accused is asked to 
plead.
41
 In the plea component of the agreement the accused must agree to plead 
guilty to the offence charged or any offence which may be a competent verdict for the 
charge.
42
 The sentence agreement must be in respect of at least one of the following: 
the sentence to be imposed by the court, the postponement of sentencing, or a 
sentence which is suspended in whole or in part.
43
 Where applicable, it may also be 
agreed that an award for compensation accompanies one of the aforementioned 
sentences.
44
 
 
In the explanation below, section 105A is divided into two broad categories, namely, 
the negotiation procedure and judicial scrutiny and approval of the agreement.  
 
3.4.1 The negotiation procedure  
There are formal requirements which must be met before a plea or sentence 
agreement may be concluded. These requirements are contained in section 105A and 
in the Directives issued by the NDPP in accordance with section 105A(11).  
 
                                                 
41
  Section 105A(1)(a). 
42
  Section 105A(1)(a)(i) and Du Toit et al (2006: 15-8) for their commentary on this provision. 
43
  Section 105A(1)(a)(ii) and further Du Toit et al (2006: 15-8). 
44
  See section 105A(1)(a)(ii), where the use of the word „and‟ indicates that an award for  
 compensation, as provided for in section 300 of the CPA, can only be an accompaniment to 
 the other sentences listed in the subsection. See also Du Toit et al (2006: 15-8).   
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3.4.1.1 The requirements contained in section 105A  
Most of the requirements contained in section 105A place duties on the prosecutor. 
However, there are certain requirements which must be fulfilled by both the 
prosecutor and the legal representative of the accused.  
 
3.4.1.1.1 Duties of the prosecutor  
Section 105A(1)(b)(i) requires that the prosecutor consult with the investigating 
officer before concluding an agreement.
45
 In Commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act, the authors state that this pre-agreement consultation ensures that the prosecutor 
makes an informed decision with regard to the desirability and necessity of 
concluding a plea and sentence agreement.
46
 Furthermore, they view this requirement 
as a means to ensure that members of the police services do not gain the impression 
that the results of their investigative efforts can be ignored by the prosecution for the 
sole purpose of avoiding a trial.
47
 However, in terms of section 105A(1)(c) the pre-
agreement consultation may be dispensed with if the prosecutor is satisfied that the 
consultation would not only delay the proceedings, causing substantial prejudice to 
the prosecution, accused, complainant or his representative, but also adversely affect 
the administration of justice. The prosecutor exercises discretion in determining 
whether the envisaged consequences would result. However, this discretion is not 
unfettered. Section 105A(4) renders the decision to dispense with a pre-agreement 
consultation subject to judicial scrutiny.
48
 
 
                                                 
45
  Section 105A(1)(a) & (b)(i).  
46
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-10).  
47
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-10). The authors state that this requirement is not meant to blur the 
 distinction between the duties of those who investigate crime and those who must decide  
 whether to prosecute or not. The purpose of a pre-agreement consultation is to provide a  
 subtle form of „internal accountability‟ between the parties.  
48
  See section 3.4.2 of the text below for discussion. 
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The second requirement to be fulfilled by the prosecutor is contained in section 
105A(1)(b)(ii). In terms of this subsection, the prosecutor, before entering into an 
agreement, must take into account the nature of and circumstances relating to the 
offence, the personal circumstances of the accused, the previous convictions of the 
accused, if any, and the interests of the community. According to Du Toit et al, the 
fact that this provision is couched in fairly wide terms is entirely acceptable because 
prosecutorial discretion and not legislative prescriptions should govern the decision to 
conclude the agreement.
49
 Also, an established principle in our law is that the 
prosecutor has discretion in deciding whether or not to accept a guilty plea on the 
main, alternative or competent charge.
50
 This discretion extends to the decision to 
enter into plea and sentence negotiations.
51
 It is submitted, therefore, that although the 
factors contained in section 105A(1)(b)(ii) may guide the prosecutor in determining 
whether to conclude the agreement, they do not constitute a numerus clausus. The 
strengths or weaknesses of the prosecution‟s case or the risk that certain evidence 
might be excluded by the trial court, for example, may be decisive factors in the 
decision to enter into negotiations.
52
      
 
In addition to the above, section 105A(1)(b)(iii) provides that, where the 
circumstances permit, the prosecutor should afford the complainant the opportunity to 
make representations regarding the contents of the agreement and the inclusion of a 
compensation order.
53
 This requirement is qualified by the words „where it is 
                                                 
49
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-11). In support of their view the authors cite S v Esterhuizen 2005 (1) 
 SACR 490 (T) at 494 paragraphs c-h, where the court concluded that the prosecuting authority 
 needs a fair measure of latitude in order to negotiate and reach plea and sentence agreements.  
50
  See North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) at 676-677  
 paragraphs j-d and further Du Toit et al (2006: 15-11). 
51
  See further directive 4 of the Directives issued by the NDPP on 14 March 2002 in accordance 
 with section 105A(11) which confirms this principle . 
52
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-11). 
53
  Section 105A(1)(b)(iii). See further Appendix B, recommendation (k).    
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reasonable to do so and taking into account the nature of and circumstances relating to 
the offence and the interests of the complainant‟. 54  Although the prosecutor 
determines whether victim participation would be reasonable, his decision to exclude 
the victim from negotiations is subject to judicial scrutiny.
55
  
 
3.4.1.1.2 Combined duties 
In terms of section 105A(2) the accused, before entering into the agreement,  must be 
informed that he has the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to be 
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence.
56
 By entering into an agreement the 
accused waives these rights and a right can be waived only if the holder knows and 
understands what he is waiving.
57
 Thus, by requiring that the accused be informed of 
his rights, the legislature sought to ensure that plea and sentence agreements are not 
attained at the expense of the constitutional rights of the accused.
58
 However, the 
provision fails to indicate whether the prosecutor or legal representative of the 
accused is responsible for ensuring that the accused is informed of his rights before 
entering into the agreement. 
 
According to Du Toit et al, the legal representative of the accused is primarily 
responsible for ensuring that his client has been informed of his constitutional rights.
59
 
                                                 
54
  Du Toit et al (2006:15-12). 
55
  See section 105A(4)(a)(ii) and section 3.4.2 below for discussion. 
56
  Section 105A(2)(a).  
57
  See Schwikkard & van der Merwe (2002: 222-223). According to the authors, although the 
 decision of the accused to waive the exercise of his rights must be an informed one, he need 
 not be aware of all the factual details or all the details of the charge. The emphasis should be 
 on the reality of the total situation having an impact on the accused‟s understanding and  
 appreciation. It is submitted that the „reality‟ which must be explained to an accused in the 
 context of negotiated justice is that by entering into the agreement he relinquishes his right to 
 go to trial and offers full disclosure in exchange for leniency.   
58
    Du Toit et al (2006: 15-13). These rights are contained in section 35(3)(h) & (j) of the  
 Constitution of South Africa. 
59
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-13).  
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Yet, they submit that while the prosecutor is under no duty to inform the accused of 
these rights, a prosecutor should not sign the agreement unless he has been given an 
assurance by the accused‟s legal representative that these rights have been explained 
to the accused.
60
 It should be added that, in order to avoid judicial disapproval of the 
agreement, it would be in the state‟s best interest to ensure that the accused is aware 
of his constitutional rights before the agreement is finalised.  
 
Section 105A(2) also requires that the agreement be in writing and be signed by the 
prosecutor, the accused and his legal representative.
61
 In addition, the terms of the 
agreement should be established and stated in the agreement.
62
 In this regard, the 
substantial facts on which the plea is based and all other facts relevant to the sentence 
agreement, as well as any admissions made by the accused, must be determined 
between the parties and included in the agreement.
63
 This is regarded as a crucial 
requirement because the purpose of negotiated justice is to circumvent a conventional 
trial, and in order to do this sufficient information must be placed before the court to 
secure judicial approval of the negotiated plea and sentence.
64
 
 
3.4.1.2 The Directives issued by the NDPP 
In addition to the requirements prescribed by section 105A, the prosecutor must 
comply with the directives issued by the NDPP in accordance with section 105A(11), 
which provide that:  
The National Director of Public Prosecutions, in consultation with the 
Minister, shall issue directives regarding all matters which are reasonably 
necessary or expedient to be prescribed in order to achieve the objects of this 
                                                 
60
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-13).  
61
  Section 105A(2)(c). 
62
  Section 105A(2)(b). 
63
  See section 105A(2)(b). 
64
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-14).  
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section and any directive so issued shall be observed in the application of this 
section. 
 
The directives referred to above were issued by the NDPP on 14 March 2002.
65
 The 
use of the words „any directive so issued shall be observed‟ permits the reasonable 
inference that non-compliance with the directives may render an agreement 
defective.
66
   
 
The need for the directives is apparent. As far as the negotiation between the 
prosecutor and defence counsel is concerned, section 105A is non-prescriptive with 
regard to the types of offences which may be negotiated and the manner in which 
these negotiations are to be initiated.
67
 The directives therefore supplement the 
procedure prescribed by section 105A by regulating its application. In this regard, 
directive 2 contains the first form of clarification. It provides that:  
Section 105A is to be utilized for those matters of some substance, the 
disposal of which will actually serve the purpose of decongesting or reducing 
the court rolls without sacrificing the demands of justice and/or the public 
interest. 
 
 
The fact that section 105A may be utilised only when a matter is of „some substance‟ 
means that the nature of the offence determines the eligibility of an accused to 
negotiate an agreement. However, neither section 105A nor the directives issued by 
the NDPP provide a closed list of offences which may or may not be negotiated. It is 
submitted, therefore, that the determination of whether a matter is of „some substance‟ 
                                                 
65
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-24). See also De Villers (2004: 244). The first draft had to be  
 submitted to Parliament within four months of the commencement of section 105A. 
66
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-22). 
67
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-7). 
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and thus capable of being negotiated is left to the discretion of the prosecuting 
authority.
68
 
            
Directive 17 makes provision for the manner in which section 105A negotiations are 
to be initiated. The directive reads:  
Where it is clear that a legal representative of an accused has expressed a firm 
intention to enter into formal negotiations with a view to a s105A agreement, the 
prosecutor must request a written offer to negotiate (which shall include the 
accused‟s proposals) be submitted to him/her at least 14 days before the intended 
trial date. Where the decision to prosecute is that of a Senior Public Prosecutor, the 
written offer is to be submitted to that Prosecutor and the period for submissions 
may be lengthened particularly where the Senior Public Prosecutor is at a centre 
removed from the court. 
 
  
The discussion prompted by this directive pertains to the distinction between formal 
and informal negotiations. On a strict interpretation of directive 17, it would appear 
that the legal representative of the accused, as opposed to the prosecution, must 
initiate formal negotiations by submitting a written request to negotiate. This 
interpretation is supported by section 105A(1)(a), as well as by directives 5, 6 and 7.  
In terms of section 105A(1)(a) a prosecutor may enter into plea and sentence 
negotiations if he has obtained the written authority of the NDPP.
69
 It is submitted 
that for the prosecutor to obtain such authority he will be required to produce the 
                                                 
68
   This submission is supported by directive 4 which provides that the established principle, in 
 terms of which it is within the discretion of the prosecutor to decide whether or not to consider 
 accepting a plea of guilty on the main, alternative or competent charge, applies.  
69
  See De Villiers (2004: 245) who states that the NDPP has to date afforded all the directors, 
 deputy directors and certain chief and senior prosecutors the authority to negotiate. See also 
 S v Sassin 2003 4 All SA 506 (NC) at paragraph 10 where the court held that proof of the  
 prosecutor‟s authority to negotiate and enter into an agreement with the accused was an  
 essential pre-requisite in terms of section 105A(1)(a). The prosecutor then tended a  
 certificate from the NDPP which confirmed that he had been authorised to negotiate and  
 conclude the agreement. However, see Watney (2006 :225) who argues that, although section 
 105A(1)(a) clearly stipulates that a prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the NDPP may 
 conclude a plea and sentence agreement, the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta donec 
 probetur in contrarium (presumption of regularity) operates in favour of the prosecutor. He 
 argues that the court‟s interpretation in S v Sassin is unnecessarily strict and submits that it is 
 unnecessary for the prosecutor to prove the delegated authority to a court as prerequisite for 
 the prosecutor to participate in the agreement. 
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written offer to negotiate. In addition, directive 5 specifies that the prosecutor must 
refer a written offer to negotiate to the senior prosecutor. Directives 6 and 7 further 
provide that unless authorisation has been obtained from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP), section 105A cannot be applied where the accused has a previous 
conviction, or where the DPP has instructed that the accused be prosecuted. As 
authorisation can be sought only after the defence submits a request to negotiate, it 
follows that formal negotiations can be initiated only by the defence.  
 
Yet, in Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act the authors opine that „the 
prosecutor or the legal representative of the accused may initiate the process of 
negotiation‟.70 They also state that „in practice much will depend upon each party‟s 
assessment of the probable outcome of the case and the bargaining power available to 
him‟.71 Although this appears to contradict a strict interpretation of directive 17, it is 
important to note that the authors are actually referring to initiating informal 
negotiations. This is clarified toward the end of their discussion where they state that 
„once initial and tentative discussions have taken place and the defence has expressed 
an interest, directive 17 should be followed‟.72 From this statement it can be inferred 
that informal negotiations usually precede formal negotiations. It can be inferred also 
that nothing prevents a prosecutor from initiating informal negotiations with the aim 
of concluding a section 105A agreement. However, the effect of directive 17 means 
that undertakings made during informal negotiations cannot bind the state until the 
defence requests that formal negotiations commence. If the NDPP or his authorised 
agents refuse the request, the state would not be bound by the undertakings made by 
the prosecutor during the informal negotiations.  
                                                 
70
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-8). Original emphasis. 
71
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-9). 
72
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-9).  
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It is submitted, therefore, that formal negotiations, aimed at concluding a section 
105A agreement, can be initiated only by the defence, whereas informal negotiations 
may be initiated by either the prosecutor or the defence. This approach complies with 
the intended purpose of the directives, namely, to ensure that the office of the NDPP 
and DPP maintains a measure of control over statutory agreements.  
 
3.4.2 Judicial scrutiny and approval of section 105A agreements 
The court does not control or participate in the negotiations.
73
 According to the 
SALRC, such participation would be difficult to reconcile with the court‟s role as an 
impartial adjudicator because it could create the impression that the judicial officer, as 
a person in a position of authority, is exerting undue influence to exact a guilty plea.
74
 
However, judicial scrutiny and approval of the agreement concluded are required.
75
 
The duties of the presiding officer may be divided into three stages, namely, 
verification before plea, consideration of the plea agreement and consideration of the 
sentence agreement.
76
   
 
3.4.2.1 Verification before plea 
Before the accused is required to plead, the prosecutor must inform the court that a 
written agreement has been negotiated.
77
 The court is required then to verify two 
aspects of the agreement. Firstly, the court must ask the accused to confirm that such 
an agreement indeed has been concluded.
78
 Secondly, it must satisfy itself that the 
                                                 
73
  Section 105A(3). See further Du Toit et al (2006: 15- 6) and further Appendix B,  
 recommendation (l).  
74
  SALRC Discussion Paper 94 paragraph 4.8. 
75
  See section 105A(4) – (8).  
76
  See, for example, De Villiers (2004: 248). 
77
  Section 105A(4)(a). See further appendix B, recommendation (a). 
78
    Section 105A(4)(a)(i). 
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prosecutor has consulted with the investigating officer and, where it was reasonable to 
do so, has heard representations from the complainant.
79
  
 
The second verification requires consideration. As explained in section 3.4.1.1.1 
above, the prosecutor may enter into the plea and sentence agreement only after he 
has consulted the investigating officer.
80
 However, section 105A(1)(c) provides that 
the pre-agreement consultation may be dispensed with if the prosecutor is satisfied 
that the consultation would not only delay the proceedings, resulting in substantial 
prejudice to the prosecution, accused, complainant or the latter‟s representative, but  
also would affect adversely the administration of justice. According to Du Toit et al, it 
would seem that the pre-agreement consultation may be dispensed with if the 
prosecutor alone is satisfied that such a consultation would result in the envisaged 
consequences.
81
 However, the authors quickly reject this interpretation.
82
 In their view 
the fact that the prosecutor was satisfied that he had grounds for dispensing with a 
pre-agreement consultation cannot relieve the court of its duty to satisfy itself that the 
requirements of section 105A(1)(b)(i) have been met.
83
 In this regard, Du Toit et al 
submit that the court should satisfy itself that the prosecutor has advanced adequate 
grounds for dispensing with the pre-agreement consultation.
84
  
 
It is submitted that this approach should extend also to the prosecutor‟s consulting the 
victim. Even though section 105A(1)(b)(iii) requires that the prosecutor determine 
                                                 
79
    Section 105A(4)(a)(ii) provides that the court shall satisfy itself of compliance with the  
 requirements of subsection (1)(b)(i) and (iii) have been complied with. See further De Villiers 
 (2004: 248). 
80
  Section 105A(1)(b)(i).   
81
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-10). 
82
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-10). The authors opine that, as a rule, a prosecutor must consult the 
 investigating officer. 
83
   Du Toit et al (2006: 15-10).    
84
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-10).  
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whether it is reasonable to allow victim participation this cannot relieve the court of 
its section 105A(4) duty in respect of the victim. The court must determine, therefore, 
whether the prosecutor had adequate grounds for excluding victim participation.  
   
If the court is not satisfied that the agreement complies with the requirements of 
sections 105A(1)(b)(i) and (iii), the court must inform the prosecutor and the accused 
of the reasons for its finding.
85
 The parties will then be allowed an opportunity to 
comply with the requirements.
86
 If, however, the court is satisfied that the agreement 
complies with the requirements, the court will require the accused to plead and order 
that the contents of the agreement be disclosed.
87
  
 
3.4.2.2 Judicial scrutiny of the plea agreement 
Once the accused has entered his guilty plea and the contents of the agreement have 
been disclosed, the court must question the accused to ascertain whether he confirms 
the terms of the agreement and the admissions he has made therein.
88
 With regard to 
the recorded facts of the case, the court must establish from the accused whether he 
admits the allegations in the charge to which he has agreed to plead guilty.
89
 
Thereafter, the court will require the accused to confirm that the agreement was 
entered into freely and voluntarily.
90
  
 
If, after this inquiry, the court is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence 
in respect of which the agreement was reached, the court must record a plea of not 
                                                 
85
  Section 105A(4)(b)(i). 
86
  Section 105A(4)(b)(ii). 
87
  Section 105A(5).  
88
  Section 105A(6)(a)(i). 
89
  Section 105A(6)(a)(ii). 
90
  Section 105A(6). See further Appendix B, recommendation (e). 
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guilty and the trial will begin de novo before a different presiding officer.
91
 However, 
if the court is satisfied with the plea agreement, it will proceed to consider the 
sentence agreement.
92
 It should be noted that the court will not convict the accused 
until it has scrutinised the sentence agreement. A formal conviction of the accused can 
follow only if the court is satisfied with the sentence agreement.
93
  
 
3.4.2.3 Judicial scrutiny of the sentence agreement 
When considering the sentence agreement, the court may hear evidence, direct 
relevant questions to both the prosecutor and accused, and accept a statement from the 
accused or complainant. 
94
 Where applicable, the court must have due regard to the 
minimum penalty prescribed for the offence.
95
  
 
If the court is satisfied that the sentence agreement is just, the accused will be found 
guilty and the agreed sentence imposed.
96
 However, where the court is of the opinion 
that the sentence agreement is unjust, the prosecutor and accused must be informed of 
the sentence which the court considers just.
97
 It should be noted that the court may 
regard a sentence as unjust because it is too harsh or too lenient. Where the court has 
decided that it will impose a different sentence it must first inform the parties 
thereof.
98
 If the parties accept the sentence which the court intends to impose, the 
court must convict the accused and impose the sentence. Alternatively, either party 
                                                 
91
  Section 105A(6)(c).  
92
  Section 105A(7). 
93
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-17). 
94
  Section 105A(7)(b)(i). See further De Villiers (2004: 249). 
95
  Section 105A(7)(b)(ii). 
96
  Section 105A(7) and (8). See further Appendix B, recommendation (h). 
97
  Section 105A(9)(a).  
98
  See Appendix B. This demonstrates the rejection of SALRC recommendation (i) which  
 provides that if the court is of the view that it would have imposed a lesser sentence (emphasis 
 added) than the agreed sentence then it may impose the lesser sentence.  
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may reject the court‟s proposed sentence and withdraw from the agreement, in which 
event the trial will start de novo before a different presiding officer.
99
  
 
When a trial is set to start de novo, section 105A dictates that the parties may not enter 
into a plea and sentence agreement in respect of a charge arising out of the same 
facts.
100
 However, it must be noted that once an attempt to conclude a statutory 
agreement has failed, the parties are not prevented from concluding an informal plea 
agreement in respect of the same charge.
101
 In accordance with the rules of 
interpretation, it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to alter the common 
law.
102
 Thus, where an enactment does not explicitly provide for its repeal, it is 
assumed that the common law remains intact.
103
 As the Criminal Procedure Second 
Amendment Act
104
 does not expressly provide for the repeal of informal plea 
agreements, it would be reasonable to conclude, and it is therefore submitted, that two 
independent systems of negotiated justice exist in South African criminal procedure, 
namely, informal plea agreements and statutory plea and sentence agreements. 
 
3.5 The effect of judicial non-compliance  
Compliance with the provisions of section 105A is required from the negotiating 
parties as well as the presiding officer. While the consequences of non-compliance by 
negotiating parties are provided for in the section, it is silent about judicial non-
compliance.
105
    
                                                 
99
  Section 105A(9)(b), (c) and (d). See further Appendix B, recommendation (j). 
100
  Section 105A(10)(b). 
101
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 199). See also Anderson (2005: 28-29).  
102
  De Ville (2000: 170-172). 
103
  De Ville (2000: 171). 
104
   Section 105A was inserted into the CPA by section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Second  
 Amendment Act 62 of 2001. 
105
  See section 105A(4) for the consequences of non-compliance by the negotiating parties and 
 section 3.4.2.1 above for discussion. Of the SALRC recommendations contained in  
 Appendix B, recommendation (m), which specified that the offender should have a right of 
 review as opposed to a right of appeal, was not incorporated into section 105A.     
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In the Solomans case the Cape High Court considered the effect of judicial non-
compliance.
106
 The court stated that the plea bargaining regime constitutes a 
fundamental departure from the adversarial system and, as a result, the legislature 
sought to make the provisions of section 105A peremptory.
107
 From the record of the 
proceedings, the High Court detected three irregularities which raised questions as to 
the overall legality of the proceedings in the lower court.
108
 The first irregularity was 
that the admissions made by the accused constituted a repetition of the allegations 
contained in the charge, whereas according to the court, section 105A(6)(a)(ii) 
requires the accused to confirm the facts upon which those admissions are based.
109
 
All the elements of the crime must be admitted in the facts presented by the accused 
so that the court may draw the conclusion that the accused had in fact committed the 
crime to which he pleads guilty. The court cannot reach this conclusion where the 
admission constitutes a mere repetition of the allegations against the accused. The 
second irregularity was that there was no indication that the accused had entered into 
the agreement freely and voluntarily as required by section 105A(6)(a)(iii).
110
 The 
final irregularity arose from the fact that the magistrate had rejected the negotiated 
sentence but failed to disclose this to the parties.
111
 The magistrate then proceeded to 
impose a harsher sentence without affording the parties an opportunity to withdraw 
from the agreement, as required by section 105A(9)(a).
112
 
 
                                                 
106
  S v Solomans 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C). See for discussion Du Toit et al (2006: 15-8) and  
 Cowling (2006: 239). 
107
  Supra at 435 paragraph d-e.  
108
  Cowling (2006: 241). 
109
  S v Solomans at 435 paragraph h. 
110
  Supra at 436 paragraph a. 
111
  Supra at 436 paragraph e. 
112
  Supra at 436 paragraph e. 
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Taking into account these irregularities, the High Court set aside the conviction and 
sentence and remitted the matter to the magistrates‟ court to be heard, de novo before 
a different presiding officer.
113
 However, the court failed to indicate whether any 
single irregularity or the cumulative effect of the three irregularities motivated its 
decision.
114
 It is submitted that this would be dependent on the facts of each case. For 
example, Cowling states that, with regard to the second irregularity, if from the 
overall documentation, it was clear that the accused freely consented, this should be 
sufficient for the purposes of section 105A(6)(a)(iii).
115
 Thus, the second irregularity 
on its own would be insufficient to set aside the conviction. By contrast, the third 
irregularity constitutes a material non-compliance.
116
 Where the court does not intend 
to impose the negotiated sentence it is required to disclose the sentence it considers 
just, prior to convicting the accused.
117
 This constitutes one of the core provisions of 
section 105A, because the parties must be allowed the opportunity to withdraw from 
the agreement before the court may proceed to impose the sentence it considers just. 
Non-compliance in this instance constitutes a gross irregularity in the application of 
the section 105A procedure. It is possible therefore to set aside a conviction based 
upon judicial non-compliance with a single but material provision contained in 
section 105A.  
                                                 
113
  Supra at 437 paragraph d. 
114
   See Cowling (2006: 242) who states that „the fact that the court did not give any indication as 
 to whether these factors were measured cumulatively or whether they were weighted in any 
 way, is to be regretted‟. 
115
  Cowling (2006: 242). 
116
  Cowling (2006: 242). 
117
  See section 105A(9)(b). 
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3.6    The differences between informal and statutory negotiated justice 
3.6.1 Sentence agreements 
The main difference between informal negotiated justice and statutory negotiated 
justice is that sentence agreements were not recognised in South African law prior to 
the passage of section 105A.
118
  
 
The prosecutor and accused cannot reach an agreement with regard to the sentence to 
be imposed in an informal plea agreement because this would require the co-operation 
and the participation of the presiding officer.
119
 At most, the parties can reach an 
agreement in terms of which the prosecutor undertakes to recommend that a reduced 
sentence be imposed.
120
 Hence, informal plea agreements are not dependent upon the 
court‟s acceptance of the prosecutor‟s sentence recommendation. Thus, where the 
court imposes a sentence which is more or less severe than that recommended by the 
prosecutor, this would not constitute a ground upon which either party could 
withdraw from the agreement.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, in North Western Dense the court defined informal plea 
agreements as „the practice of relinquishing the right to go to trial in exchange for a 
reduction in charge and/or sentence‟.121 The inaccuracy of this definition is obvious. 
However, Uijs AJ reasoned that because the South African prosecutor is dominus litis, 
the court cannot prevent the state from accepting a plea, and once the factual basis of 
a guilty plea has been accepted by the prosecutor, the court is bound to sentence the 
                                                 
118
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 200). See also SAHRC (2001: 2). 
119
  See de Villers (2004: 253). 
120
   This recommendation may be made in accordance with section 112(3) of the CPA. 
121
  North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) at 670 paragraph c. 
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accused on the basis of those facts.
122
 An informal plea agreement therefore curtails 
the sentencing discretion of the court, in that the court is obligated to sentence the 
accused on the basis of the facts which the accused has admitted and the prosecutor 
has accepted. Thus, even though the parties are unable to bind the court to a 
negotiated sentence, the plea agreement in effect manipulates the sentencing 
discretion of the court to the extent that the sentence finally imposed is usually the 
sentence preferred by the parties. However, the counter-argument to this is that the 
court does not have to accept a guilty plea. If, after questioning the accused about the 
recorded facts, the court is not satisfied with a guilty plea, the court must record a plea  
of not guilty and order that the prosecutor proceed with the trial.
123
 The court‟s ability 
to exercise this discretion outweighs, by far, any attempt made to manipulate its 
sentencing discretion.      
 
By contrast, statutory negotiated justice includes sentence agreements. According to 
Du Toit et al, a plea agreement on its own is insufficient to activate section 105A. 
There must be a sentence agreement also.
124
 However, it must be noted that the 
prosecutor and accused still cannot bind the court to a negotiated sentence. This was 
confirmed in the case of Yengeni, in which the appellant, a former Member of 
Parliament, filed an appeal against his sentence on the basis that he had concluded a 
                                                 
122
  Supra at 677 paragraph c. 
123
  Section 113(1) of the CPA provides that „if the court at any stage of the proceedings under 
 section 112(1)(a) or (b) or 112(2) and before sentence is passed is in doubt whether the  
 accused is in law guilty of the offence to which he or she has pleaded guilty or if it is alleged 
 or appears to the court that the accused does not admit an allegation in the charge or that the 
 accused has incorrectly admitted any such allegation or that the accused has a valid defence to 
 the charge or if the court is of the opinion for any other reason that the accused‟s plea of guilty 
 should not stand, the court shall record a plea of not guilty and require the prosecutor to  
 proceed with the prosecution: Provided that any allegation, other than an allegation referred to 
 above, admitted by the accused up to the stage at which the court records a plea of not guilty 
 shall stand as proof in any court of such allegation.‟ This section demonstrates that the court 
 is not compelled to accept the factual basis of a guilty plea even if the prosecutor has accepted 
 the plea.    
124
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-8). 
 
 
 
 
   66 
non-custodial sentence agreement with the NDPP.
125
 The court held that even if such 
an agreement had been reached it would be fundamentally unenforceable.
126
 Any 
attempt to fetter the court‟s discretion on sentence or to seek to subject the court‟s 
sentencing function to a prior agreement would be in conflict with the constitutionally 
protected independence of the judiciary.
127
 The sentence agreement in terms of 
section 105A is therefore better understood as a recommendation made to the court.  
 
Nevertheless, there remains an important distinction between a statutory sentence 
recommendation and the sentence recommendation made in accordance with an 
informal plea agreement. Should the court reject the sentence agreement concluded in 
terms of section 105A, the parties may withdraw from the agreement and the trial will 
commence de novo before a different presiding officer, where the accused may enter a 
plea of not guilty.
128
 The court‟s rejection of a sentence recommendation made in 
accordance with an informal plea agreement would not entitle the parties to withdraw 
from the agreement, and thus the accused will not be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea.
129
 
 
3.6.2 Victim participation  
A fundamental difference between informal and statutory negotiated justice lies in the 
victim‟s participation in the negotiation process. Little is known of how often victims 
have been allowed to participate in informal plea negotiations and hence the extent to 
which such participation influenced the negotiations is also unknown. Traditionally, 
                                                 
125
   S v Yengeni 2005 (3) SACR 1306 (T) at 1308 paragraph c. 
126
   Supra at 1310 paragraph e. 
127
  Supra at 1310 paragraph e. 
128
   Section 105A(9)(b)(ii) read with subsection (9)(d). 
129
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 4.17. 
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victims have no formal or recognised rights in the process of plea negotiations.
130
 In 
addition to this, the uncertainty surrounding the legality of these agreements further 
entrenched the neglect of the victim. By contrast, statutory plea and sentence 
agreements make provision for victim participation.
131
 Whether the provision allows 
for adequate recognition of the developing rights of the victim is examined in the next 
chapter.  
 
3.6.3 Transparency  
Further differences between informal and statutory negotiated justice would include, 
but are not limited to, the issues of transparency in procedure and judicial scrutiny. 
With informal plea agreements the parties need not disclose that such an agreement 
has been concluded. Furthermore, the court need not be advised of the contents of the 
agreement because the guilty plea tendered by the accused is accepted as a plea 
submitted in accordance with section 112. Thus, transparency and judicial scrutiny are 
clearly absent from informal plea agreements.  
 
With section 105A agreements the court must be notified that the prosecutor and 
accused have concluded a plea and sentence agreement. In addition, the contents of 
the agreement must be disclosed in court.
132
 Furthermore, the presiding officer is 
                                                 
130
   Bekker (1996: 208). 
131   See section 105A(1)(b)(iii). Although it is beyond the scope of this study to assess the role 
 of the victim in informal plea agreements, it is submitted that section 105A, which makes 
 provision for victim participation, provides a constitutional challenge to the operation of  
 informal plea agreements. In a statutory agreement the prosecutor has a duty to consider  
 whether victim participation would be reasonable. In addition,  where the prosecutor decides to 
 exclude the victim from the negotiations, the court assesses whether the prosecutor can  
 advance adequate grounds for his decision. Yet, in informal plea agreements the prosecutor is 
 under no obligation to consider victim participation and the court does not scrutinise the  
 reasons for excluding the victim. Thus, victims in informal plea agreements are treated  
 differently from victims in statutory agreements. This differentiation is unlikely withstand the 
 constitutional challenge.  
132
  Section 105A(5). 
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required to verify that all procedural requirements set out in the section have been 
satisfied. Thus, when statutory agreements are concluded the entire agreement is 
subjected to judicial scrutiny. By prescribing stringent guidelines, which provide a 
controlled legal context for negotiations, section 105A promotes a transparent system 
of negotiated justice.
133
 
 
3.7 The controversy surrounding plea and sentence agreements  
Plea and sentence agreements remain a controversial subject among academics. It has 
not enjoyed undivided academic support.
134
 Both its supporters and detractors present 
sound arguments to support their views.  
 
3.7.1 Supporters  
Supporters view negotiated justice as a means to exchange the truth for a reduction in 
charge and, where applicable, a reduction in sentence.
135
 It has been described as a 
handsome alternative to lengthy and costly criminal trials and the sine qua non for the 
efficient administration of justice.
136
 The supporters of negotiated justice place 
emphasis on the benefits of negotiation for the accused, the state and the victim.   
 
For an accused, the main objective of a plea and sentence agreement is to influence 
the sentence which may be imposed.
137
  
 
                                                 
133
  See Isakow & van Zyl Smit (1985: 174) who predicted that South African courts might soon 
 be faced with the realities of negotiated justice and suggested that the issue be confronted 
 squarely and that positive guidelines be developed to provide a controlled legal context for the 
 negotiation of pleas.   
134
  See Steyn (2007: 207). 
135
  Combs (2005: 130). 
136
  Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 144). 
137
  Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 154). 
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Du Toit & Snyman explain that the primary aims of such an agreement are: 
a) to minimise the ambit of the sentence through the negotiation of a  reduction in 
 the number or severity of charges; and 
b) to determine the exact type of sentence as far as it is possible, in advance.138 
 
Where the accused has negotiated a reduction in charge, this is usually accompanied 
by a shorter term of imprisonment or even a non-custodial sentence.
139
 Insofar as non-
custodial sentences are concerned the directives issued by the NDPP stipulate that:  
Negotiating a plea and sentence agreement is not to be understood as meaning 
the bargaining away of a sentence of imprisonment for a non-custodial 
sentence. Where the interest of justice and/or public interest requires an 
effective sentence of incarceration that is the stance to be taken. 
140
 
 
Thus, plea and sentence negotiations cannot be viewed as means of avoiding 
incarceration. Yet, a shorter term of imprisonment is viewed as an intrinsic benefit of 
negotiated justice.
141
 A further benefit for the accused is that he could plead to what 
may be perceived as a „morally condonable‟ or „softer‟ offence. For example, a 
motorist charged with culpable homicide agrees to plead guilty to reckless or 
negligent driving.  The alternative offence would result not only in a lesser sentence 
but also, because of the curtailed stigma attached to the offence, re-integration of the 
offender into the community is facilitated.  
 
For the state, negotiated justice is viewed as a means of easing the overburdened 
criminal justice system and facilitating the achievement of an effective and efficient 
system.
142
 A plea and sentence agreement can be reached swiftly, thus saving the time 
and the expense involved in a lengthy criminal trial with all its evidentiary risks.
143
 If 
                                                 
138
  Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 155). 
139
  Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 155). See further Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 191 & 196). 
140
  Directive 3 of the Directives issued by the NDPP on 14 March 2002. 
141
   See, for example, S v Esterhuizen at 495 paragraph c and further Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 
 197). 
142
  SAHRC (2001: 1). 
143
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 199). 
 
 
 
 
   70 
used optimally, it could reduce awaiting-trial prisoner numbers, as well as the 
caseloads of criminal justice personnel such as the police, justice centre attorneys, 
magistrates and prison officials.  
 
For the victim who has been traumatised by the offence, negotiated justice is viewed 
as a means to prevent reliving the experience by having to testify at trial and 
undergoing cross-examination.
144
 In addition, the anxiety which accompanies lengthy 
criminal trials (usually the result of numerous delays) may be avoided by the swift 
outcome associated with negotiated justice.  
 
 3.7.2 Critics  
Negotiated justice is practised extensively in the USA and most South African critics 
base their views on the evident flaws within the American criminal justice system.
145
 
These flaws include, inter alia, the overzealous prosecutor who would systematically 
charge an accused with multiple and more serious offences so as to increase his 
bargaining power in the negotiation process.
146
 This situation is aggravated then by 
the incompetent defence counsel who, due to his overwhelming caseload, manipulates 
his client into an ill-advised agreement in order to dispose of the case quickly.
147
 
Furthermore, the presiding officer may be motivated to accept the plea agreement in 
order to avoid a lengthy trial. Critics have labelled the above „the problems 
concerning the motivations of the actors‟ in negotiated justice.148  
 
                                                 
144
  Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 154). 
145
  De Villiers (2004: 250). See also Bekker (1996: 195) who notes that over 90% of all  
 criminal convictions in the United States of America are based on plea agreements.  
146
  Combs (2005: 127). See also Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 153). 
147
  Uphoff (1995: 78). See also De Villiers (2004: 251). 
148
  See De Villiers (2004: 240) and further Fletcher (1995: 191) who states that „the very idea that 
 the authorities cut special deals with particular defendants offends the rule of law‟.  
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The foremost criticism levelled against negotiated justice is that it undermines the 
values of the criminal justice system.
149
 The criminal justice system contains explicit 
rules for the determination of guilt and the punishment of the guilty.
150
 Negotiated 
justice is viewed as a circumvention and manipulation of the established legal rules 
because the rigorous standards of due process and proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
are avoided.
151
 Detractors further argue that these agreements are procedurally unfair 
because the guilt of the accused is determined by weighing the chance of success at 
trial against a full investigation, the leading of evidence and impartial fact-finding.
152
 
They submit that these procedural safeguards are our main assurance of equal 
protection of the law.
153
  
 
In addition, a section 105A agreement may be concluded only when an accused is 
legally represented.
154
 Hence, it is only available to a small percentage of accused 
persons. De Villiers poses the following question: „Why are unrepresented accused 
deemed to be competent to plead guilty in the conventional manner but not to 
participate in section 105A proceedings?‟155  If an accused is deemed fit to plead 
guilty in terms of section 112 of the CPA while not being represented, he should be 
able also to negotiate an agreement in accordance with section 105A while not being 
represented.
156
 To deny the accused an opportunity to conclude a plea agreement 
because he does not have the means to appoint a legal representative or has waived 
                                                 
149
  Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 195).  
150
  Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 195). 
151
  Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 195). See also Piccinato (2004: 2) and further De Villiers (2004: 
 251). 
152
  Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 197) See De Villiers (2004: 251) and further Bekker (1996: 210).  
153
  De Villiers (2004: 252). 
154
  Section 105A(1)(a). 
155
  De Villiers (2004: 254). 
156
  De Villiers (2004: 255). 
 
 
 
 
   72 
his right to legal representation is not defensible, and it is doubtful whether this 
limitation will survive constitutional scrutiny.
157
 
 
Critics also express concern for the innocent accused who may be induced to plead 
guilty.
158
 The pressure placed on an innocent accused to conclude a plea agreement 
may originate from a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system or in the 
competence of defence counsel. In addition, the harsher sanctions associated with 
conviction after trial may provide a prosecutor with significant bargaining power.
159
 
Thus, an accused may fear harsher punishment should he attempt to contest the 
charges levied against him.
160
 Furthermore, the prospect of incarceration may be 
especially unnerving to an innocent accused, rendering him willing to agree to almost 
anything if the agreement guarantees a non-custodial sentence.
161
 Critics therefore 
conclude that the most serious concern with negotiated justice is that innocent persons 
may be induced to plead guilty to offences which they did not commit or for which 
they have a valid defence.
162
  
 
Linked to the above is the criticism most dear to public concern, namely, that a guilty 
accused will receive a lenient sentence if he enters into a plea and sentence 
agreement.
163
 The reduction in sentence is almost inevitable. In Esterhuizen the court 
stated that the price for such agreements may be that the sentence which normally 
would flow from the commission of the crime is lower than might otherwise have 
                                                 
157
  De Villiers (2004: 254). 
158
  Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 197). See also Piccinato (2004: 2) and Steyn (2007: 207).  
159
  Piccinato (2004: 3). 
160
  Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 197). 
161
   Uphoff (1995: 130). 
162
   Piccinato (2004: 3). 
163
   Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 197). 
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been imposed.
164
 Although a reduction in sentence may be unacceptable to most 
victims and is arguably the reason why the public disapproves of the practice, it does 
not mean that justice has not been served.
165
 In Esterhuizen the court held that as long 
as the sentence bears an adequate relationship to the crime, justice has been served.
166
  
 
However, according to De Villiers, section 105A undermines the deterrent effect of 
our criminal justice system because the criminal now knows that even if he is caught, 
the struggling system will offer him a plea to a lesser offence and agree to a lesser 
sentence in order to cope with its caseload.
167
 Thus, negotiated justice fails to address 
and possibly entrenches the problem of repeat offenders.
168
 De Villiers asserts that, 
instead of addressing the real causes of the decline in the efficiency of the criminal 
justice system, much effort has been put into the implementation of a measure which 
accelerates the criminal justice process.
169
 It is argued that even though prompt and 
efficient procedures are state interests worthy of cognisance, the criminal justice 
system embodies values higher than expediency and efficiency.
170
 
 
Despite the cogent arguments made by critics, negotiated justice has been introduced 
formally and accepted as a facet of criminal procedure in South Africa. Thus, 
arguments pertaining to the legitimacy of the practice have become obsolete to a large 
extent. However, these arguments are likely to be revived in critical assessments of 
the procedures followed in pursuit of negotiated justice.     
                                                 
164
  S v Esterhuizen at 495 paragraph c. 
165
   Snyman & Du Toit (2000: 197) and S v Esterhuizen at 495 paragraph d.  
166
   S v Esterhuizen at 495 paragraph e. 
167
   De Villiers (2004: 251). 
168
   De Villiers (2004: 255). 
169
   De Villiers (2004: 252). 
170
   De Villiers (2004: 251) for his discussion of Santobello v New York and further Burchell  
 (2005: 16) who states that „plea bargaining has little to do with justice, fairness and principle. 
 It is all about the expeditious handling of criminal cases‟. 
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3.8 Conclusion  
There are clearly two independent systems of negotiated justice in South African 
criminal procedure, namely, statutory negotiated justice and informal negotiated 
justice. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to consider the role of the victim 
in informal negotiated justice, this should not detract from the importance of such 
consideration. Certainly, it is anticipated that this research, inter alia, will provide a 
foundation for testing the constitutionality of the distinction between victim 
participation in informal negotiated justice and victim participation in statutory 
negotiated justice.  
 
Statutory negotiated justice makes provision for victim participation at significant 
stages of the proceedings. Section 105A(1)(b)(iii) allows for victim participation at 
the negotiating stage, while section 105A(7)(b)(i)(bb) allows for victim participation 
at the sentencing stage. However, these provisions do not guarantee the victim a right 
to participate. Participation at the negotiating stage is subject to the prosecutor finding 
that it would be reasonable to allow the victim to participate and the victims‟ input at 
sentencing is subject to judicial discretion. Although these provisions constitute a 
manifest attempt to promote victim participation, their sufficiency in the light of 
South Africa‟s commitment to victim protection requires critical assessment. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS DURING PLEA AND 
SENTENCE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the need to give victims their rightful place in the criminal justice system is 
apparent, the manner in which this should be done is not. Ultimately, one must be 
guided by the demands made by victims and their families. These demands have been 
identified and may be divided into two broad categories, namely, the demand for 
restitution and services, and the demand for procedural rights.
1
 The demand for 
restitution and services includes, inter alia, the need for compensation in some form 
and the need for information on the legal process.
2
 The demand for procedural rights 
is based on the victim‟s desire to be part of and acknowledged in the legal process.3   
 
This chapter identifies and analyses those victims‟ rights which require emphasis in 
the context of negotiated justice. This is followed by a critical evaluation of section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) CPA. Although the section has been classified as one which seeks to 
promote victims‟ rights in the context of negotiated justice, the critical evaluation will 
draw the reader‟s attention to its inadequacies.4  
 
                                                 
1
  SALRC (2003) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 at paragraph 40.1.1. 
2
  SALRC (2003) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 at paragraph 40.1.1. 
3
  SALRC (2003) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 at paragraph 40.1.1. 
4
   See, for example, Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12). 
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Thereafter, a proposal for amendment of the section is provided. The amendment 
proposed is aimed at remedying the identified inadequacies. The chapter concludes by 
anticipating and addressing some of the possible objections to the proposal.   
 
4.2 Victims’ rights in negotiated justice 
In her article, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, Welling focuses on the rights of 
victims in the American plea agreement system.
5
 She identifies three specific rights 
which require emphasis in the context of negotiated justice, namely: 
 the right to be informed of the agreement, 
 the right to be present when the agreement is presented to the court, and 
 the right to participate in the agreement.6   
 
The South African Victims‟ Charter does not focus on the rights of victims within 
negotiated justice. However, it does offer a legal framework for the rights identified 
by Welling.
7
 In combination, then, Welling‟s submission and the relevant provisions 
of the Charter constitute a tool-kit with which to assess victims‟ rights in the context 
of section 105A agreements.  
 
In the discussion which follows the need for and scope of the victims‟ rights in 
respect of information, presence and participation will be analysed.  
                                                 
5
  Welling (1987: 301). The American criminal justice system is divided into federal law and 
 state law. Welling does not distinguish between the rights of victims in the federal plea  
 agreement system and those in the state plea agreement system. Instead, she identifies a set of 
 basic rights common to both systems of law.     
6
  Welling (1987: 305). See further Bekker (1996: 204). Bekker‟s discussion of the role of the 
 victim in plea negotiations was based on Welling‟s articulation of the potential rights which 
 may be accorded to victims.         
7
  Articles 2 and 3 of the Victims‟ Charter provide that the victim has the right to receive and 
 offer information. These articles provide a basis for the rights which, according to Welling, 
 require emphasis in negotiated justice.   
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4.2.1 The right to be informed of the agreement 
4.2.1.1 The victim’s need for information 
The need for information is the need most often expressed by victims.
8
 There are 
numerous arguments which found the need to provide victims with a right to 
information. Bruce summarises the various arguments into three basic pupositions:  
 
Firstly, the victim is the person likely to have reported the case. Were it not for his 
or her victimisation there would be no case to investigate. In a sense the case 
„belongs‟ to the victim more so than it does the agencies of the criminal justice 
system. While these agencies are administering the investigation and prosecution of 
it, the victim has a reasonable claim (potentially a right) to be kept up to date with 
developments relating to the case.  
 
Secondly, it is argued, providing information along with other victim support or 
empowerment measures is part of basic professional practice. 
 
Thirdly, providing information to victims is necessary in order for them to 
cooperate with and assist the criminal justice system at key points.
 9
   
 
In addition to the above, it is submitted that providing the victim with information 
facilitates his psychological recovery.
10
 The trauma inflicted by victimisation should 
not be ignored.
11
 Victims encounter the criminal justice system after being exposed to 
a traumatic event. In most cases such an event forces victims to confront their own 
mortality and this may lead to significant feelings of, inter alia, distress, 
powerlessness and fear about safety.
12
 Batley explains that we derive much of our 
                                                 
8
  See Pretorius & Louw (2005: 75-76). According to the authors the primary needs of the victim 
 are emotional and practical needs, the need for information, acknowledgement and  
 understanding as well as the need to interact with the criminal justice system. See further 
 paragraph 3 of the Victims‟ Charter Consultative Draft.     
9
  Bruce (2005: 105-106).  
10
  See Pretorius & Louw (2005: 75). 
11
  See, for example, Williams (1999: 52) who explains that case studies have revealed that after 
 the act of victimisation victims may feel jumpy and easily startled. Some are physically ill and 
 often find it difficult to sleep and to concentrate. There are also long-term reactions such as 
 depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome which may occur.   
12
  Williams (1999: 52). See also Henderson (1985: 957-958). The author explains that  
 victimisation  shatters the assumption that „crime happens to others and it won‟t happen to 
 oneself‟ and the lack of control that a victim feels during the victimisation deprives him not 
 only of his belief in his invulnerability but also of his sense of autonomy in the world. 
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sense of safety from a sense of control.
13
 During the commission of a crime the 
accused has control over the life of the victim and reclaiming that control becomes 
vital to the victim‟s psychological recovery.14 Victims are unable to reclaim their 
sense of security and control if the criminal justice system, which is designed to 
protect them, alienates them instead. There is, therefore, a rational basis for the 
victim‟s need for information.       
 
4.2.1.2 The scope and application of the right to information  
According to Pretorius & Louw, victims often want to know whether the perpetrator 
was caught, whether he is in custody or out on bail, what the charges were, when the 
court appearance will be, whether they have to give evidence in court, whether the 
accused was convicted and, if so, what sentence was imposed.
15
 The Victims‟ Charter 
caters for such concerns. It provides that victims have the right to receive information 
and can request to be informed of the status of the case, that is, whether or not the 
perpetrator has been arrested, charged, granted bail, indicted, convicted or 
sentenced.
16
  
 
Welling submits that, in the context of negotiated justice, the right to be informed 
means that the prosecutor must inform the victim of the terms of the agreement before 
it is presented to the court.
17
 In the first part of her submission, Welling identifies the 
scope of the victim‟s right to be informed as the right to be informed of the terms of 
                                                 
13
  Batley (2005: 121). 
14
  Batley (2005: 120). Batley explains that this loss of control is demoralising and affects one‟s 
 sense of safety, identity and well-being.  
15
   Pretorius & Louw (2005: 76). 
16
  See article 3 of the Victims‟ Charter.  
17
  Welling (1987: 306). 
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the agreement.
18
 In the second part of her submission she states that this right finds 
application before the agreement is presented to the court.
19
 This implies that the 
victim‟s right to be informed of the agreement comes into effect after the agreement 
has been concluded. 
 
Du Toit & Snyman offer a different view of the timing of the right to be informed. 
They argue that: 
In order to establish a healthy dispensation in South African courts the victim 
should be informed of the planned plea bargaining proceedings and the possible 
contents of those proceedings.
20
  
 
Du Toit & Snyman are suggesting that the victim be informed of the prosecutor‟s 
intention to conclude an agreement with the accused. Article 3 of the Victims‟ Charter 
supports their suggestion. It provides that the victim has the right to receive 
information and hence can request to be informed of the status of the case.
21
 The 
victim can invoke this right at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, where a prosecutor 
intends to negotiate a plea and sentence agreement he would be obliged to inform the 
victim of his intention, at that stage, if the victim has invoked his right to be informed 
of the status of the case.  
 
Therefore, on the basis of article 3 of the Victims‟ Charter, the South African victim, 
unlike his American counterpart, could enjoy the right to be informed of the 
agreement before and after it has been concluded. Yet, the stage at which the right to 
receive information may find application does not affect the substance of the right. 
                                                 
18
  Welling (1987: 306). 
19
  Welling (1987: 306). 
20
  Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 154).  
21
  See article 3 of the Victims‟ Charter. 
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The victim still enjoys only a right to be informed of the agreement or, at best, a right 
to be informed of the state‟s intention to enter an agreement. 
 
4.2.1.3 The practical implications argument against the right to information 
The practical implications argument is based on the premise that allowing victims a 
right to information will place an insurmountable burden on the criminal justice 
system.
22
   
  
Bruce poses the following questions about the practical implications of the victim‟s 
right to information:  
If victims have a “right” to information, how much information how often does this 
right entitle them to? What lengths should be gone to and what costs should be 
entered into to ensure that this right is upheld? And what if one of the costs is 
placing further demands on criminal justice officials who feel they are already 
overextended? 
23
 
 
According to Bruce, victims may not necessarily be satisfied with being informed 
about events or decisions.
24
 They may want to know why those events are taking 
place and why those decisions were made.
25
 He adds that providing victims with 
information regarding the progress of the case may be reasonable, but it does not 
necessarily contribute towards the credibility of the criminal justice process.
26
 In his 
view, the obligation to provide victims with information will contribute towards the 
credibility of the criminal justice system only if the obligation is combined with 
improvements in the effectiveness of the system.
27
 Thus, according to Bruce, if the 
obligation to provide information simply places an additional strain on already over-
                                                 
22
  See, for example, Bruce (2005: 105).  
23
  Bruce (2005: 106).  
24
  Bruce (2005: 106). 
25
  Bruce (2005: 106). 
26
   Bruce (2005: 106). 
27
   Bruce (2005: 104). 
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extended justice officials, it will be unlikely to contribute to either greater credibility 
or effectiveness of the criminal justice system.
28
 He, therefore, disapproves of 
allowing victims a right to information if such right places an additional strain on 
criminal justice officials. 
 
There are at least two flaws in the practical implications argument presented by Bruce. 
Firstly, he assumes, incorrectly, that providing victims with information will improve 
the credibility of the criminal justice system. In this regard, it is submitted that the 
credibility of a criminal justice system does not depend upon its ability to provide 
information to victims, but rather upon its ability to administer justice fairly. It must 
be emphasised that although the credibility of the justice system might be improved 
by fulfilling the victim‟s right to information, this is not the purpose but rather the 
consequence of such right. Bruce has failed, therefore, to observe that the purpose of 
the right to information is to prevent victim alienation.  
 
A second flaw in the practical implications argument is that it is endorses the theory 
that victims are better kept on the periphery until the systemic problems of the 
criminal justice system are resolved.
29
 The argument therefore endorses secondary 
victimisation. Thus, the practical implications argument, as presented by Bruce, 
should be abandoned because it does not make a legitimate case for denying victims a 
right to information. 
 
 
                                                 
28
  Bruce (2005: 106). 
29
  See, for example, Bruce (2005: 106) who quotes the following controversial submission by 
 Morgan & Sanders: „Telling a victim that their case will be dropped, for example, leads many 
 victims onto the obvious question of “why?”. If this question is not answered, many victims 
 end up less satisfied than they would have been if they had been kept in the dark.‟  
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 4.2.2  The right to be present   
4.2.2.1 The need for victim presence  
The second right which Welling identifies is the victim‟s right to be present when the 
agreement is presented to the court.
30
 According to Hagan, a victim‟s attendance at 
court serves two purposes.
31
 Firstly, it is a way in which the victim can have contact 
with, and involvement in, the criminal justice process.
32
 Secondly, the victim gains 
knowledge of the disposition of the case by attending court proceedings.
33
 Hagan‟s 
empirical study also reveals that victims‟ demand for severity in sentencing is reduced 
by court attendance.
34
 He concludes, therefore, that victims should be encouraged to 
attend court because attendance decreases the victim‟s assessment that criminal 
sanctions are too lenient.
35
   
 
4.2.2.2 The scope of the right to be present when the agreement is presented to 
the court   
In the context of negotiated justice, the victim‟s right to be present entails the right to 
attend the court‟s scrutiny and verification of the plea and sentence agreement.36 
 
The right to be present during court proceedings is an inherent facet of South African 
criminal procedure. In terms of section 152 of the CPA, as a general rule, criminal 
                                                 
30
  Welling (1987: 305). 
31
  Hagan (1982: 323). The author conducted his study in Toronto, Canada. It focused on two 
 types of victims‟ responses within the criminal justice process, namely, victims‟ responses to 
 sentences imposed by the court generally, and victims‟ responses to the specific person  
 charged. 
32
  Hagan (1982: 323). 
33
  Hagan (1982: 323). 
34
  Hagan (1982: 327). 
35
  Hagan (1982: 327). 
36
  See sections 3.4.2.1-3.4.2.3 in the text above for the discussions on the process of judicial  
 scrutiny and approval of section 105A agreements. 
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proceedings must take place in open court.
37
 In addition, the Victims‟ Charter 
provides that the victim has the right to attend the bail hearing, the trial, sentencing 
proceedings and the Parole Board hearing if necessary and where possible.
38
 An 
exception to the victim‟s right to attend court proceedings relates to the victim as 
witness. In this instance, the rules of evidence would require that the victim wait 
outside the courtroom before being called upon to testify.
39
  
 
Plea and sentence agreements do not constitute an exception to the general rule 
contained in section 152. Section 105A does not stipulate that such agreements be 
presented to the court behind closed doors. In addition, the court will not hear 
testimony from the victim because there is no trial. Hence, the rules of evidence 
would not be compromised by the victim‟s presence during the court‟s scrutiny and 
verification of the agreement. Section 152 and the provisions of the Victims‟ Charter 
would apply, therefore, when the agreement is presented to the court. Thus, it would 
appear that the victim‟s right to be present is provided for adequately by the CPA as 
read with the Victims‟ Charter.  
 
4.2.3 The significance of the right to information and of the right to be present  
Most of the available literature emphasises the significance of a victim‟s right to 
information and the right to be present during court proceedings. The SAHRC, for 
example, views the right to receive information as particularly significant in the 
context of negotiated justice.
40
 It states that: 
                                                 
37
  Section 153 of the CPA contains the exceptions to this general rule. 
38
  Article 2 of the Victims‟ Charter. 
39
  See Schwikkard & van der Merwe (2002: 401). At 508 the authors explain that this is done to 
 ensure that a witness is not influenced by what he hears from other witnesses who testify in 
 his presence. 
40
  SAHRC (2001: 4). 
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By failing to inform the victim that the charge has been altered, to entice a plea 
agreement from the accused, the victim is denied the right to receive information 
pertaining to his case. The alteration of a charge and subsequent failure to notify the 
victim thereof constitutes an infringement of the victim‟s right to dignity. 41  
 
Support for the SAHRC‟s submission is found in Henderson‟s article titled The 
Wrongs of Victims’ Rights.42 According to Henderson, failing to inform the victim of 
the agreement could be viewed by the victim as an invalidation of the victimisation he 
has experienced.
43
 She explains that satisfying the informational needs of the victim is 
definitely the first step towards resolving the problem of victim alienation which is 
associated with negotiated justice.
44
  
 
Bekker also addresses the significance of the victim‟s right to information and the 
right to be present when the agreement is presented to the court.
45
 He endorses 
various recommendations, made by American authors, which accommodate these 
rights in plea negotiations.
46
 One of the recommendations requires the prosecutor to 
notify the victim of the proposed terms of the agreement at least ten days before the 
agreement is presented to the court.
47
 To this Bekker adds that the prosecutor‟s 
notification should include advising the victim that he has the right to be at hand when 
the agreement is presented to the court.
48
  
                                                 
41
  SAHRC (2001: 5). 
42
  Henderson (1985: 981) states that although the prosecutor represents the state, rather than the 
 individual victim, courtesy and common sense would seem to dictate that the prosecutor treat 
 victims with respect by informing them of the plea bargaining options. 
43
  Henderson (1985: 981). 
44
    Henderson (1985: 980) opines that in order to solve the problem of victim alienation  
 associated with plea bargaining, prosecutors could simply provide more information to 
 victims. 
45
  Bekker (1996: 205). 
46
  Bekker (1996: 205). 
47
   Bekker (1996: 205). Other recommendations endorsed by Bekker include requiring a  
 prosecutor to consult with the victim before a plea proposal is made to the accused and  
 allowing the victim a right to participate at the hearing by expressing his views to the trial 
 court before the agreement is accepted. These recommendations are reiterated, to a large  
 extent, by Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 154).  
48
  Bekker (1996: 205).   
 
 
 
 
   85 
Welling raises doubts about the practical value of the right to information and the 
right to be present. She opines that:   
The right to be informed of the agreement and the right to be present at the 
hearing are relatively insignificant rights because the victim remains a spectator 
and has no opportunity to affect the outcome of negotiation.
49
  
 
She adds that, to a large extent, the general public currently enjoys these rights and 
that victims therefore already are entitled to these rights.
50
  
 
In response to Welling‟s concerns, it is submitted that the rights in question are not 
intended to be participatory in nature as this would simply overreach the scope of 
such rights. Thus, the victim‟s remaining a spectator throughout the proceedings 
corresponds to the scope and nature of these rights. The rights to information and to 
be present, like all other rights, have limitations, but this should not detract from their 
significance. Neither should the fact that the rights in question are enjoyed by the 
general public undermine their value to victims. Indeed, the general public‟s 
enjoyment of the rights in question could be interpreted to mean that such rights are 
inherently significant. Therefore, Welling‟s submission is understood better not as an 
assault upon the rights themselves but as demonstrating the need to combine these 
rights with a participatory right. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
  Welling (1987: 306) states that the value of these rights is diminished by the timing involved. 
 She explains that in the American criminal justice system the right to information arises  
 relatively late in the process. The problem of timing of the right to information also impairs 
 the victim‟s right to be present because the victim will not get information on the hearing  
 schedule in time to implement the right to be present. 
50
   Welling (1987: 305-306). 
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4.2.4 The right to participate  
The victim‟s participation right has been defined as a right to be heard.51 According to 
Welling, this is a significant right which may be accorded victims because it 
encompasses the right to be informed and the right to be present when the agreement 
is presented to the court.
52
  A natural consequence of allowing victims a right to 
participate is that they will have to be notified of the intention to enter into an 
agreement and, as a result, would gain knowledge of their right to be in attendance 
when the agreement is presented to the court.  
 
4.2.4.1 The need for victim participation  
Both Welling and Bekker submit that allowing victims the right to participate in 
negotiated justice promotes the interests of the victim and the interests of society.
53
  
 
4.2.4.1.1  The interests of the victim 
According to the authors, the victim has at least two interests which could be 
protected by his participation in negotiated justice.
54
 The first interest is financial.
55
 
Welling explains that a victim will have a financial interest in negotiated justice if he 
is eligible for compensation.
56
 In the plea agreement the victim‟s interest lies in 
ensuring that the accused pleads to a charge which is sufficiently linked to the damage 
                                                 
51
   Welling (1987: 355). 
52
   Welling (1987: 307).  
53
   See Welling (1987: 308) and Bekker (1996: 204). 
54
  See Welling (1987: 308) and Bekker (1996: 204). 
55
  Welling (1987: 307).   
56
  Welling (1987: 307).  
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or loss he has suffered.
57
 Alternatively, the victim could advocate that an award of 
compensation be included as a component of the sentence agreement.
58
  
 
Welling‟s view, although based on the American plea agreement system, finds 
support in South African criminal procedure. In terms of section 300 of the CPA, the 
charge on which the accused is convicted determines the extent to which the victim 
will be compensated by the state.
59
 Thus, a victim who is eligible for compensation 
will have an interest in ensuring that the negotiated plea reflects the loss he has 
suffered.  
 
The victim‟s second interest, according to Welling, is retribution.60 She argues that 
because the victim‟s interests have been violated, he feels that the punishment of the 
accused should be severe.
61
 Thus, in the plea agreement the victim would want the 
accused to plead guilty to a serious charge and in the sentence agreement the victim 
would want a significant sentence imposed.
62
 However, Kennard strongly opposes 
this analysis. According to her, Welling‟s view is based on the „Myth of Victim 
Retributiveness‟.63 Kennard opines that, although observers may assume that victims 
are motivated by a desire for retribution, there is no evidence which supports this 
                                                 
57
  Welling (1987: 307). The compensation which may be awarded by a criminal court is limited 
 to the damage or loss caused to property. The victim would have to pursue a civil action   
 against the accused should he wish to claim for the infringement of personality interests. 
58
  Welling (1987: 307).  
59
  Section 300 of the CPA provides that „where a person is convicted by a superior court, a  
 regional  or a magistrates‟ court of an offence which has caused damage to or loss of property 
 (including money) belonging to some other person, the court in question may, upon the  
 application of the injured person or of the prosecutor acting on instructions of the injured  
 person, forthwith award the injured person compensation for such damage or loss.‟  
60
  Welling (1987: 307). See also Bekker (1996: 209). 
61
  Welling (1987: 306).  
62
  Welling (1987: 308).  
63
  Kennard (1989: 446). 
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assumption.
64
 She adds that empirical studies have proved the contrary, in that most 
victims have demonstrated reservations about sending perpetrators to prison because 
they believe that prison conditions are brutalising and encourage criminal behaviour.
65
   
 
Obtaining a real understanding of victims‟ interests is a complex process.  Victims are 
not a homogeneous group and generally will have a variety of views, interests and 
perspectives.
66
 Often the most marginalised victims have the least access to debates 
about such issues and the voices of certain victims would not necessarily reflect the 
interests of all victims.
67
 Thus, a proper conclusion can be reached only if the victim 
concerned is allowed an opportunity to be heard. In that way the interests which the 
victim seeks to protect can be established, through his participation, without undue 
assumption.  Therefore, it cannot be concluded with certainty that victims will seek to 
protect a retributive interest by participating in negotiated justice. They may, for 
example, favour rehabilitative or diversionary programmes.
68
 
 
 
                                                 
64
  Kennard (1989: 447).  
65
  Kennard (1989: 447) refers to empirical research conducted by Heinz & Kerstetter (1979: 
 349). The authors conducted a field experiment in Dade County, Florida in which court  
 personnel were required to hold pre-trial conferences at which the victim, the accused and 
 arresting officer were allowed an opportunity to express their opinions. At 359 they state that, 
 contrary to the expectations of some observers, the victims involved did not demand the  
 maximum authorised punishment. Instead they were usually supportive of the disposition 
 proposed by the attorneys. A similar study was conducted by Henderson & Gitchoff (1981: 
 226). At 230 the authors state that victims have demonstrated that they are quite willing to 
 move away from a position of retribution if given viable alternatives. 
66
  See the website of the Victims‟ Rights Working Group for its discussion of the interests of 
 victims. VRWG is a non-profit organisation which seeks to promote the rights and interests of 
 victims before the International Criminal Court. See also Williams (1999: 51) who states that 
 reactions to victimisation are individual and unpredictable. He explains that while there may 
 be some discernible patterns, it can never be assumed that a particular offence will have  
 predictable consequences for an individual victim.  
67
  See VRWG website. 
68
  See, for example, Leggert (2005: 111). According to the author, victims are not as single- 
 mindedly retributive as many would believe. He states that some of the most victimised South 
 Africans in the country (those who reside in inner-city Johannesburg) are still open to more 
 creative approaches to resolving criminal incidents. See also Karmen (1994: 335). 
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4.2.4.1.2  The interests of society 
Welling and Bekker opine that allowing the victim a right to participate in negotiated 
justice promotes the interest of society.
69
 There are at least three arguments which 
motivate this opinion.  
 
Firstly, the criminal justice system relies on the co-operation of victims.
70
 According 
to Kennard, the continued functioning of the criminal justice system depends on 
victim co-operation both in reporting offences and in assisting the prosecution of 
crime.
71
 The theory is that if victims are not allowed to participate in the plea and 
sentence negotiation and hence feel alienated and irrelevant, they will not co-operate 
in the reporting and prosecution of crime.
72
  Kennard explains that when victims are 
dissatisfied they show their dissatisfaction by not reporting crimes, by failing to 
appear in court and, at times, by resorting to vigilantism.
73
 
 
Secondly, within the confines of plea and sentence negotiation, victim participation 
would enhance the negotiating ability of the prosecutor. According to Welling, 
allowing the victim the right to participate will result in more information being 
provided to the prosecutor and the court, and more information, theoretically, results 
                                                 
69
  Welling (1987: 308) and Bekker (1996: 205). 
70
  See Strijdom (1983: 65-66). The author explains that although some may argue that the police 
 are the „gatekeepers‟ of the criminal justice system, this is not the case. He states that it must 
 be borne in mind that crimes are normally reported to the police by the victims. As the police 
 can act only after a crime is reported, victims can be regarded rightly as the primary  
 gatekeepers of the criminal justice system. 
71
  Kennard (1989: 417). 
72
  This point has been made repeatedly. See Bekker (1996: 205) and Welling (1986: 308).  
73
  Kennard (1989: 417). See further Pretorius & Louw (2005: 77) who favour the view that the 
 treatment of victims by authorities indirectly influences their obligation to obey the law. This 
 view is based on the premise that authorities, by treating victims fairly and as valued members 
 of society, can reinforce the perceived obligation to obey the law and thereby elicit law-  
 abiding behaviour.      
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in better decisions.
74
 By contrast, victim alienation offers no apparent benefits. Instead, 
it may deepen the frustration of the victim and entrench a practice of secondary 
victimisation in negotiated justice.
75
   
 
The third argument is presented by Du Toit et al. They state that: 
Victim participation in the negotiation process is, especially in the context of 
present criticism of our criminal justice system, an important step which can 
cultivate and strengthen society‟s acceptance of plea and sentence agreements as a 
method of avoiding a traditional adversarial trial.
76
  
 
Thus, according to the authors, if the public is aware that the victim‟s views have 
been incorporated in the agreement, society would feel more confident that justice has 
been done.
77
 Their view is based on the premise that victim participation will enhance 
the legitimacy and transparency of negotiated justice.
78
  
 
4.2.4.2 The scope of victim participation  
From studies conducted by legal scholars as well as sociologists, it is possible to 
identify at least two policy frameworks which influence the scope of victim 
participation.
79
 For the purposes of this study, these are labelled veto participation and 
non-veto participation.
80
  
                                                 
74
  Welling (1987: 308). 
75    See the Research Report prepared for the Canadian Department of Justice by Verdun-Jones & 
 Tijerino (2002) at paragraph 6.0. According to the authors victim participation effectively 
 minimises the deleterious effects of secondary victimisation.  
76
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12). Bekker (1996: 206) shares this sentiment. The author states that if 
 the problems facing the victim in the plea bargaining process are addressed, the whole process 
 would gain legitimacy with the general public. 
77
  See Garkawe (2003: 334). The author uses a similar rationale when discussing society‟s 
 acceptance of the TRC proceedings. He states that „with the increasing awareness of and  
 attention paid to crime victims it is commonly recognised that any mechanism established to 
 deal with perpetrators must have the confidence of victims if it is to be accepted by the  
 community‟. 
78
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12). Although the authors endorse and emphasise the importance of 
 victim participation they fail to acknowledge the inadequacy of section 105A in this regard.   
79
  See, for example, Goldstein (1982: 515). Goldstein suggests that victim participation entails 
 the victim being a party to the prosecution for limited purposes. See also Gittler (1984: 176) 
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4.2.4.2.1  Veto participation  
Veto participation extends the scope of victim participation to a right which the victim 
may exercise over the prosecutors‟ office. 81  Kennard explains that with veto 
participation the victim, after reviewing the offer and the prosecutor‟s justification for 
the offer, would be asked to sign a release form that permits the prosecutor to present 
the offer to the accused.
82
 Victims who find the offer too punitive or too lenient could 
refuse to give their consent and thereby exercise a veto.
83
 Where the victim has 
rejected the offer in this manner the prosecutor would be required to formulate a new 
offer and present it to the victim.
84
 This process would continue until the victim and 
the prosecutor agree on the contents of the offer.
85
 Alternatively, the case would 
proceed to trial if failure to reach an agreement on the offer threatens to infringe the 
accused‟s right to a speedy trial.86  
 
4.2.4.2.2  Non-veto participation 
By contrast, non-veto participation limits the scope of the victim‟s input to approving 
or opposing the agreement and commenting on the terms of the agreement. This form 
of participation exposes the criminal justice system to the victim‟s views by allowing 
him an opportunity to communicate his opinion of the agreement.
87
 However, the 
victim is not placed in a position to countermand the prosecutor‟s decision to 
                                                                                                                                            
 who endorses Goldstein‟s recommendation. See further Fletcher (1996: 247-248). At 250 
 Fletcher  argues that victims should be given the power to approve or disapprove the  
 negotiated agreement. He also reveals his approval of German criminal procedure which  
 allows the victim to join the proceedings as a private prosecutor.  
80
  See Welling (1987: 345-353) and Goldstein (1982: 515) as examples of non-veto participation 
 and Kennard (1989: 437-438) as well as Fletcher (1996: 247-248) for their proposals on a 
 victim‟s veto in negotiated justice. 
81
  See Kennard (1989: 437-438). 
82
  Kennard (1989: 438). 
83
  Kennard (1989: 438). 
84
  Kennard (1989: 438). 
85
  Kennard (1989: 438). 
86
  Kennard (1989: 438). 
87
  See Welling (1987: 346). 
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conclude the agreement. Thus, should the victim disapprove of the agreement, his 
disapproval will not prevent the prosecutor from concluding the agreement, nor will it 
prevent the court from accepting the terms of the agreement.
88
 Similarly, where the 
victim approves of the agreement, the prosecutor would not be obliged to conclude 
the agreement and the court would not be obliged to accept the agreement, based 
solely on the victim‟s approval thereof. Thus, non-veto participation merely allows 
the victim an opportunity to be heard, and those who are required to listen are not 
obliged to give effect to the views expressed by the victim.
89
  
 
4.2.4.2.3  The scope of section 105A participation  
Section 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the CPA represents a form of non-veto participation. 
According to the provision, the victim may be allowed an opportunity to make 
representations to the prosecutor regarding – 
(aa) the contents of the agreement; and 
(bb) the inclusion in the agreement of a condition relating to     
compensation. 
 
It limits the scope of the victim‟s participation to representations on the contents of 
the agreement and a condition relating to compensation. Thus, although the provision 
allows the victim an opportunity to express his opinion on specific aspects of the 
agreement, the victim‟s opinion will not countermand the decision taken by the 
prosecutor. Hence, section 105A(1)(b)(iii) is based on the policy framework of non-
veto victim participation in the dispensation of negotiated justice.  
 
 
                                                 
88
  Welling (1987: 350) who explains that the victim‟s participation right would be a right to be 
 heard by the trial court; the court would not be bound to act in accordance with the victim‟s  
 views but only to listen to them.  
89
  Welling (1987: 349). 
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4.3 Section 105A(1)(b)(iii) and victims’ rights 
It must be determined now whether the inclusion of the victim, in terms of section 
105A(1)(b)(iii), is adequate. Its adequacy will be determined by evaluating critically 
whether the section gives effect to the victim‟s rights to be informed of the agreement, 
to be present when the agreement is presented to the court, and to participate in 
concluding the agreement. The underlying principle for this evaluation is that section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) may be classified as adequate only if these basic rights are embodied 
therein.  However, before commencing the evaluation of the current provision, 
consideration will be given to the SALRC‟s proposed version of section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) as well as the SAHRC‟s evaluation of this provision in the draft 
Amendment Bill.
90
      
 
4.3.1 The SALRC proposal    
In its recommendation that the Criminal Procedure Act be amended to provide for 
plea and sentence agreements, the SALRC submitted the following provision to 
define the role of the victim in negotiated justice:  
The prosecutor, if reasonably feasible, shall afford the complainant or his  
or her legal representative the opportunity to make representations to the 
prosecutor.
91
   
 
 
An intriguing debate is reported by the SALRC regarding the inclusion of this 
provision. One commentator proposed that the words „if reasonably feasible‟ be 
deleted.
92
 He argued that it is vital that victims of crime be involved to a greater 
extent in the plea negotiation phase as it would strengthen the prosecutor‟s hand in 
                                                 
90
  See SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report and SAHRC (2001: 2).   
91
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.33. 
92
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.34 for the comment by van 
 Vuuren. 
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these negotiations.
93
 By contrast, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), 
Witwatersrand argued that the subsection be removed because, in his view, the aim of 
these negotiations is to shorten proceedings and the proposed provision would slow 
down the entire process.
94
 Thus, the DPP would have preferred the victim to be 
removed completely from the negotiations. Others argued that the provision is 
superfluous because victim consultation is not compulsory.
95
 In a notably brief 
submission, the SALRC stated „there is a clear division of opinion on the matter and it 
is impossible to reconcile the conflicting points of view‟.96 Without adding anything 
new to the debate, it recommended that the provision remain as it was because it 
placed the onus on the victim to make representations.
97
 It concluded that „to be more 
or less prescriptive does not appear to be justified‟.98  
 
The SALRC proposal is significant because the phrase „if reasonably feasible‟ 
suggests that the objective test of reasonableness be applied to determine the role of 
the victim at the negotiating stage. This test would find its way into the final 
Amendment Act. 
 
4.3.2  The SAHRC submission   
Notwithstanding the SALRC recommendation, the legislature produced the following 
provision in the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Bill:  
                                                 
93
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.34. 
94
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.36. 
95
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.36 for the comment by Levitt. 
96
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.40. 
97
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.40. 
98
  SALRC (2001) Project 73: Fourth Interim Report paragraph 6.40. 
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The prosecutor may only enter into an agreement if the circumstances permit, 
after affording the complainant or his or her representative the opportunity to 
make representations to the prosecutor.
99
 
 
The SAHRC, in its investigation of the role of the victim in plea and sentence 
negotiations, scrutinised this provision. In its analysis, the SAHRC found the phrase 
„if the circumstances permit‟ too vague because it was unclear under which 
circumstances the prosecutor would be entitled not to consult with the victim.
100
 
According to the SAHRC, this provision allowed the prosecutor a broad discretion 
and, as a result thereof, the provision failed to recognise the rights of victims.
101
 It 
explained that the provision was intended to allow the victim the opportunity to 
participate in plea and sentence negotiations. Yet, the discretion afforded to the 
prosecutor meant that the victim may be denied this opportunity.
102
 It found this 
discretion to be contrary to then provisions of the draft Victims‟ Charter.103  
 
The draft Victims‟ Charter provided the following guarantee to victims: „the 
prosecutor assigned to your case, will provide you with the opportunity for 
meaningful consultation prior to major case decisions‟.104 The SAHRC stated that 
„from a victim‟s perspective plea and sentence negotiations would in many instances 
amount to a major case decision‟. 105  Thus, the draft Charter would require the 
prosecutor to consult the victim regarding the agreement. There was, therefore, a 
contradiction between the proposed section 105A(1)(b)(iii) and the draft Charter 
insofar as the victim‟s right to participate was limited by the prosecutor‟s discretion.  
                                                 
99
  See the section 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Bill published 
 in Government Gazette No 22582 on 17 August 2001. 
100
  SAHRC (2001: 4). 
101
  SAHRC (2001: 3). 
102
  SAHRC (2001: 3). 
103
  SAHRC (2001: 3). 
104
  See paragraph 92 of the Victims‟ Charter Consultative Draft. 
105
  SAHRC (2001: 4). 
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The SAHRC concluded that allowing the prosecutor discretion to consult the victim 
did not recognise the rights of such victim.
106
 It recommended that the words „if the 
circumstances permit‟ be removed from the proposed provision.107 According to the 
SAHRC, this would be in line with the victim‟s Charter rights because prosecutorial 
discretion would then be replaced with a prosecutorial duty to consult the victim.
108
 
 
The SAHRC‟s conclusion is strengthened when it is compared to the provisions of the 
Victims‟ Charter as enacted. In terms of the Charter a victim has the right to offer 
information, which includes the right to make any contribution he wishes to make, to 
the prosecution.
109
 Thus, if the proposed Amendment Bill had been enacted its 
provisions would have been contrary to the provisions of the Charter. 
 
4.3.3 A critical evaluation of section 105A(1)(b)(iii) as enacted   
When section 105A was finally enacted, it was neither the SALRC proposal nor the 
provision contained in the Second Amendment Bill which constituted section 
105A(1)(b)(iii). The legislature, instead, decided to formulate the provision in a 
manner which had not been considered by either the SALRC or SAHRC. In terms of 
the enacted section: 
The prosecutor may enter into an agreement contemplated in paragraph (a) 
after affording the complainant or his or her representative, where it is 
reasonable to do so and taking into account the nature of and circumstance of 
the offence and the interest of the complainant, the opportunity to make 
representations to the prosecutor. 
 
                                                 
106
  SAHRC (2001: 3). 
107
  SAHRC (2001: 5). 
108
  SAHRC (2001: 5). 
109
  Article 2 of the Victims‟ Charter. 
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Du Toit et al have classified this provision as „one which seeks to promote victim 
participation‟ in the course of plea and sentence negotiations. 110  The authors are 
correct. The provision could be comprehended as a legislative attempt to include the 
victim in negotiated justice. However, from a theoretical and practical perspective, 
there is a significant difference between a provision which attempts or seeks to 
promote victims‟ rights and a provision which actually promotes victims‟ rights. A 
provision which seeks to promote the rights of victims but does not achieve the 
intended result has failed. There are at least two indications that section 105A(1)(b)(iii) 
is a futile attempt to promote victims‟ rights.  
 
4.3.3.1   The omission of the right to information 
Firstly, the provision does not require that the victim be informed of the agreement 
either before or after it has been concluded. Victimologists have advised repeatedly 
that the need for information is the need most often expressed by victims.
111
 It is to be 
expected, therefore, that legislation seeking to include victims in criminal justice 
procedures would give effect to this most basic need of victims. Yet, section 105A 
fails in this regard, rendering it difficult to defend the provision as one which really 
does incorporate the victim in negotiated justice. 
 
4.3.3.2   The qualified inclusion of the victim 
Secondly, victim participation is qualified by the criterion of reasonableness. Section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) makes the conclusion of a plea and sentence agreement contingent 
upon the prosecutor affording the victim, or his representative, an opportunity to make 
                                                 
110
  Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12). 
111
  See Karmen (1994: 177-178) and Pretorius & Louw (2005: 75-76) as well as Camerer (1997: 
  1). At 2 Camerer opines that victims have a right to expect timely information about the  
  matters which concern them.  
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representations regarding the intended agreement. However, the opportunity to make 
representations is qualified by the words „where it is reasonable to do so and taking 
into account the nature and circumstances of the offence and the interest of the 
complainant‟. These words have replaced the terms „if reasonably feasible‟112 and „if 
the circumstances permit‟ 113  contained in the SALRC proposal and the Second 
Amendment Bill respectively.  
 
This study contends that the provision does not confer discretion on the prosecutor to 
allow the victim to participate. Hawkins has defined discretion as the space between 
legal rules in which legal actors may exercise choice.
114
 In giving effect to section 
105A(1)(b)(iii), the prosecutor cannot exercise choice in the sense used by Hawkins. 
Instead he is required to test whether victim participation is objectively reasonable. 
The test of reasonableness, combined with factors which must be objectively 
determined, such as the nature and circumstances of the offence and the interest of the 
complainant, have therefore replaced the prosecutorial discretion of the Second 
Amendment Bill.
115
 This type of qualification is similar to the qualification contained 
                                                 
112
  See section 4.3.1 of the text above. 
113
  See section 4.3.2 of the text above. 
114
  Hawkins (1995: 10) explains that he uses the term legal actor to refer not only to „judges,  
 lawyers and prosecutors but also to those many other officials, such as the police, regulatory 
 inspectors, probation officers, social workers and the like, whose work involves extensive 
 decision-making in the implementation of a legal mandate‟.  
115
  Apart from the wording of section 105A(1)(b)(iii), the absence of prosecutorial discretion in 
 deciding whether the victim can make representations is evident from the directives issued by 
 the NDPP. The directives aim to regulate the prosecutor‟s discretion during plea and sentence  
 negotiations (see section 3.4.1.2 in the text above). A point of note is that when dealing with 
 the victim, the directives specify who should be consulted as opposed to whether or not they 
 can be consulted. For example, directive 10 provides that „where a child under the age of 18 is 
 the complainant, such child is to be consulted in the presence of a person in loco parentis. 
 Where such child is the victim and a person in  loco parentis the complainant, the latter is to 
 be consulted‟. Directive 11 provides that „in the case of a homicide, the relatives of the victim 
 are to be consulted‟. Whether or not these victims can be consulted and allowed to make 
representations is determined by the test of reasonableness and not prosecutorial discretion, 
 hence the directives do not regulate this aspect of the negotiations. 
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in the SALRC proposal because it is not prosecutorial discretion but rather an 
objective standard which determines the role of the victim at the negotiating stage.
116
  
 
Classen defines „reasonable‟ as that which is moderate or fair.117 He explains that 
reasonableness means considering the matter as a reasonable person normally would 
and then deciding as a reasonable person normally would decide.
118
 This objective 
standard for determining the role of the victim is, arguably, an improvement on the 
subjective standard entailed in prosecutorial discretion. Yet, the problem with 
rendering victim participation subject to the test of reasonableness, combined with the 
other objective factors, is that it begs the question: Is it ever reasonable to exclude 
victims from the criminal justice process? The answer has to be no. The wisdom of 
including victims is evident from the following submission by Welling:  
Making victims feel that their contribution is important, regardless of its actual 
value, will motivate those victims (and others) to report crimes and cooperate in the 
investigation and prosecution.
119
  
 
This point has been made repeatedly.
120
 It should be added that applying a test of 
reasonableness to determine whether or not victims are allowed to participate in 
negotiated justice is inherently problematic. This is because victim exclusion amounts 
to secondary victimisation. The victim who is refused the opportunity to participate, 
in effect, is being victimised by the criminal justice system. Thus, denying the victim 
an opportunity to make representations regarding plea and sentence negotiations 
simply cannot be justified as reasonable. In fact, the converse is true. It is 
                                                 
116
   See section 4.3.1 in the text above. 
117
   Classen (1997) issue 9 at R9. 
118
  Classen (1997) issue 4 at R16. The Appellate division cases of Vanderbijlpark Health  
 Committee v Wilson 1950 (1) SA 447 (A) at 458 and Johannesburg LLB v Kuhn 1963 (4) SA 
 666 (A) at 671 support Classen‟s submission. 
119
  Welling (1987: 309). 
120
  See Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12) and Bekker (1996: 209). 
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unreasonable to exclude the victim from such negotiations, especially where the right 
to be exercised by the victim is of a non-veto nature.  
 
It is submitted, therefore, that in this context the test of reasonableness is an 
instrument of victim oppression because it facilitates the trend toward excluding the 
victim from the criminal justice system. There is no rational basis for refusing victims 
an unqualified right to be heard.   
 
4.3.4 Rectifying the inadequacy of section 105A(1)(b)(iii)      
The victim‟s right to information, to be present when the agreement is presented to 
the court and to participate in the negotiation process have been identified as rights 
which require emphasis in the context of negotiated justice.
121
 If the purpose of 
section 105A(1)(b)(iii) is to include the victim in negotiated justice then the 
legislature‟s silence with regard to informing the victim of the agreement and the 
qualification of victim participation renders the section inadequate. If, as argued 
above, the provision does not allow the prosecutor a choice in allowing victim 
participation, then it is impossible to establish prosecutorial guidelines to regulate 
victim participation in negotiated justice. The rational solution to removing the 
inadequacy of section 105A(1)(b)(iii) is to amend it. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121
  See section 4.2 above. As stated in section 4.2.2.2 in the text above the right of presence is 
 adequately provided for by section 152 of the CPA and article 2 of the Victims‟ Charter.  
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4.4 A proposal for the amendment of section 105A(1)(b)(iii) 
It is submitted that the amendment to section 105A(1)(b)(iii) should be two-fold. 
Firstly, the test of reasonableness should be removed from the section so that victims 
are allowed an unconditional right to be heard. This is achieved by removing the 
words „where it is reasonable to do so and taking into account the nature of and 
circumstance of the offence and the interest of the complainant‟.  
 
Secondly, provision should be made for the victim‟s representation to be reduced to 
writing and submitted to the court. This is achieved by inserting the words „and where 
such representations have been made they shall be submitted to the court‟.  
 
Accordingly, the amended section would read: 
105A(1)(b)  The prosecutor may enter into an agreement contemplated in  
    paragraph (a) - (iii) after affording the complainant or his or  
    her representative the opportunity to make written   
representations to the prosecutor regarding -  
 
  (aa) the contents of the agreement; and 
  (bb) the inclusion in the agreement of a condition relating to 
   compensation or the rendering to the complainant of  
   some specific benefit or service in lieu of   
   compensation for damage or pecuniary loss.  
  and where such representations have been made they shall  
  be submitted to the court.  
 
The victim‟s representations could be reduced to writing by the victim, his 
representative or the prosecutor on the victim‟s behalf.122 The written representations 
place the court in a position to make an informed decision as to whether the 
                                                 
122
  In the case of S v Muggels (unreported CPD decision) case number SS3/2002 an affidavit 
 from the mother of the deceased was annexed to the plea and sentence agreement. The  
 affidavit was prepared by the prosecutor. Similarly, in the case of S v Vlok & Others  
 (unreported TPD decision) case number SS 15/2007 the views of the victim, Reverend Frank 
 Chikane, were included in the written agreement presented to the court. The aim of this  
 proposal is to ensure that the approach adopted in these cases becomes the norm.   
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agreement should be accepted.
123
 Welling explains that victim participation through 
the court is preferable because, by its very nature, such participation diminishes the 
prosecutor‟s power.124 Thus, having to consider the interests of the victim is viewed 
as a disincentive for prosecutors.
125
 It is difficult to establish the link between victim 
participation and a reduction in the prosecutor‟s power and this is, arguably, not the 
best explanation for the disincentive referred to by Welling. It is submitted that a 
better explanation for the disincentive is that, when considering the interests of the 
victim, prosecutors have to take cognisance of the victim‟s expectations for the 
outcome of the case. Hence, the prosecutorial disincentive lies in the fact that once the 
prosecutor has been exposed to the victim‟s expectations he cannot isolate himself or 
the case from such expectations. Victim participation through the court is preferable 
because the role of the prosecutor is to represent the interests of society.
126
 By 
contrast the victim represents only himself.
127
 The interests of society and those of the 
victim are not always identical and should conflict arise between these interests, the 
prosecutor must give priority to the interests which he represents.
128
 Unlike the 
prosecutor, the court has assumed the role of adjudicating competing interests to 
achieve a just result. Hence, adding an additional interest, namely, that of the victim 
would not conflict with the court‟s defined role.129  
 
                                                 
123
  See, for example, Goldstein (1984: 232) where the author, in considering the need for  
 consultations with the victim, concluded that the prosecutor should be obligated not only to 
 consider the victim‟s views but also to convey these views to the court, particularly when the 
 victim‟s views differ from those of the prosecution. 
124
  Welling (1987: 347). 
125
  Welling (1987: 347). 
126
  Welling (1987: 347). The author, furthermore, states that exposing the prosecutor to the  
 victim‟s  information could only enhance the prosecutor‟s ability to seek justice on behalf of 
 society. 
127
  Welling (1987: 347). 
128
  Welling (1987: 347). But, see Davis, Kunreuther & Connick (1984: 505) who state that the 
 victims‟ views may not always be identical to those of the community, but they probably are 
 often closer to the public‟s sentiments than those of courthouse professionals.  
129
  Welling (1987: 347). 
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It should be emphasised that this proposal by no means allows the victim a right to 
veto the agreement. It merely aims to ensure that all victims are allowed an 
opportunity to draw judicial attention to their individual interests.
130
 Thus, the scope 
of victim participation would be limited still to the victim commenting on the contents 
of the agreement and, if applicable, the inclusion of a compensation order.  
 
Once the victim has been allowed the unconditional right to be heard, the onus rests 
on him to exercise the right. The victim may respond to such right in one of two ways. 
He may choose not to submit a written statement to the prosecutor, in which event his 
inaction could be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard.
131
 Alternatively, the 
victim may seek to exercise his right by submitting a written statement to the 
prosecutor. This statement should then form part of the plea and sentence 
agreement.
132
  In the statement the victim could agree to or oppose the contents of the 
agreement and, where applicable, his request for compensation would be included. 
Since the victim does not have a veto right, the prosecutor would be entitled to 
conclude the agreement even where the victim has expressed his disapproval thereof. 
This also means that when the agreement, which now includes the victim‟s written 
approval or disapproval, is presented to the court, the presiding officer would be 
bound only to consider the victim‟s views and need not necessarily act in accordance 
with such views. By implication, this proposal places a positive duty on the 
prosecutor to notify the victim of the agreement. Thereby, it gives effect to the 
victim‟s right to information.  
 
                                                 
130
   See, for example, S v Vlok & Others at paragraph e, where the complainant stated that while 
 he was satisfied with the plea agreement it was extremely important for him to have the true 
 facts surrounding the attempt on his life disclosed.  
131
  See Welling (1987: 348). 
132
  Welling (1987: 348). 
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It is anticipated that this proposal will draw some substantive criticism. The 
discussion below seeks to address some of the anticipated objections.   
 
4.5 Possible objections to the proposed amendment  
The criticisms that may be levelled at the proposal may be grouped into two 
categories, namely, interests which may be impaired by the proposed amendment and 
the practical implications which such amendment may have for an already 
overburdened criminal justice system. 
  
4.5.1 Interests which may be impaired by the proposed amendment  
4.5.1.1 The interests of the accused 
Meintjies-van der Walt warns that victims‟ rights should not be promoted at the cost 
of curtailing the fundamental rights of accused persons.
133
 Opponents of victim 
participation in negotiated justice may object to the proposed amendment of section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) on the grounds that the accused is not able to confront the victim 
regarding his written statement nor may he lead evidence to contradict such statement. 
In this regard, Welling submits that victim participation will not affect the 
confrontational rights of the accused.
134
 This is because, by entering a guilty plea, the 
accused admits his guilt and waives his right to cross-examine the victim.   
 
A further interest which the accused may have is obtaining the court‟s acceptance of 
the agreement.
135
 Critics may argue that victim participation renders plea and sentence 
agreements a less attractive option to accused persons because it increases the risk 
                                                 
133
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 159). 
134
  Welling (1987: 311). 
135
  Welling (1987: 312). 
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that the court might reject the agreement.
136
 Welling responds to this type of criticism 
by explaining that, although the court‟s acceptance of the agreement may be a 
practical interest of the accused, the accused has no right to have the court assess the 
agreement on less than the total amount of information available.
137
 Hence, the 
accused has no legitimate interests which would be impaired by the proposal.  
 
4.5.1.2 The interests of the prosecutor  
There are no legitimate prosecutorial interests which would be slighted by the 
proposal.
138
 Exposing the prosecutor to the victim‟s information will improve the 
prosecutor‟s ability to meet his primary goal, namely, to negotiate justice on behalf of 
society.
139
 Prosecutors may fear that mandatory consultations with victims will 
undermine their prosecutorial discretion. This assumption is invalid. The victim‟s 
right to be heard cannot be extended to or interpreted as a victim‟s right to control the 
prosecution of the case. The proposal merely provides victims with an opportunity to 
be heard, giving them a voice and not a veto. 
 
4.5.2 The practical implications for an overburdened criminal justice   
 system 
Critics may argue that the proposed amendment of section 105A(1)(b)(iii) is not 
feasible given the existing constraints of an already overburdened criminal justice 
                                                 
136
  Welling (1987: 312). 
137
  Welling (1987: 312). 
138
  See, for example, Welling (1987: 310) who states that „the prosecutor‟s responsibility is to 
 seek justice on behalf of society and victim participation will not interfere with this goal‟.  
139
  Welling (1987: 310).  
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system.
140
 They may argue that the proposal will result in additional strain on already 
over-extended justice officials.
141
  
 
It may be argued also that victim participation will lengthen the proceedings or slow 
down the negotiations.
142
 It is submitted that these fears are based on assumptions 
which have found no support in empirical research.
143
 Furthermore, even though 
prompt and efficient procedures are interests worthy of cognisance, the criminal 
justice system embodies values higher than expediency and efficiency.
144
 Thus, the 
need for administrative efficiency should not determine the structure of our criminal 
justice system.
145
   
 
Having to notify and consult the victim regarding the agreement is undoubtedly an 
additional administrative burden. However, this additional burden is not 
insurmountable and is easily justified in relation to the importance of granting victims 
adequate recognition in negotiated justice.
146
  
 
 
                                                 
140
  See Kennard (1989: 438) where this is listed as a possible criticism which may be levelled at 
 her proposal for a victim‟s veto in negotiated justice. 
141
  See Erez (1991: 5). See also the practical implications argument present by Bruce (2005: 106) 
 and dealt with in section 4.2.1.3 in the text above.  
142
  During the negotiations surrounding the enactment of section 105A, the DPP of   
 Witwatersrand incorrectly stated that the aim of these negotiations is to shorten proceedings 
 and victim participation would slow down the entire process. See section 4.3.1 of the text 
 above for discussion.  
143
  In fact, the contrary has been proved. See Heinz & Kerstetter (1979: 358) who state that one 
 of their concerns, while conducting a field experiment, was the amount of time that the  
 conferencing with the victim might add to the disposition of cases. They found that the  
 sessions averaged approximately ten minutes and only five percent took more than twenty 
 minutes. The authors concluded that these conferences did not increase substantially the time 
 attorneys and prosecutors devoted to case dispositions.   
144
   See De Villiers (2004: 251). 
145
  See Welling (1987: 311). 
146
  See, for example, Du Toit & Snyman (2001: 154), Kennard (1989: 450) and Welling (1987: 
 306).    
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified three specific victims‟ rights which require emphasis in the 
context of negotiated justice, namely, the right to be informed of the agreement, the 
right to be present when the agreement is presented to the court and the right to 
participate in the agreement. It was established that the recognition of these rights is 
essential both to the victim and for the continued functioning of the criminal justice 
system. Adequate recognition not only would enhance the transparency of negotiated 
justice but also would eliminate the possibility of secondary victimisation in this 
context. 
 
An evaluation of section 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the CPA demonstrates that the rights of 
the victim are not catered for adequately. The provision requires that an objective 
standard be applied to determine whether it would be reasonable to allow the victim to 
fulfil any role in the negotiations. The peculiar manner in which this test would have 
to be applied was identified by the simple question: Is it ever reasonable to exclude 
the victim? It was concluded that victim exclusion is never reasonable as this 
constitutes secondary victimisation. It was submitted, accordingly, that amendment is 
necessary to remove the inadequacies of section 105A(1)(b)(iii).  
 
The amendment proposed seeks to ensure that the criminal justice system does not 
inflict a second wound upon the victim. This is achieved by allowing the victim an 
unconditional non-veto right to participate in the negotiations. Although a proposal 
for this form of participation ensures that the victim‟s basic rights are implemented, it 
was acknowledged that the proposal may raise some objections. Accordingly, some of 
the possible objections to the proposal were addressed in the latter part of the chapter.  
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In addition to victims being endowed with an unconditional right to participate in plea 
and sentence negotiations, it is desirable that victims be given a voice when the court 
considers the sentence agreement concluded between the state and the accused. The 
next chapter, therefore, considers the role of the victim when the court scrutinises the 
sentence agreement. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT SENTENCING: THE USE OF VICTIM 
IMPACT STATEMENTS IN NEGOTIATED JUSTICE 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Sentencing represents the official evaluation of the seriousness of the harm inflicted 
by the offender and there are two lives which are shaped profoundly by this 
evaluation, namely, that of the offender and that of the victim.
1
 Yet, the offender has a 
right to address the court before the sentence is determined and the victim does not.
2
 
A neglected aspect of the criminal justice system is the impact of crime on victims. 
Empirical research reveals that the effect of the crime on the victim is seldom 
considered in the context of negotiated justice.
3
  
 
It has been argued that, in the interest of fairness, victims should be awarded the right 
to address the court when it considers a suitable sentence.
4
 Internationally, victim 
impact statements have been identified as the primary method for implementing such 
a right.
5
 South African law, at present, contains draft legislation proposing the use of 
victim impact statements. This chapter considers the legal and practical aspects of 
these statements in the context of negotiated justice. It commences by analysing the 
role of presiding officers during sentencing and the sentencing principles which apply 
when a suitable sentence is determined. Thereafter, sentencing and the role of the 
                                                 
1
  See Karmen (1994: 202). 
2
  Karmen (1994: 202). 
3
  See Van der Merwe (2007: 11) who records that this occurs in 16 out of 30 sexual offences.  
4
  Van der Merwe (2007: 11). 
5
  See Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 166) who explains that countries such as the USA, Canada, 
 Australia and New Zealand have enacted legislation requiring courts to consider victim impact 
 statements before sentencing. 
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victim in this context will be considered. Importantly, this chapter will canvass the 
need for the court to be exposed to a victim impact statement in the context of 
negotiated justice.  
 
5.2  Sentencing  
5.2.1 An introduction to sentencing  
Sentencing has been defined, most accurately, as „the judicial determination of a legal 
sanction upon a person convicted of an offence‟.6 It has been described as a public 
ritual of symbolic as well as practical significance because it is the moment when the 
court, speaking on behalf of society, declares the appropriate penalty for the unlawful 
conduct of the offender.
7
   
 
Section 274(1) of the CPA provides that a court, before passing sentence, may receive 
such evidence as it thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the proper sentence to be 
passed. The quasi-inquisitorial approach contained in this provision places the 
presiding officer at the centre of the sentencing process.
8
  
 
The sentencing process entails determining the weight evidence in mitigation and 
aggravation should be afforded.
9
 During this process the presiding officer exercises a 
wide discretion. Discretion has been described as the pillar of the law of sentencing.
10
 
Its main advantage is that courts can adapt their sentences to provide for the slightest 
                                                 
6
  John Howard Society of Alberta (1999: 10). 
7
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 1.1. 
8
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: The Draft Sentencing Framework Bill 2000 at paragraphs 
 3.4.8 and 3.4.15. 
9
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: The Draft Sentencing Framework Bill 2000 at paragraph 3.4.8. 
10
  See Du Toit (1981: 127). 
 
 
 
 
   110 
differences between cases.
11
 This is also a disadvantage, in that the same case can be 
heard by two different presiding officers and there may be a substantial difference in 
the sentences that are imposed.
12
 Despite this disadvantage, it is accepted generally 
that sentencing requires a flexible approach. 
 
5.2.2 The role of the presiding officer   
The role of the presiding officer at sentencing is to determine and then impose the 
sentence which he considers suitable.
13
 Determining a suitable sentence may be 
viewed as the „presiding officer‟s most difficult task‟.14 To assist in determining a 
suitable sentence, South African courts have established three factors, the triad as 
enunciated in Zinn, which the presiding officer has to consider. They are: the nature 
and seriousness of the offence, the interests of the community and the personal 
circumstances of the accused.
15
 Bekker, Geldenhuys et al explain that these 
considerations must then be converted into a sentence of some kind and some 
extent.
16
  
 
5.2.3 The sentencing triad and the interests of victims  
The triad does not mention specifically the role of the victim during sentencing and 
for this reason victim rights advocates view the situation at sentencing as unbalanced. 
Meintjies-van der Walt argues, with approval by some, that the traditional triad causes 
                                                 
11
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 262). 
12
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 262). 
13
  For the meaning of the term „suitable sentence‟ see S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862 
 paragraph g where the court held that punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, 
 be fair to society, and be blended with a measure of mercy according to the circumstances. See 
 also SALRC (2000) TheDraft Sentencing Framework Bill 2000 paragraph 3.1.3. The SALRC 
 explains  that a sentence will be regarded as constitutionally acceptable, and thus suitable, if 
 the punishment imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.    
14
  See Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 260).  
15
  S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540 paragraph g. 
16
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (2003: 260). 
 
 
 
 
   111 
victim exclusion at the sentencing stage.
17
 In support of her argument she relies on the 
dictum in Zinn to the effect that „what has to be considered at sentencing is the triad 
which consists of the crime, the offender and the interests of society‟.18 According to 
the author, this dictum demonstrates the exclusion of victims‟ interests because the 
triad leaves no room for such interests to be considered.
19
   
 
It is submitted that, although Meintjies-van der Walt‟s analysis of the Zinn dictum is 
correct, it is possible to reach a different conclusion about the role of the victim under 
the sentencing triad. The definitive aim of the sentencing process is for the presiding 
officer to decide and impose a suitable sentence by making a value judgment.
20
 The 
principle which underlines this process is that a value judgment may be made only, 
and thus a sentencing discretion may be exercised only, after the presiding officer has 
heard sufficient factual information.
21
 By comparison, the Zinn dictum, as analysed by 
Meintjies-van der Walt, creates the impression that there are limitations to the ambit 
of the triad. The impression created is that the court may consider only facts 
surrounding the crime, the offender and the interests of society. If these delineate the 
ambit of the triad then they also delineate the ambit of the presiding officer‟s 
discretion at sentencing. This cannot be the correct interpretation as sentencing is 
considered a matter pre-eminently for the discretion of the court.
22
 For this reason 
alternative interpretations of the ambit of the triad, with particular regard to the 
interests and role of the victim, are considered below.   
                                                 
17
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 169). For approval of the author‟s argument see Women & 
 Human Rights Project, Community Law Centre, UWC and the Institute of Criminology UCT 
 (1999: 136). 
18
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 169) and also S v Zinn at 540 paragraph g. 
19
  Meintjies-van der Walt (1998: 169).  
20
  Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (1993: 265).  
21
  See Bekker, Geldenhuys et al (1993: 266) and further Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 653). 
22
  See Du Toit et al (1993: 28 -10A). The authors state, further, that a wide discretion is allowed 
 to a trial court in the assessment of punishment except in the case where a minimum sentence 
 is set by statute. 
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Firstly, when applying the triad, a presiding officer could have regard to the impact of 
the crime on the victim when considering the nature and seriousness of the offence 
and the interests of the community. It has been argued that the triad elements are 
broad enough to include such consideration.
23
 This interpretation avoids the 
conclusion that victims‟ interests are excluded by the application of the triad.  
 
Secondly, it is trite that in our law the courts, in considering sentence, are not 
confined to those facts placed before it by the parties.
24
 The presiding officer‟s 
sentencing discretion can be exercised properly only if all the facts relevant to the 
matter are considered. It follows, therefore, that a presiding officer has the discretion 
to consider factors which are relevant but which may fall outside of the ambit of the 
triad.
25
 In this regard, it is submitted that a statement made by the victim about the 
impact of the crime on his life is a relevant fact. Thus, if the ambit of the triad cannot 
be interpreted as broad enough to include the interests of the victim, then the 
presiding officer should exercise his discretion outside of the triad and take into 
account the interests of the victim when determining a suitable sentence.
26
 Hence, 
even if the interest of the victim is classified as a factor falling outside of the ambit of 
the triad, the presiding officer still has the discretion to take it into account. The 
                                                 
23
  See, for example, Women & Human Rights Project, Community Law Centre, UWC and the 
 Institute of Criminology UCT (1999: 137). The authors submit that in order to gauge the  
 seriousness of the offence and the impact of the crime on the interests of the community, it is 
 crucial for the presiding officer to have sufficient information about how the crime affected 
 the victim. 
24
  See Du Toit et al (1993: 15-18) and further S v Dlamini 1992 (1) SA 18 (A) at 30 paragraph d 
and 31 paragraph d.  
25
  See Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 653) and further SALRC (2000) The Draft Sentencing 
 Framework Bill 2000 paragraph 3.4.8. The SALRC explains that the court is in a position to 
form the correct impressions and make the complex value judgment required for the  
 imposition of a suitable sentence when all the facts relevant to the matter are presented.  
26
  See, for example, Mbuyase and Others v Rex 1939 NPD 228 at 231 where Selke J states that 
 „to enable a magistrate, or for that matter, anyone exercising judicial functions, to decide upon 
 what is an appropriate sentence in the case of an individual accused, he is entitled to avail 
 himself of many sources of information, and of many circumstances affecting that individual, 
 some of which it would not be proper for him to regard in coming to a conclusion as to  
 whether that accused were guilty or not guilty‟.     
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application of the triad, therefore, should not be interpreted as contributing towards 
the exclusion of victims at the sentencing stage.   
 
5.3 Sentencing and negotiated justice 
Negotiated justice has not altered the sentencing process described above 
significantly. In negotiated justice the parties reach an agreement on the sentence they 
consider suitable and they then present that sentence to the court. Notwithstanding the 
sentence agreement between the parties, section 105A(8) of the CPA requires that the 
court be satisfied that the sentence presented by the parties is a just sentence.
27
 Thus, 
judicial approval of the agreed sentence is required.
28
 Our courts have held that, in 
determining whether a sentence agreement is just, the presiding officer must have 
regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, the interests of the community and 
the personal circumstances of the accused.
29
 In other words, the well established 
elements relevant in respect of sentencing triad, and the interpretation problems 
associated therewith, are applicable also where section 105A agreements have been 
concluded.
30
 
 
5.3.1 The role of the victim when the court considers the sentence agreement  
Section 105A has been described as significant because it seeks to promote victim 
participation at the sentencing stage of negotiated justice.
31
 This encouraging 
description could be attributed to section 105A(7) which reads: 
                                                 
27
  See Du Toit et al (1993: 15-20). According to the authors the provision prevents the parties 
 from subtly usurping the court‟s sentencing function.  
28
  See section 3.4.2 in the text above. 
29
  See S v Sassin 2003 (4) All SA 506 (NC) at paragraph 15.5-15.8 and also S v Esterhuizen 
 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494 paragraph c. 
30
  See Watney (2006: 227).  
31
  See Du Toit et al (1993: 15-12) and also S v Sassin at paragraph 11.4. 
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  (a) If the court is satisfied that the accused admits the allegations in the 
   charge  and that he or she is guilty of the offence in respect of which
   the agreement  was entered into, the court shall proceed to consider  the 
   sentence agreement.  
  (b)  For purposes of paragraph (a), the court –  
   (i) may-  
   (aa)  direct relevant questions, including questions about  
  previous convictions of the accused, to the prosecutor 
  and the accused; and  
     (bb)  hear evidence, including evidence or a statement by or 
     on behalf of the accused or the complainant. 
   (ii) must, if the offence concerned is an offence   
   (aa)  referred to in the Schedule to the Criminal Law  
   Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 105 of 1997); or  
     (bb)  for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law 
     creating the offence have due regard to that Act or law. 
 
 
According to Du Toit et al, the fact that the victim, as complainant, is mentioned 
specifically in section 105A(7) accentuates the importance of victim participation at 
the sentencing stage.
32
 Although reference to the court having regard to evidence or a 
statement made by the victim is notable, the use of the word „may‟ reveals that the 
court has discretion in determining whether or not to hear the evidence or receive the 
statement when considering the sentence agreement.
33
 A further issue arising from 
this provision is whether a victim impact statement may be introduced at this stage of 
the proceedings.  
 
5.3.2 The relevance of a statement made by the victim 
When the court exercises its sentencing discretion the factual information required 
embraces more than information on the elements of the crime.
34
 Van der Merwe & 
Muller submit that if a court is to exercise its sentencing discretion properly, it is 
                                                 
32
  See Du Toit et al (1993: 15-18). 
33
  See SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 at paragraph 40.16.6 where the Project 
 Committee opines that the general approach which should be adopted is that the court be  
 directed  to consider information by a victim as to the impact of the crime, rather than allowing 
 the court to use its discretion about whether or not to consider the information. 
34
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 653). 
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necessary for the presiding officer to have access to the victim‟s narrative as well.35 In 
support of this submission, presiding officers themselves, and with good reason, have 
expressed a need to be better informed about the impact of the crime on the victim.
36
 
 
In Holtzhausen v Roodt, Satchwell J, in discussing a presiding officer‟s inability to 
comprehend the extent of harm caused to a rape victim, stated that: 
Rape is an experience so devastating in its consequences that it is rightly 
perceived as striking at the very fundament of human, particularly female, 
privacy, dignity and personhood. Yet I acknowledge that the ability of a 
judicial officer such as myself to fully comprehend the kaleidoscope of 
emotion and experience, of both rapist and rape survivor, is extremely 
limited.
37
   
 
A submission to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development prepared by 
the Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women demonstrates that the 
victim‟s experience is not understood by the courts.38 The authors list recent decisions 
by both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) which reveal the 
court‟s inability to comprehend the range of emotions and suffering a particular 
victim may have experienced.
39
 One of the cases referred to is S v G.
40
  In this case 
the accused was convicted on a charge of raping a ten-year-old girl.
41
 The case was 
referred to the High Court for sentencing. In the High Court, Borchers J stated that 
even though the accused showed no remorse for his actions, there were substantial 
and compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the mandatory life sentence. 
The circumstances referred to by the court include the following: that he was a first 
                                                 
35
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 653).  
36
  See Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA) at 205 paragraph 
 e.   
37
  Holtzhausen v Roodt 1997 (4) SA 766 (WLD) at 778 paragraph h. 
38
  Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women (2005: 12-17).      
39
  Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women (2005: 17). See also Van der Merwe 
 & Muller (2006: 653) who state that it is extremely difficult for any individual, even a highly 
 experienced person such as a magistrate or a judge, to comprehend fully the emotions which 
 the victim may have experienced.   
40
  S v G 2004 (2) SACR 296 (W) at 296 paragraph a. 
41
  Supra at 296 paragraph a - 297 paragraph f. 
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offender, that he had already been in custody for two years, that the violence he 
employed „was not excessive‟ and hence that he did not inflict serious physical 
injuries on the victim, and that this was not among the worst cases of rape that appear 
before the courts in South Africa.
42
 Borchers J stated that she felt bound by the 
decisions of the SCA in Abrahams
43
 and Mahomotsa.
44
 In both Abrahams and 
Mahomotsa the SCA did not impose life sentences for rape because, according to the 
presiding officers, the victims were not seriously injured physically and no excessive 
violence was employed.
45
  
 
The Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women raised the following 
concern about the judgments: 
The judges (sic) (both the HC and SCA judges) reference to the violence the 
rapist used as “not excessive” misses the point that rape, by definition, is 
excessive force. Further, the reliance on the fact that the rape did not inflict 
“serious physical injuries” also fails to recognise the distinct nature of rape 
whereas the most serious, yet invisible, injuries are often those to the dignity 
and psychological well-being of women.
46
 
 
This study accepts that courts (jealously) guard against interference with their 
sentencing discretion. However, the relevance of the victim‟s voice at sentencing is 
established surely by the presiding officer‟s admission in Holtzhausen v Roodt. If the 
express declaration in Holtzhausen v Roodt will not suffice, then the cases of S v G, 
Abrahams and Mahomotsa demonstrate, firstly, the presiding officer‟s inability to 
comprehend the plight of victims and, secondly, the relevance of a victim statement at 
sentencing. It is crucial, therefore, that the victim be allowed the opportunity to 
address the court during sentencing. Such statement is especially appropriate in the 
                                                 
42
  Supra at 299 paragraph e. 
43
  S v Abrahams 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA) at 124 paragraph g - 125 paragraph g.  
44
  S v Mahomotsa 2002 (2) SACR 435 (SCA) at paragraph 18. 
45
  S v G at 299 paragraph d. 
46
  Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women (2005: 12), original emphasis.  
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context of negotiated justice as the court has not been exposed to the victim‟s 
narrative. It is clear that section 105A(7) seeks to include evidence on the impact of 
the crime on the victim and it is submitted, therefore, that the court should not be 
entitled to exclude a statement from a victim as such statement is relevant to 
determining whether the sentence agreement is just.  
 
5.3.3 Rectifying the inadequacy of section 105A(7) 
It is vital that presiding officers do not have discretion in hearing from the victim. 
Erez explains that presiding officers employ several justifications in discarding victim 
input.
47
 The most common justification offered for refusing to hear from the victim is 
that the input is unreliable because of its subjective or emotional nature.
48
 Erez‟s 
response to this is that „to resist victims‟ input because, for instance, it is subjective is 
to suggest that there is an objective way to measure harm or to experience loss, 
damage and injury‟.49 What the author is saying is that harm is perceived differently, 
according to the victim‟s demographic and personal attributes, and there is no 
objective way to measure harm without doing an injustice to the experience of the 
victim in question.
50
 A proper and meaningful assessment of the harm inflicted by the 
offender is done when his victim is allowed to address the court on the consequences 
and effect of the harm. To ensure that victims are allowed an opportunity to address 
the court when it considers the sentence agreement and, furthermore, to ensure that 
presiding officers comprehend the plight of victims in the context of negotiated justice, 
the only sensible means to remedy the inadequacy of section 105A(7) is amendment. 
 
                                                 
47
  Erez (1999: 554). 
48
  Erez (1999: 554). 
49
  Erez (1999: 554). 
50
  Erez (1999: 555). 
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5.4 A proposal for the amendment of section 105A(7) 
It is proposed that the court‟s discretion in hearing evidence or receiving a statement 
from the victim be removed from section 105A(7).   
 
Accordingly, the amended section would read: 
 105A(7)(a) If the court is satisfied that the accused admits the allegations in the 
  charge and that he or she is guilty of the offence in respect of which 
  the agreement was entered into, the court shall proceed to consider the 
  sentence agreement.  
      (b)  For purposes of paragraph (a), the court –  
       (i) may-    
  (aa)  direct relevant questions, including questions about the 
   previous convictions of the accused, to the prosecutor 
   and the accused; and  
    (bb)  hear evidence, including evidence or a statement by or 
     on behalf of the accused. 
             (ii) must, if the offence concerned is an offence   
  (aa)  referred to in the Schedule to the Criminal Law  
   Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 105 of 1997); or  
    (bb)  for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law 
     creating the offence have due regard to that Act or law. 
             (iii) must hear evidence, including evidence or a statement by or on 
                   behalf of the complainant where such evidence is available. 
 
 
By exposing itself to evidence from the victim, the court is able to test the 
appropriateness of the sentence negotiated between the prosecutor and the accused in 
the light of the victim‟s narration of the harm inflicted by the accused. Hence, the 
court will be equipped better to fulfil its mandate in accordance with section 105A if 
it is considers an impact statement made by the victim. The clause „where such 
evidence is available‟ refers to instances where the victim has elected not to provide a 
statement. In this regard, it is submitted that the general principles relevant to victim 
impact statements provide a foundation for the proposed amendment.   
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5.5 The use of victim impact statements in negotiated justice 
A victim impact statement has been defined as a voluntary statement made by a 
victim of crime in which he expresses the impact which the crime has had upon him 
and, if applicable, his family.
51
 In its Issue Paper on Sentencing: Restorative Justice, 
the SALRC proposed that victim impact statements be admissible at sentencing 
hearings.
52
 Since then, the SALRC has recommended the introduction of a legislative 
provision that prescribes the consideration of victim impact statements by the court 
for sentencing purposes, rather than allowing the court discretion to do so.
53
 These 
recommendations not only have revived the victims‟ right movement in South Africa 
but also have spawned political debate on the role of victims in the criminal justice 
system.
54
   
 
At this point the reader‟s attention is drawn to the rationale, form and content, 
evidentiary aspects and pending legislative framework of victim impact statements. 
Thereafter, the academic debate surrounding the use of these statements is considered. 
 
5.5.1 The rationale for the use of victim impact statements 
There are a number of acceptable justifications for the use of victim impact 
statements.
55
 Van der Merwe & Muller list the following theories: 
 The improvement of sentencing outcomes, which includes both 
retributive-proportionate as well as restorative justice (reparation and 
compensation) arguments. 
                                                 
51
   Clarke, Davis & Booysen (2003: 44). 
52
   SALRC (2000) Project 82: Issue Paper 7 paragraph 4.7.  
53
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: Discussion Paper 91  paragraph 3.7.23 and also SALRC  
 (2001) Project 102: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.16.6. 
54
   See, for example, the speech delivered by Helen Zille of the Democratic Alliance at Victims‟ 
   of Crime Imbizo held in Durban on 2 August 2008 and section 2.5.2 in the text  above for 
  discussion. 
55
   Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 651-652). 
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 The enhancement of system efficiency and service quality in that the 
criminal justice system may become more sensitive to the needs of victims, 
and, in turn, victims are more satisfied with the system because of their 
participation. 
 The benefit for victims in that their contribution will be of therapeutic and 
cathartic value for themselves. 
 The fourth theory focuses on process values, citizenship and victims‟ 
rights based on participatory democracy and respect for individual dignity 
and humaneness.
 56
 
 
In addition, they list nine purposes for the use of victim impact statements observed in 
international literature, namely:   
 Providing presiding officers with information about the seriousness of the 
crime and, to a lesser extent, about the culpability of the offender in order 
to assist the court in imposing a sentence consistent with the sentencing 
principles. 
 Providing the court with a direct source of information about the victims‟ 
needs which may assist in the determination of a more appropriate, 
reparative sanction. 
 Providing the court with information about the appropriate conditions that 
might be imposed on the offender. 
 Providing the victim with a public forum in which to make a statement 
reflecting his or her suffering. 
 Providing the court with an opportunity to recognise the wrong committed 
against an individual victim. 
 Providing the victim with an opportunity to communicate the effects of the 
crime to the offender. 
 Increasing the offender‟s awareness of the extent of the harm. 
 Allowing victims to participate in sentencing, albeit in a non-determinate 
way. 
 Providing the idea that, although crimes are committed against the state, 
crimes are also committed against individuals.
 57
 
 
While these motivations all have merit, simplification is desirable. On the strength of 
the information provided by Van der Merwe & Muller, it is possible to reduce the 
purpose of victim impact statements to two principal rationales.  
 
                                                 
56
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 651-652). See also Edwards (2001: 39) as cited by Van der 
 Merwe & Muller (2006: 651). 
57
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 652). The international literature referred to by the authors 
 was compiled by Roberts (2003: 371-372). 
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The first rationale for the use of victim impact statements is that they allow the victim 
a voice at the sentencing stage.
58
 Thus, the person directly affected by the crime is 
allowed to address the court during its decision-making process. By according the 
victim a voice at sentencing, the victim‟s need for a formal procedural right within the 
criminal justice context is addressed.
59
 There are a number of supplementary 
consequences which flow from this. Thus, victims may be more satisfied with the 
criminal justice system because it acknowledges the personal nature of the crime and 
the harm they have suffered.
60
  It also allows the victim an opportunity to 
communicate the effect of the crime to the offender. 
 
The second rationale for the use of victim impact statements has already been 
mentioned above, namely, by informing the court of the impact of the crime on the 
victim, these statements serve as a source of information for the court when exercising 
its sentencing discretion.
61
 It not only allows the presiding officer a comprehensive 
understanding of the impact of the crime on the victim, but also prevents 
inappropriate assumptions about the effects of the crime.
62
 The ultimate purpose of 
victim impact statements is to impress upon the court the effect of the offence on the 
victim.
63
 It also reminds the presiding officer that behind the crime is a real person, 
who is the victim. This reminder is especially important in the context of negotiated 
justice because the court is not exposed to the testimony of the victim. In practice, 
prosecutors frequently lead evidence on the impact of the crime on the victim during a 
                                                 
58
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 3.4.20.   
59
  See Snyman (1999: 31). 
60
  The National Centre for Victims of Crime (2007: 2). 
61
  See section 5.2.2 in the text above. See also Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 653). 
62
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.16.5. 
63
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Discussion Paper 91 Appendix B paragraph 4.7 
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trial.
64
 The absence of a trial when a plea and sentence agreement is presented to the 
court motivates further the need for victim impact statements in the context of 
negotiated justice.
65
  
 
5.5.2 Form and content of victim impact statements 
Victim impact statements are presented to the court after it has reached a guilty 
verdict and before the sentence is imposed. Although they are usually written 
statements, they can take an oral form.
66
 These statements generally include a 
description of the harm, in physical, psychological and economic terms, which the 
crime has had, and will continue to have, on the victim.
67
 The idea is that the victim 
be allowed to say whatever he needs to say, with the emphasis being on the fact that 
the statement is made in his own words and voluntarily.
68
   
 
Whether a victim impact statement should include the victim‟s opinion as to the 
sentence to be imposed is a thorny issue.
69
 The lack of consensus between the SALRC 
Project Committees is an indication that this is a particularly difficult issue to address. 
According to the Project Committee on the Draft Sentencing Framework Bill:  
                                                 
64
  See SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.16.4.   
65
  In fact, the adversarial trial system is circumvented by negotiated justice and as such neither 
 the state nor the accused present any witnesses. 
66
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report at paragraph 3.4.2. See also Clarke, Davis & Booysen 
 (2003: 44) who explain that an oral victim impact statement can be submitted by audio, video 
 or other electronic means. 
67
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report at paragraph 3.4.21 and further Van der Merwe & 
 Muller (2006: 650). See also Appendix C. Paragraphs 1-14 allow the victim to describe the 
 extent of harm he has suffered.  
68
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 661). See also Clarke, Davis & Booysen (2003: 45) who 
 state that victims should be allowed to discuss their feelings about what has happened to them 
 freely, and as long as the statement is not abusive or offensive in any way, victims should be 
 encouraged to write it as they choose.  
69
  See Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 656) for their discussion on conflicting international 
 views. See also Appendix C paragraph 15 where provision is made for the victim‟s opinion on 
 sentencing. 
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Victim impact statements ought to address the actual physical, psychological, 
social and financial consequences of the offence on the victim and not the 
question of an appropriate sentence which ought to be imposed.
 70
 
 
By contrast, the Project Committee on Sexual Offences states that:  
While the Committee acknowledges the broad discretion which the courts 
have in determining an appropriate sentence, it believes that complainants 
should be allowed an opportunity to express their opinion in the victim impact 
statement on the question of an appropriate sentence, as is permitted in certain 
other jurisdictions.
 71
     
 
It adds:  
There is no harm in allowing a victim to make recommendations regarding an 
appropriate sentence to the presiding officer, provided that it is well 
understood that the presiding officer is under no obligation to follow this 
recommendation.
72
 
 
 
Although the Project Committee on the Draft Sentencing Framework Bill did not 
provide any reasons for opposing the victim‟s opinion on sentence, there are at least 
two reasons which might have been raised. Firstly, it has been argued that victims 
may find it distressing to have their recommendations ignored by the presiding 
officer.
73
 Hence, it may be more damaging to the victim to make a sentence 
recommendation which may be ignored than not being allowed to make such 
recommendation. Secondly, the victim‟s recommendation regarding a specific 
sentence may be seen by a presiding officer to be inappropriate because the victim 
usually has no legal background and may simply be seeking revenge.
74
  
 
                                                 
70
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Discussion Paper 91 Appendix B Part 1 paragraph 4.7. 
71
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.18.1. 
72
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.18.1. 
73
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 657). 
74
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 657). See also Ashworth (1986: 86-122). At 113 the author 
 demonstrates his disapproval of the victim‟s opinion on sentence by stating that „the further 
 step of inviting the victim‟s views on the appropriate sentence can have little justification. 
 Most victims will lack knowledge of the range of options, normal sentencing level, penal  
 history and the problems of penal policy‟.   
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Yet, most of the available literature favours the approach adopted by the Project 
Committee on Sexual Offences.
75
 Van der Merwe & Muller opine that if victims are 
advised that presiding officers are under no obligation to follow the sentence 
recommendation it would not be distressing to have their recommendations 
overlooked.
76
 They argue that providing victims with even a small degree of control 
over the accused‟s fate may help them regain their sense of agency in general.77 
Furthermore, it may be that, through the recommendation of a lenient sentence, the 
victim is allowed the opportunity to show mercy to the offender.
78
 It is, therefore, 
inappropriate to assume that victims, in general, simply will be seeking revenge when 
recommending a sentence.
79
  
 
The Victims‟ Charter does not settle the debate between the Project Committees. It 
simply provides that the victim may make a statement to the court to bring the impact 
of the crime to the court‟s attention.80 This does not assist with establishing whether 
the statement should include the victim‟s opinion on sentencing. By contrast, the 
Minimum Standards is more suggestive. It provides that:  
The prosecutor may submit a victim impact statement or lead further evidence 
in support of an appropriate sentence, where available and relevant.
81
  
 
Van der Merwe & Muller assert that the phrase „in support of an appropriate sentence‟ 
could be interpreted to include a suggestion by the victim regarding sentence.
82
  This 
would mean that the provision should be understood in the following way:  
                                                 
75
  See, for example, Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 657) and Women & Human Rights  
 Project,  Community Law Centre, UWC and the Institute of Criminology UCT (1999: 141). 
76
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 657).  
77
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 657). See also Batley (2005: 120) and  Henderson (1985: 
 958) for discussions on the loss of control caused by victimisation and the victim‟s need to 
 regain that sense of control.  
78
  Henderson (1985: 958). 
79
  It is submitted, however, that if the court does encounter such victim it would not be obliged 
 to give effect to a vengeful sentence recommendation. 
80
  See article 2 of the Victims‟ Charter.  
81
  See the paragraph 19 of Minimum Standards on Services for Victims of Crime. 
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1. The prosecutor may submit a victim impact statement in support of an 
appropriate sentence; or  
2. The prosecutor may lead further evidence in support of an appropriate 
sentence.  
Although interpreting the provision in this manner would allow the victim to suggest 
an appropriate sentence, it is submitted that an alternative interpretation is possible, 
namely: 
1. The prosecutor may submit a victim impact statement; or 
2. The prosecutor may lead further evidence in support of an appropriate 
sentence. 
If the latter interpretation is preferred, it would mean that the content of a victim 
impact statement and, more specifically, the question as to whether the victim can 
include a sentence recommendation in his statement is not settled by the Minimum 
Standards.   
 
Both the Victims‟ Charter and Minimum Standards have formulated the position too 
vaguely. Whether a sentence recommendation by the victim should be included in the 
victim impact statement should have been addressed more directly by both documents. 
It is submitted, however, that the approach adopted by the Project Committee on 
Sexual Offences be preferred. There can be no harm in exposing the court to a 
victim‟s sentence recommendation as the court would not be bound to accept such 
recommendation. In addition, to the motivations put forward by the Project 
Committee, it is submitted that qualifying the sentence recommendation in this 
                                                                                                                                            
82
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 657-658). 
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manner minimises the perception that there is interference with the sentencing 
discretion of presiding officers.
83
 
 
5.5.3 Evidentiary aspects of victim impact statements 
Generally, the rules of evidence applying to the merits of the case will also apply to 
the sentencing procedure. However, South African courts have adopted a liberal 
attitude with regard to evidence produced during sentencing.
84
 The SALRC warns that 
this does not mean that all the rules of evidence are to be ignored during the 
sentencing stage.
85
 Yet, where it is suitable to do so, the SALRC agrees that a strict 
and technical approach to these rules should not be adhered to since it may result in 
the exclusion of information which is relevant to determining a suitable sentence.
86
  
 
5.5.3.1   Admissibility 
In terms of section 210 of the CPA, „no evidence as to any fact, matter or thing shall 
be admissible which is irrelevant or immaterial and which cannot conduce to prove or 
disprove any point or fact at issue in criminal proceedings‟. The provision states the 
rule of admissibility in its negative form, namely, irrelevant evidence is 
inadmissible.
87
 Schwikkard et al explain that there are no degrees of admissibility.
88
 
Evidence is either admissible or inadmissible.
89
  
 
                                                 
83
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 657). 
84
  See the case of S v Gqabi 1964 (1) SA 261 (T) where the court relaxed the rules of evidence at 
 sentencing by allowing hearsay evidence. See also SALRC (2000) The Draft Sentencing  
 Framework Bill 2000 paragraph 3.4.8 where the SALRC states that „in general, the court  
 allows the parties considerable leeway in the presentation of evidence and address on  
 sentencing and are not too strict in this regard‟.   
85
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.11.3. 
86
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.11.3. 
87
  Section 2 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 contains a similar provision. 
88
  See Schwikkard et al (2002: 20). 
89
  Schwikkard et al (2002: 20). 
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The admissibility of evidence is determined by reference to its relevance and in 
determining relevance the question is ultimately whether the evidence can assist the 
court. The relevance of hearing from the victim at sentencing has already been 
established above.
90
 However, it is necessary to re-state the point that exposing the 
court to the victim‟s narrative, by means of a victim impact statement, will assist the 
court in determining a suitable sentence. Victim impact statements may, therefore, be 
classified as relevant evidence in accordance with section 210 of the CPA. 
 
A further issue affecting the admissibility of a victim impact statement is the 
constitutionality of such statement. Generally, victim impact statements are accepted 
as constitutional because the accused‟s guilt is established before the statement is 
introduced.
91
 Admitting such statements, therefore, would not affect the accused‟s 
constitutional right to due process.
92
 However, the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Booth v Maryland has cast doubt on the constitutionality of victim impact 
statements in certain instances.
93
 In this case the court stated that:  
Victim impact statements are irrelevant to capital sentencing decisions because its 
admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the 
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
94
  
 
There are two crucial distinctions between the South African legal landscape in which 
these statements would apply and the United States of America. Firstly, South Africa 
abolished the jury system in criminal cases in 1969 and, secondly, in 1995 the South 
                                                 
90
  See section 5.3.2 in the text above. 
91
  See Kennard (1989: 427).  
92
  See section 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa for the rights of accused, 
 arrested and detained persons. 
93
  Booth v Maryland 107 S. Ct. 2529-2536 (1987) United States Supreme Court of Appeal. See 
 Kennard (1989: 428) for discussion.  
94
  Booth v Maryland at 2533. 
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African Constitutional Court held that capital punishment was unconstitutional.
 95
 
Thus, the risks envisaged by the United States Supreme Court do not apply in the 
South African context. 
 
Notwithstanding its comfortable classification as admissible evidence, the prejudicial 
effect of written victim impact statements remains a topical issue.  According to the 
SALRC, there must be safeguards against an offender being prejudiced by a written 
victim impact statement which is inaccurate.
96
 To this end, the SALRC recommends 
that the victim should be called to testify in support of the victim impact statement 
where the contents of the statement are challenged.
97
 This recommendation has merit. 
Relevant evidence can and has been excluded on the basis of its prejudicial effect 
causing a procedural disadvantage to either of the parties.
98
 It would be appropriate, 
therefore, for the victim to testify in support of his written statement where there is 
doubt as to its accuracy. Van der Merwe & Muller, correctly, qualify the SALRC 
recommendation by adding that a victim who is called upon to testify in support of a 
statement should be given the choice to withdraw the statement.
99
 This qualification is 
notable because it conforms to the underlying principle that victim impact statements 
should always be voluntary.  
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that a victim impact statement is constitutionally 
admissible evidence. Where such statement is uncontested it will be admissible 
                                                 
95
  See Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969 and S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 
 (CC). 
96
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 3.4.24.   
97
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 3.4.24. See also SALRC (2001) Project 107: 
 Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.16.9. 
98
  See R v Davis 1925 AD 30. In this case the state sought to produce as evidence certain  
 pornographic materials found at the residence of the accused that had been charged with gross 
 indecent assault. The court held, inter alia, that the probative value of the evidence was  
 outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
99
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 661). 
 
 
 
 
   129 
evidence on the production thereof.
100
 However, where the written statement is 
contested for accuracy and thus prejudice, the victim should be given the choice to 
testify in support thereof. Where the victim elects to testify, the accused would be 
entitled to cross-examine him.  
 
5.5.3.2   Methods of presenting victim impact statements 
One of the ways in which the rules of evidence are relaxed at sentencing involves the 
methods used to place evidence before the court.
101
 There are three methods whereby 
evidence in mitigation or aggravation of sentence may be presented. The first method 
is the presentation of oral evidence by a witness under oath.
102
 Oral evidence is 
viewed as the primary method of adducing evidence at sentencing.
103
 The second 
method involves handing in sworn statements without the testimony of a witness.
104
 
The third and final method is an address to the court by the prosecution and the 
defence.
105
  
 
In some jurisdictions victim impact statements must be made under oath.
106
 However, 
they generally take the form of a written statement which is presented to the court.
107
 
According to the SALRC, it is important that oral and written statements be 
permitted.
108
 The SALRC explains that some victims may not wish to return to court 
to be confronted by the accused and possibly be cross-examined by the defence for a 
                                                 
100
  SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 3.4.25.    
101
  See S v Gqabi at 262. 
102
  See, for example, S v Gough 1980 (3) SA 785 (NC) at 787 paragraph h and S v Van Rensburg 
 1968 (2) SA 622 (T) at 624 paragraph b. 
103
  See Du Toit et al (1993: 28.3-28.4) who explain that, strictly speaking, facts in mitigation and 
 aggravation should be placed before the court by way of evidence given under oath. 
104
  Du Toit et al (1993: 28.3-28.4). 
105
  Du Toit et al (1993: 28.3-28.4). 
106
  Jurisdictions such as Tanzania, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory require 
 that victim impact statements be presented orally under oath.   
107
  See SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.13.3. 
108
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.16.8. 
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second time.
109
 Hence, the importance of admissible written victim impact statements 
lies in the avoidance of secondary victimisation. Written victim impact statements 
could be categorised conveniently as admissible evidence in terms of the second 
method of adducing evidence during sentencing. 
 
5.5.3.3   Weight   
The general rule is that evidence conveyed by way of written statements will not 
weigh more than argument.
110
 However, our courts have held that if the defence 
agrees to the admission of a written statement then it will carry the same weight as 
evidence submitted under oath.
111
 Thus, if the defence agrees to the admission of a 
victim impact statement which has been reduced to writing, then it ought to carry the 
same weight as evidence submitted under oath. 
 
The issue of drawing an adverse inference in the absence of a victim impact statement 
is a particularly sensitive issue. Victim impact statements are, by definition, voluntary 
statements. It would be illogical, therefore, to conclude that the absence of such 
statement means that no harm, loss or emotional suffering has been experienced by 
the victim.
112
 Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that an adverse inference should not 
be drawn if a victim elects not to make a victim impact statement. Yet, in S v O the 
contrary approach was adopted.
113
 In this case the accused pleaded guilty to three 
                                                 
109
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.16.8. 
110
   SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.11.2. 
111
  See S v H 1977 (2) SA 954 (A) at 960 paragraph H. See also SALRC (2001) Project 107: 
 Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.11.2 and Du Toit et al (1993: 28.3). See further Erez  
 (1999: 549) who notes that research has shown that defence counsel, for various reasons;  
 seldom embark on cross-examination of the victim during the sentencing hearing. She states 
 that empirical research has shown that legal professionals agree that a good defence attorney 
 would not challenge the victim impact statement directly and would not cross-examine  
 victims on the contents of their statements.   
112
  See Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 660). 
113
  S v O 2003 (2) SACR 147 (C). 
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charges of indecent assault and one charge of attempted indecent assault on four boys 
between the ages of eight and twelve years.
114
 It is submitted that the court erred in 
concluding that no harm was suffered by the victims because no evidence was 
presented on the impact of the assaults on the victims.
115
 It is submitted, further, that a 
victim‟s silence, much like the silence of an accused during a trial, should not result in 
an adverse inference being drawn with the regard to the harm caused by the crime.
116
 
S v O demonstrates the dangers of allowing adverse inferences when a victim has 
elected not to make a victim impact statement. It is unreasonable to conclude from the 
absence of a victim impact statement that no harm was caused, as these statements are 
intended to be voluntary.   
 
Where the victim has elected not to make a statement or he has elected not to testify 
in support of a contested statement the court, when evaluating the extent of the harm 
the victim may have suffered, will be required to exercise its discretion „reasonably 
and judicially‟.117  
 
5.5.4 The legislative framework for the use of victim impact statements  
The current legal position in South Africa allows for victim impact statements to be 
admissible for the purposes of sentencing, even though there is no express legislative 
provision to this effect.
118
 Section 274(1) of the CPA provides that, in determining a 
suitable sentence, the court may call witnesses to give evidence and it may allow the 
prosecution or the defence to call witnesses at the sentencing stage. This section, thus, 
                                                 
114
  Supra at 152. 
115
  Supra at 161. 
116
  See, for example, S v Brown en Andere 1996 (2) SACR 49 (NC) at 49 where the court held 
 that no adverse inference can be drawn against an accused simply because he has elected to 
 exercise  his constitutional right to refuse to testify at his trial. 
117
  See, for example, S v Pieters 1987 (3) SA 717 (A).    
118
  See SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.16.2. 
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allows for the victim to be called to adduce evidence on sentence. The SALRC opines 
that although it may be ideal for facts in mitigation and aggravation of sentence to be 
placed before the court by the victim testifying under oath, such facts may also be 
placed before the court by submission of a victim impact statement.
119
 Thus, 
according to the SALRC, the use of oral or written victim impact statements is 
permissible in terms of section 274(1) of the CPA.   
 
Since the SALRC submission, there have been various attempts to provide dedicated 
legislation to regulate the use of victim impact statements. The Victims‟ Charter is 
one such attempt. In terms of the Charter: 
Victims may, where appropriate, make a statement to the court or give  
 evidence during the sentence proceedings to bring the impact of the crime to 
 the court‟s attention.120  
 
There are a number of issues which the provision fails to address, such as what the 
content of the statement should be and who would be responsible for preparing the 
statement. The Charter does not regulate adequately the implementation of victim 
impact statements. 
 
Although limited to sexual offences, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment 
Bill is another attempt to provide for victim impact statements.
121
 In terms of clause 
17(b):  
Evidence of the surrounding circumstances and impact of any sexual offence 
upon a complainant may be adduced at criminal proceedings where such 
offence is tried in order to prove for purposes of imposing an appropriate 
sentence, the extent of the harm suffered by the person concerned. 
                                                 
119
  SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.11.2. See further Du Toit et 
 al (1993: 28.2-28.3).  
120
  See article 2 of the Victims‟ Charter.  
121
  Criminal Law Sexual Offences Amendment Bill B50 - 2003 published in the Government 
 Gazette of the Republic of South Africa No. 25282 of 30 July 2003.  
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It is submitted that the most significant attempt, thus far, is the SALCR proposal in 
the Draft Sentencing Framework Bill.
122
 This Bill has been published and awaits 
presidential assent.
123
 The preamble to the Bill sets out that the restoration of the 
rights of the victim is a factor which must be accommodated in the determination of 
the sentence to be imposed. Clause 47 of the Bill constitutes formal recognition of the 
use of victim impact statements in the criminal justice process. In terms of this clause: 
(1) The prosecutor must, when adducing evidence or addressing the court on 
sentence, consider the interests of a victim of the offence and the impact of 
the crime on the victim and, where practicable, furnish the court with 
particulars of – 
(a) damage to or the loss or destruction of property, including money; 
(b) physical, psychological or other injury; or  
(c) loss of income or support. 
(2) A victim impact statement may be made by a victim who, as a result of an 
offence, suffered damage, injury or loss as referred to in subsection (1), or 
by a person nominated by such victim. 
(3) The prosecutor must seek to tender evidence of a victim impact statement 
where the victim is not called to give evidence and such a statement is 
available. 
(4) If the contents of a victim impact statement are not disputed a victim impact 
statement is admissible evidence on its production. 
(5) If the contents of a victim impact statement are disputed, the victim must be 
called as witness for the statement to be taken into account by the court.     
 
The significance of this provision is apparent. By regulating the content and use of 
victim impact statements, it provides a near thorough legislative framework for such 
statements. There are, arguably, only two issues which clause 47 does not settle, 
namely, the victim‟s opinion on sentence and the issue of adverse inferences in the 
case where the victim does not wish to make an impact statement or where he does 
not wish to testify in support of a contested statement.  
                                                 
122
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 4.5.23 and further SALRC (2000) Project 
 82: Discussion Paper 91 Appendix B Part 1 paragraph 4.7. For discussion see Van der Merwe 
 & Muller (2006: 648). 
123
  The status of this Bill is that it has been approved by the National Assembly and has been 
 published. Hence, all that is required is President‟s signature and the publication of a  
 proclamation in the Government Gazette which sets out the date the Bill will become an Act 
 of Parliament. 
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With regard to the first issue, clause 47(1) sets out clearly the content of the victim 
impact statement and, by way of exclusion, it is anticipated that victims will not be 
allowed to make recommendations on the appropriate sentence to be imposed. This 
omission is not detrimental to the successful implementation and operation of victim 
impact statements. However, it is submitted that there is no harm in allowing a victim 
to make sentence recommendations, provided that it is well understood that the 
presiding officer is under no obligation to follow the recommendation.
124
 By contrast, 
it is imperative that the second issue be addressed before the enactment of the Bill. 
The decision in S v O, combined with the presiding officer‟s likely inability to 
comprehend the plight of the victim, means that the possibility of adverse inferences 
being drawn in the absence of a victim impact statement cannot be ignored.
125
 It is 
submitted, therefore, that the following sub-clause be added to clause 47: 
 
(6) No adverse inference, with regard to the harm suffered by the victim, may be 
drawn if the victim elects not to make a victim impact statement or elects not 
testify in relation to a disputed victim impact statement as referred to in sub-
clause (5).  
This sub-clause will prevent inappropriate assumptions about the effects of the crime 
in the absence of a victim impact statement. An adverse inference, in this context, 
cannot be condoned. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124
   See SALRC (2001) Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.18.1. See also section 5.5.1 in the text 
 above. 
125
  See sections 5.3.2 and 5.5.2.3 above for discussion. 
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5.5.5 The duty to prepare victim impact statements 
Internationally, the approach to determining the party responsible for preparing a 
victim impact statement is not uniform. Depending on the country concerned, victim 
impact statements may be prepared by the police, probation officers, victim assistance 
groups or the prosecutor.
126
  
 
The Victims‟ Charter adopts a hybrid approach to the preparation of victim 
statements.
127
 According to article 2 of the Charter, the police, prosecutor and 
correctional services officers (i.e. probation officers) must take measures to ensure 
that any statement which the victim wishes to make is heard and considered. By 
contrast, the SALRC proposes that the prosecution have the ultimate duty to ensure 
that victim impact statements are available for submission to court.
128
 Clause 47(3) of 
the Sentencing Framework Bill places an obligation on the prosecutor to produce a 
victim impact statement where the victim is not called to give evidence. This clause is 
particularly significant in the context of negotiated justice, as the victim is not called 
to give evidence when a plea and sentence agreement is concluded. In this instance, 
the prosecutor is best situated to oversee the preparation of a victim impact statement. 
However, this does not mean that the preparation of such statement cannot be 
delegated to other criminal justice personnel and victim assistance organisations. 
Resource concerns must be taken into account. Preparing a victim impact statement 
will require notifying and consulting with the victim. If proper procedures are 
                                                 
126
  See Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 658). See also Erez (1999: 546) who explains that in 
 countries such as England, Wales, Scotland, Canada and Australia police officers prepare 
 victim impact statements, whereas in countries such as the United States of America and New 
 Zealand, probation officers, victim assistance staff or prosecution staff prepare victim impact 
 statements. See also SALRC (2000) Project 82: Report paragraph 3.4.23 where the SALRC 
 states that responsibility for the preparation of victim impact statements can rest with criminal 
 justice personnel, like the prosecutor, police or probation officer, or with an independent 
 organisation, like victim service specialists. 
127
  Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 658).  
128
  See SALRC (2001) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 40.19.1. 
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established and standard form impact statements are made available, the duty to 
prepare this statement may be delegated.
129
 Thus, even though the prosecutor would 
be responsible primarily for the preparation of the victim impact statement, resource 
concerns mandate that alternative agents not be absolved from ensuring that the best 
possible effort is made to secure the victim‟s input. 
 
5.6 The controversy over victim impact statements 
Victim-orientated reforms, such as restitution, compensation and access to various 
services, have been adopted by most countries. Generally, these reforms have been 
accepted and welcomed. However, the reform which incorporates the use of victim 
impact statements has been slow in some countries (like South Africa) and at times 
controversial.  
 
Although the use of victim impact statements is viewed favourably by most South 
African academics,
130
 a fierce debate exists among international academics such as 
Ashworth and Erez. Ashworth opposes the use of victim impact statements.
131
 The 
major argument he raises to support his objection is that „victim impact statements are 
detrimental not only to procedural and substantive justice but also to the victims who 
provide the input‟.132  He argues that the movement to incorporate victims in the 
criminal justice system coincides with the movement towards harsher sentences. 
Therefore, he views the use of victim impact statements as a ploy to reconstruct 
sentencing priorities by increasing sentence severity. He explains that a victim impact 
                                                 
129
  See Appendix C. 
130
  See, for example, Van der Merwe & Muller  (2006: 661), Clarke, Davis & Booysen (2003: 
  43), Women & Human Rights Project, Community Law Centre, UWC and the Institute of 
  Criminology UCT (1999:139) and also Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against  
  Women  (2005: 10).  
131
  See Ashworth (1993: 498) and also Ashworth (1998: 4). 
132
  Ashworth (1998: 4). 
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statement is a call for punishment that satisfies or restores the victim and this 
undermines consistent and proportionate treatment of offenders.
133
 It also undermines 
the penal system in terms of which public interest is the only justification for 
increased severity of penalties.
134
 Ashworth concludes that using victims to 
accomplish this goal amounts to „victim prostitution which ought to be exposed and 
opposed‟.135  
 
In direct opposition to the comments made by Ashworth, Erez has sought to expose 
the „unsubstantiated justifications based on research findings which have been taken 
out of context‟.136 She explains that research suggests that the concerns, expressed by 
opponents of victim impact statements, regarding a possible erosion of adversarial 
criminal justice principles, rights of the accused and imposition of harsher sentences 
have not materialised.
137
 By contrast, she points out that these statements make an 
important contribution to proportionality rather than to severity in sentence.
138
 She 
acknowledges that in some cases the statement may be redundant because the harm 
suffered by the victim may be capable of being inferred from the documents before 
the court.
139
 She then refers to instances where the statement causes the reader to 
rethink the penalty he had in mind prior to reading the statement. These include 
instances where the offence was perpetrated in an unusually cruel manner or the 
victim is perceived as especially vulnerable.
140
 Generally, the presence of these 
characteristics would be aggravating factors, which would mean the sentence imposed 
                                                 
133
  Ashworth (1993: 503). 
134
  Ashworth (1993: 506). 
135
  Ashworth (1993: 498). 
136
  Erez (1999: 555). 
137
  Erez (1999: 547) refers to the empirical research she conducted in the United States of  
 America and Australia.  
138
  Erez (1999: 548).  
139
  Erez (1999: 548). 
140
  Erez (1999: 548).  
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was likely to be more severe. However, if the victim disclosed in his victim impact 
statement that he had made a complete recovery, or that a certain injury had 
mistakenly been attributed to the crime, this would cause the decision-maker to re-
evaluate the extent of the harm initially inferred.
141
 In this way, Erez makes her point 
that victim impact statements can make an important contribution to proportionality 
as opposed to severity in sentence.    
 
Although most South African academics currently favour the use of victim impact 
statements, it is submitted that a debate about the consequences of these statements is 
likely to develop once appropriate legislation is enacted. The pursuit of legal certainty 
will undoubtedly spawn volumes of conflicting research on the effect of victim impact 
statements and some roads may lead to the Ashworth-Erez debate. Harsher sentences 
may result from the use of victim impact statements just as lenient sentences may 
result from its use. This study embraces the fact that victims are not a homogeneous 
group and their reactions to harm inflicted by offenders will differ. Similarly, their 
expectations and experiences in an era of victim impact statements will vary. 
Ultimately, the aim of victim impact statements is to allow the victim a voice if he 
elects to be heard. Often, it is the cathartic effect of recording the impact of the crime 
and not the outcome which provides relief to the victim. Scholars in this area have 
discussed at length the therapeutic advantages of having a voice versus the harmful 
effects that feeling voiceless and external to the process may have on victims.
142
 It is, 
therefore, difficult to conclude, as Ashworth does, that victim impact statements 
amount to „victim prostitution‟. Instead, it is submitted that a more reasonable 
conclusion would be that approaching victims in a paternalistic manner, ignoring their 
                                                 
141
  Erez (1999: 548). 
142
  See Wiebe (1996: 5) and Erez (1999: 554) for summary. 
 
 
 
 
   139 
wishes to be heard and then using the harm they have suffered to justify the 
prosecution and punishment of another amounts to „victim prostitution‟.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The perception that the criminal justice system is unresponsive to victims of crime has 
led to the demand that the views and concerns of victims be presented and considered 
at appropriate stages of the criminal justice system. The victim impact statement, as a 
mechanism for victims‟ input into sentencing decisions, is an important reform aimed 
at satisfying the victim‟s need to be part of the process. Although courts guard against 
interference with its sentencing discretion, presiding officers, by their own admission, 
often are unable to comprehend the plight of victims. This admission is aggravated 
then by the fact that the court will not be exposed to the victim‟s testimony when a 
plea and sentence agreement has been concluded.  
 
In the context of negotiated justice, victim impact statements provide the court with a 
means to test the sentence agreement concluded by the state and the defence. The 
current legal position in South Africa already allows victim impact statements to be 
admissible for the purposes of sentencing, even though there is no express provision 
to this effect. Thus, nothing prevents the use of victim impact statements in cases of 
negotiated justice. However, it is conceded that despite the promising draft legislation 
produced by SALRC, legal certainty and, thus, implementation of these statements 
have been slow in coming. In anticipation of appropriate legislation to govern victim 
impact statements, it is predicted that prosecutors will be identified as the party 
primarily responsible for preparing a victim impact statement. It is also envisaged that 
the enactment of appropriate legislation will spawn conflicting research on the affect 
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of victim impact statements, and South African academics may engage in a 
confrontation similar to the Ashworth-Erez debate. It is hoped that common sense will 
prevail ultimately and that the victim will finally be accorded a more prominent role 
in the dispensation of negotiated justice. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Victims may be integrated into the criminal justice system in a number of ways.
1
 
However, the purpose of this study was to focus on the ways in which victims‟ rights 
may be developed in relation to negotiated justice. Central to the study is the assertion 
that victims have a definite right to participate in the negotiation and sentencing 
stages of negotiated justice. It is the nature and extent of these rights which this study 
has sought to clarify. What follows are detailed conclusions and recommendations 
based on the analyses contained in the previous chapters. 
 
6.2 Conclusions  
The South African Constitution does not provide a clear expression of the rights of 
crime victims. At best, procedural rights for victims can be inferred from general 
provisions. This study has sought guidance, therefore, in the UN Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the Victims‟ 
Charter. Currently, the Victims‟ Charter provides the only domestic standard against 
which to assess whether statutory negotiated justice makes adequate provision for the 
rights of victims.  
 
It was established that two independent systems of negotiated justice exists in South 
Africa, namely, informal plea agreements and statutory plea and sentence agreements. 
                                                 
1
    See Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 648). 
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Although it was beyond the scope of this study to consider the rights of victims in 
informal plea agreements, it was noted that a questionable distinction exists between 
victim participation in informal negotiated justice and victim participation in statutory 
negotiated justice. Statutory negotiated justice makes provision for victim 
participation at two significant stages of the proceedings. Section 105A(1)(b)(iii) of 
the CPA allows for victim participation at the negotiating stage, while section 
105A(7)(b)(i)(bb) allows for victim participation, at the sentencing stage. However, 
these provisions do not provide victims with a clear right to participate. Participation 
at the negotiating stage is subject to the prosecutor finding that it would be reasonable 
to allow the victim to participate and the victim‟s input at sentencing is subject to 
judicial discretion. These attempts to include the victim in statutory negotiated justice 
formed the crux of this study.   
 
When considering the role victims should have during the negotiation stage of plea 
and sentence agreements, it is necessary first to identify the needs of crime victims 
and thereafter the rights which they should be accorded to satisfy these needs.
2
 This 
study accepted the finding that in the context of negotiated justice those victims‟ 
rights requiring emphasis include the right to information, the right to be present when 
the agreement is presented to the court and the right to participate.
 3
 The analysis of 
the nature and extent of these rights established that a natural consequence of 
allowing victims a right to participate is that they will have to be informed of the 
                                                 
2
   Welling (1987: 301) and also SALRC (2003) Project 107: Discussion Paper 102 paragraph 
  40.1.1 where the SALRC identifies these needs as demands, in particular, the demand for  
  services and procedural rights. 
3
    See the findings of Welling (1987: 302), Henderson (1985: 980), SAHRC (2001: 4) and  
  Bekker (1996: 205).     
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intention to enter into an agreement and, as a result, would gain knowledge of their 
right to be present when the agreement is presented to the court.
 4
  
Section 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the CPA has been hailed as a provision which seeks to 
promote victim participation in the course of plea and sentence negotiations.
5
 
Although the legislature evidently sought to allow victims a non-veto right to 
participate, a critical evaluation of the provision revealed at least two indications that 
it is an ineffectual attempt to promote victims‟ rights. Firstly, the provision omits the 
victim‟s right to be informed of the negotiations by failing to prescribe that such 
information be relayed to victims. One of the main problems with negotiated justice is 
that victims often are alienated during the negotiation process. This problem may be 
solved simply by providing more information to victims. Hence, legislation 
purporting to include victims in negotiated justice, in an effort to avoid victim 
alienation, would have to give effect to the victim‟s right to information. Section 
105A does not acknowledge or make provision for this right. Secondly, the victim‟s 
right to participate is contingent upon the prosecutor finding that such participation 
would be reasonable. The consequence of this type of qualified inclusion is 
detrimental not only to the participatory right of the victim but also to the victim‟s 
right to information. If, for example, the prosecutor found that it is unreasonable to 
allow the victim to participate in the negotiations then he would not be obliged to 
inform the victim of the plea and sentence negotiations and agreement finally 
concluded, as the victim has no right, in terms of the section, to such information. 
Hence, the victim would be completely alienated from the proceedings and section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) would not be promoting victim participation after all.  
                                                 
4
   Welling (1987: 307).   
5
   Du Toit et al (2006: 15-12). 
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Since victim exclusion amounts to secondary victimisation, a victim who is denied the 
opportunity to participate, in effect, is being victimised by the criminal justice system. 
Thus, denying the victim an opportunity to make representations regarding plea and 
sentence negotiations simply cannot be justified as reasonable. In fact, the converse is 
true. Invariably, it is unreasonable to exclude the victim from such negotiations, 
especially where the right to be exercised by the victim is of a non-veto nature.
6
 There 
is a fundamental problem with the objective standard of reasonableness which 
qualifies victim participation in section 105A(1)(b)(iii). It is submitted that the victim 
should enjoy an unqualified non-veto participatory right.  
 
The final conclusion reached in this study is that victim impact statements are the 
primary method of improving the role of the victim during the sentencing phase of 
negotiated justice. Section 105A(7) provides that presiding officers may have regard 
to evidence from or a statement made by the victim when considering the sentence 
agreement. It is presiding officer‟s duty, at this stage of the proceedings, to determine 
whether the sentence which the parties have agreed on is just.
7
 It is accepted that in 
order to fulfil this duty the factual information required by the presiding officer 
embraces more than information on the elements of the crime.
8
 Whether or not victim 
impact statements have a direct impact on the sentence, they are intrinsically valuable 
in the sentencing process. They not only help the victim reach emotional closure but 
also help the victim to convey personal information to the presiding officer. Hence, a 
proper and meaningful assessment of the harm inflicted by the offender is achieved 
when the victim is allowed to address the court on the consequences and effect of the 
                                                 
6
  A non-veto right to participate is a right to be heard. 
7
  See SALRC (2000) Project 82: The Draft Sentencing Framework Bill 2000 paragraph 3.4.8 
 and paragraph 3.4.15.  
8
  See Du Toit et al (2006: 15-18) and further S v Dlamini 1992 (1) SA 18 (A) at 30 paragraph d 
 and 31 paragraph d. See further Karmen (1994: 202).  
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harm. This is especially important in the context of negotiated justice, as the court has 
not been exposed to the victim‟s testimony. Thus, exposing the court to an impact 
statement made by the victim both allows for proper fulfilment of the presiding 
officer‟s duty at sentencing, and allows for the presiding officer to test the 
appropriateness of the sentence negotiated between the prosecutor and the accused 
against the victim‟s testimony of the harm inflicted by the accused. 
 
6.3 Recommendations  
For the role of victims in negotiated justice to be meaningful, the rights which they 
are entitled to exercise during the negotiation and sentencing stages of these 
proceedings must be set out clearly. Concisely worded legislation can help to avoid 
misconceptions by prosecutors, presiding officers and victims. Well-written statutory 
language which clarifies the prosecutor‟s obligations towards victims encourages 
consistent application of victims‟ rights. This study has shown that section 105A in its 
current form does not promote or clarify victims‟ rights in negotiated justice 
sufficiently or satisfactorily.  
 
It is recommended that section 105A(1)(b)(iii) be amended to remedy its inadequacies. 
In its broadest description, the amendment should allow victims a right to comment 
on the plea agreement. This means that the victim‟s views on the terms and conditions 
of the plea agreement should form part of the agreement.
9
 The victim could agree to 
or oppose the contents of the plea agreement. Since the victim has a non-veto right to 
participate, his wishes, although important, are not determinative. The prosecutor 
would be entitled to conclude the agreement even where the victim has expressed his 
disapproval thereof. Similarly, presiding officers would be bound only to consider the 
                                                 
9
  See, for example, Van der Merwe & Muller (2006: 653). 
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victim‟s views and need not necessarily act in accordance them. By implication, the 
proposed amendment places a positive duty on the prosecutor to notify the victim of 
the agreement. Thus, in addition to giving effect to the victim‟s right to be heard, the 
recommendation gives effect to the victim‟s right to information also.  
 
A further opportunity for victim participation in negotiated justice exists at the 
sentencing stage. Having established the relevance of a statement made by the victim, 
this study recommends that the discretion which the court exercises in hearing from 
the victim be removed from section 105A(7). Since presiding officers cannot 
comprehend readily the plight of victims it is important that the victim‟s narrative be 
presented to the court.
10
 It is recommended, therefore, that a victim impact statement 
form part of the plea and sentence agreement. The statement will allow the victim an 
opportunity to inform the court of the impact which the crime has had upon him and, 
if applicable, his family.
11
 Exposing the court to a victim impact statement will ensure 
that presiding officers are better equipped to fulfil their mandate in accordance with 
section 105A. Importantly, victim impact statements are voluntary statements. It is 
recommended, therefore, that an adverse inference not be drawn if the victim elects 
not to exercise his right to make a statement or if he elects not to testify in support of 
a contested statement.  
 
Finally, this study might not have been possible or it might have taken a different path 
were it not for the constitutional imbalance between the rights of the accused and 
those of the victim. Regrettably, the precedent set by the Constitution requires that 
victims be satisfied with fragmented legislation which does not serve their interests or 
                                                 
10
  Holtzhausen v Roodt 1997 (4) SA 766 (WLD) at 778 paragraph h. 
11
   Clarke, Davis & Booysen (2003: 44). 
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protect their rights adequately. Thus, the final recommendation formulated by this 
study is that the constitution be amended so as to provide an express foundation for 
victims‟ rights in the supreme law of the land.  
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APPENDIX A 
Section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
(Plea and Sentence Agreements) 
 
105A Plea and sentence agreements 
  (1) (a)  A prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the National Director of  
   Public Prosecutions and an accused who is legally represented may, 
   before the accused pleads to the charge brought against him or her, 
   negotiate and enter into an agreement in respect of –  
  (i) a plea of guilty by the accused to the offence charged or to an 
   offence of which he or she may be convicted on the charge; and 
  (ii)  if the accused is convicted of the offence to which he or she has 
   agreed to plead guilty -  
  (aa) a just sentence to be imposed by the court; or  
  (bb)  the postponement of the passing of sentence in terms of 
   section 297(1)(a); or  
  (cc)  a just sentence to be imposed by the court, of which the  
                    operation of the whole or any part thereof is to be 
   suspended in terms of section 297(1)(b); and  
  (dd)  if applicable, an award for compensation as    
   contemplated in section 300.  
        (b)  The prosecutor may enter into an agreement contemplated in   
   paragraph (a) -  
             (i) after consultation with the person charged with the    
   investigation of the case;  
             (ii) with due regard to, at least, the –  
        (aa) nature of and circumstances relating to the offence;  
        (bb)  personal circumstances of the accused;  
        (cc) previous convictions of the accused, if any; and 
        (dd)  interests of the community; and  
             (iii) after affording the complainant or his or her representative,  
  where it is reasonable to do so and taking into account the  
  nature of and circumstances relating to the offence and the  
  interests of the complainant, the opportunity to make  
  representations to the prosecutor regarding –  
    (aa)  the contents of the agreement; and  
    (bb) the inclusion in the agreement of a condition relating to         
         compensation or the rendering to the complainant of 
  some specific benefit or service in lieu of compensation 
  for damage or pecuniary loss.  
              (c) The requirements of paragraph (b)(i) may be dispensed with if the 
     prosecutor is satisfied that consultation with the person charged with 
      the investigation of the case will delay the proceedings to such an  
     extent that it could –  
          (i)  cause substantial prejudice to the prosecution, the accused, the 
             complainant or his or her representative; and  
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       (ii)  affect the administration of justice adversely.  
  (2) An agreement contemplated in subsection (1) shall be in writing and  
       shall at least–  
                 (a) state that the accused, before entering into the agreement, has been  
             informed that he or she has the right –  
              (i)  to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable   
         doubt;  
              (ii)  to remain silent and not to testify during, the proceedings; and  
   (iii) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence;  
                 (b) state fully the terms of the agreement, the substantial facts of the 
           matter, all other facts relevant to the sentence agreement and any  
           admissions made by the accused;  
                  (c) be signed by the prosecutor, the accused and his or her legal      
            representative; and 
                  (d) if the accused has negotiated with the prosecutor through an      
            interpreter, contain a certificate by the interpreter to the effect that he 
 or she interpreted accurately during the negotiations and in respect of 
 the contents of the agreement. 
            (3) The court shall not participate in the negotiations contemplated in   
          subsection (1).  
            (4) (a) The prosecutor shall, before the accused is required to plead, inform 
    the court that an agreement contemplated in subsection (1) has been 
    entered into and the court shall then -  
                (i)  require the accused to confirm that such an agreement has been 
          entered into; and  
       (ii) satisfy itself that the requirements of subsection (1)(b)(i) and (iii) 
           have been complied with. 
                   (b) If the court is not satisfied that the agreement complies with the  
      requirements of subsection (1)(b)(i) and (iii), the court shall-  
                 (i) inform the prosecutor and the accused of the reasons for non-  
           compliance; and 
                 (ii) afford the prosecutor and the accused the opportunity to comply 
            with the requirements concerned.   
              (5) If the court is satisfied that the agreement complies with the   
           requirements of subsection (1)(b)(i) and (iii), the court shall require the 
           accused to plead to the charge and order that the contents of the  
           agreement be disclosed in court. 
              (6) (a) After the contents of the agreement have been disclosed, the court 
      shall question the accused to ascertain whether –  
               (i) he or she confirms the terms of the agreement and the admissions 
        made by him or her in the agreement;  
               (ii) with reference to the alleged facts of the case, he or she admits                                                           
                 the allegations in the charge to which he or she has agreed to  
                  plead guilty; and  
                (iii) the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily in his or 
            her sound and sober senses and without having been unduly  
            influenced.  
             (b) After an inquiry has been conducted in terms of paragraph (a), the 
         court shall, if-   
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                    (i) the court is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence 
              in respect of which the agreement was entered into; or 
                    (ii)  it appears to the court that the accused does not admit an  
     allegation in the charge or that the accused has incorrectly  
     admitted any such allegation or that the accused has a valid 
     defence to the charge; or  
                    (iii) for any other reason, the court is of the opinion that the plea of 
     guilty by the accused should not stand, record a plea of not 
     guilty and inform the prosecutor and the accused of the  
     reasons therefor. 
           (c) If the court has recorded a plea of not guilty, the trial shall start de 
        novo before another presiding officer: Provided that the accused 
        may waive his or her right to be tried before another presiding  
        officer.  
           (7) (a) If the court is satisfied that the accused admits the allegations in the 
         charge and that he or she is guilty of the offence in respect of  
         which the agreement was entered into, the court shall proceed to 
         consider the sentence agreement.  
                         (b) For purposes of paragraph (a), the court –  
                  (i)  may-  
           (aa) direct relevant questions, including questions about the 
                                          previous convictions of the accused, to the prosecutor and
          the accused; and  
            (bb) hear evidence, including evidence or a statement by or on 
         behalf of the accused or the complainant; and  
            (ii) must, if the offence concerned is an offence –  
  (aa) referred to in the Schedule to the Criminal Law  
         Amendment Act, 1997(Act 105 of 1997) 
             (bb) for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law  
          creating the offence, have due regard to the provisions of 
          that Act or law.  
                   (8)  If the court is satisfied that the sentence agreement is just, the court 
      shall inform the prosecutor and the accused that the court is so  
      satisfied, whereupon the court shall convict the accused of the  
      offence charged and sentence the accused in accordance with the  
      sentence agreement.  
             (9) (a) If the court is of the opinion that the sentence agreement is unjust, 
           the court shall inform the prosecutor and the accused of the  
           sentence which it considers just.  
            (b) Upon being informed of the sentence which the court considers 
            just, the prosecutor and the accused may –  
                               (i)  abide by the agreement with reference to the charge and  
      inform the court that, subject to the right to lead evidence and 
      to present argument relevant to sentencing, the court may  
      proceed with the imposition of sentence; or  
                               (ii) withdraw from the agreement.  
                           (c) If the prosecutor and the accused abide by the agreement as  
            contemplated in paragraph (b)(i), the court shall convict the  
            accused of the offence charged and impose the sentence which it 
            considers just.  
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              (d) If the prosecutor or the accused withdraws from the agreement 
      as contemplated in paragraph (b)(ii), the trial shall start de 
      novo before another presiding officer:    
                            Provided that the accused may waive his or her right to be  
      tried before another presiding officer. 
                           (10) Where a trial starts de novo as contemplated in subsection (6)(c) 
    or 9(d) –  
                                (a) the agreement shall be null and void and no regard shall be 
     had or reference made to –  
              (i) any negotiations which preceded the entering into the  
          agreement;  
                                    (ii) the agreement; or  
                                    (iii) any record of the agreement in any proceedings relating 
           thereto, unless the accused consents to the recording of all 
           or certain admissions made by him or her in the agreement 
                      or during any proceedings relating thereto and any  
                                 admission so recorded shall stand as proof of such   
                                         admission;  
                                 (b) the prosecutor and the accused may not enter into a plea and  
                            sentence agreement in respect of a charge arising out of the
      same facts; and  
                                 (c) the prosecutor may proceed on any charge.  
                            (11)(a) The National Director of Public Prosecutions, in consultation 
        with the Minister, shall issue directives regarding all matters 
        which are reasonably necessary or expedient to be prescribed 
        in order to achieve the objects of this section and any  
        directive so issued shall be observed in the application of this 
                                       section.  
                                   (b) The directives contemplated in paragraph (a) –  
                               (i) must prescribe the procedures to be followed in the  
              application of this section relating to – 
               (aa) any offence referred to in the Schedule to the Criminal  
            Law Amendment Act, 1997, or any other offence for  
            which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law creating 
            the offence;  
               (bb) any offence in respect of which a court has the power or is 
            required to conduct a specific enquiry, whether before or 
            after convicting or sentencing the accused; and  
               (cc)  any offence in respect of which a court has the power or is 
            required to make a specific order upon conviction of the 
           accused; 
                 (ii) may prescribe the procedures to be followed in the  
      application of this section relating to any other offence 
      in respect of which the National Director of Public  
      Prosecutions deems it necessary or expedient to  
      prescribe specific procedures;  
                                 (iii) must ensure that adequate disciplinary steps shall be 
       taken against a prosecutor who fails to comply with 
        any directive; and  
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                   (iv)  must ensure that comprehensive records and statistics 
                           relating to the implementation and application of this 
     section are kept by the prosecuting authority.  
           (c) The National Director of Public Prosecutions shall submit 
          directives issued under this subsection to Parliament before
          those directives take effect, and the first directives so  
          issued, must be submitted to Parliament within four months 
          of the commencement of this section.  
            (d) Any directive issued under this subsection may be amended 
          or withdrawn in like manner.  
          (12) The National Director of Public Prosecutions shall at least 
       once every year submit the records and statistics referred to in 
       subsection (11)(b)(iv) to Parliament. 
          (13) In this section sentence agreements means an agreement  
                  contemplated in subsection (1)(a)(ii).  
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APPENDIX B 
Extract from 
The South African Law Reform Commission Project 73: Simplification of Criminal 
Procedure (Sentence Agreements) Fourth Interim Report, paragraph 4.17. 
 
The Commission concluded that sentence agreements should be legalised and 
regulated subject to what follows:  
 
a) The agreement must be reached before the plea. In the US the bargain must 
be struck before the trial. Otherwise practical problems arise. If the court 
does not accept the agreement the trial will have to restart before another 
court. 
b) Such an agreement will become binding on both the accused and the 
prosecution as soon as the plea is entered, but it does not bind the court. 
c) The agreement must be in writing and must contain a preamble, setting out 
the relevant rights of the accused which have to be explained to him before 
the agreement is concluded. 
d) If the agreement is reached, the accused pleads guilty and the sentence 
agreement is then disclosed to the court. 
e) The court, before convicting the accused, has to question the accused to 
ascertain whether the accused understood his rights, that the agreement was 
entered into freely and voluntarily and that the plea is in conformity with the 
facts. In other words, the procedure of sections 112(1)(b) and (2) comes into 
operation. 
f)  This, at the same time, enables the court to assess whether the agreed 
sentence is appropriate or inappropriate. 
g) The court then accepts or rejects the agreement. 
h) If it accepts it, the accused is found guilty in terms of the plea and the agreed 
sentence is imposed. 
i)   If the court is of the view that it would have imposed a lesser sentence than 
the agreed sentence, it may likewise find the accused guilty but impose the 
lesser sentence. 
j)   If it rejects the agreement, the accused is so informed. The accused then has 
a choice: he may abide by his plea and the matter proceeds as usual. He is, 
however, entitled to withdraw his plea, in which event the matter has to 
begin anew before another judicial officer. No reference may then be made 
to the plea agreement or the proceedings before the first court. 
k) The Commission gave consideration to providing victims‟ input in the 
negotiations but came to the conclusion that it would be in conflict with the 
general scheme of the Criminal Procedure Act and would be impractical. 
The Commission, however, allowed for a provision in terms of which the 
prosecutor should consider the views of the victim when engaging in 
negotiations.  
l)   The judicial officer should not instigate or take part in any negotiations. To 
invite the judge to preside over negotiations appears to be fraught with 
dangers. 
m) Once a person is convicted and sentenced in terms of an agreement, he 
should not have a right of appeal against either. Review would be the proper 
remedy in the event of undue influence or the like.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Sample Victim Impact Statement 
 
 
State v ____________________________________ 
 
Case Number ________________________________ 
 
TO ASSIST THE COURT IN ITS EFFORT TO WEIGH ALL FACTORS PRIOR 
TO IMPOSING SENTENCE, WE REQUEST YOUR VOLUNTARY 
COOPERATION IN COMPLETING THIS FORM. THIS STATEMENT IS 
INTENDED TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDING OFFICER IMPOSING 
SENTENCE HEREIN. 
 
 
Name of victim   _________________________________________________ 
 
Address  __________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
1.   Please describe the nature of the incident in which you were involved. 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
2.    As a result of this incident, were you physically injured?   Yes or  No 
    If yes, please describe the extent of your injuries. 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.   Did you require medical treatment for the injuries sustained?  Yes or No 
   If yes, please describe the treatment received and the length of the time  
    treatment was or is required. 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
4.   Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of medical treatment received:  
      R ________________________ 
      Anticipated (future) medical expenses: R_______________________ 
 
5.   Were you psychologically injured as a result of the incident?  Yes or No 
      If yes, please describe the psychological impact which the incident has had on 
  you. 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
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6.  Have you received any counselling or therapy as a result of this incident?  
    Yes or No 
    If yes, please describe the length of time you have been or will be undergoing 
  counselling or therapy, and the type of treatment you have received. 
    _____________________________________________________________ 
    _____________________________________________________________ 
 
7.   Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of counselling or therapy  
     received: R ____________________________________ 
 
8.   Has this incident affected your ability to earn a living?  Yes or No 
     If yes, please describe your employment, and specify how and to what  
     extent your ability to earn a living has been affected, days lost from work,  
     etc. 
     ______________________________________________________________ 
     ______________________________________________________________ 
 
9.  Have you incurred any other expenses or losses as a result of this incident? 
      Yes or No 
      If yes, please describe. 
    _______________________________________________________________ 
     _______________________________________________________________ 
 
10.   Did any insurance cover the expenses you have incurred as a result of this  
     incident? Yes or No                                                                                                                 
       If yes, please specify the amount of any reimbursements you have received. 
        R ____________________________________ 
 
11.   Has this incident in any way affected your lifestyle or your family‟s lifestyle? 
      Yes or No 
     If yes, please explain. 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
 
12.    Are there any other effects of this incident which are now being experienced 
  by you or members of your family?  Yes or No 
         If yes, please explain. 
        ______________________________________________________________ 
    ______________________________________________________________ 
 
13.    Please describe what being a victim has meant to you and your family. 
         _______________________________________________________________
       _______________________________________________________________ 
 
14.   What are your feelings about the criminal justice system? Have your feelings 
  changed as a result of this incident? Please explain. 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
     _______________________________________________________________ 
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15.   Do you have any thoughts or suggestions on the sentence which the court  
    should impose? Please explain and indicate whether you favour imprisonment.  
 
 Please remember that the court decides the appropriate sentence to  
 impose and this will not necessarily be the sentence which you have  
 recommended.  
    
   _______________________________________________________________ 
     _______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The information and thoughts you have provided are very much appreciated. 
 
 
This form is affirmed by the victim as true under the penalty of perjury.  
 
 
 
 
__________________   ________________________________ 
DATE      SIGNATURE - VICTIM 
 
I certify that the abovementioned signature is the true signature of ______________ 
and that he/she acknowledged to me that he/she knows and understands the contents 
of the aforegoing which was signed and attested to on this ______________ day of 
______________ 2009 in accordance with the provisions of GN R1258 dated 21 July 
1972 as amended by Regulation No. 1648 dated 19 August 1977, by GN R1428 of 11 
July 1980 and by GN R774 of 23 April 1982. 
 
 
       _________________________________ 
       COMMISSIONER OF OATHS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   157 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Primary Sources 
 
A.  Case Law 
 
Booth v Maryland 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536 (1987) United States Supreme Court of 
Appeal 
 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) & 2003 (2) SA 656 (C) 
 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC)  
 
Holtzhausen v Roodt 1997 (4) SA 766 (WLD)  
 
Johannesburg LLB v Kuhn 1963 (4) SA 666 (A)  
 
Mbuyase and Others v Rex 1939 NPD 228  
 
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) 
 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 
(CC)  
 
North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) 1999 (2) 
SACR 669 (C) 
 
Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA) 
 
R v Davis 1925 AD 30  
 
R v Khumalo & Nkosi 1918 AD 500 
 
 
 
 
 
   158 
Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaal & others 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC)  
 
S v Abrahams 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA)   
 
S v Armugga & Others 2005 (2) SACR 259  
 
S v Brown en Andere 1996 (2) SACR 49 (NC)  
 
S v Dlamini 1992 (1) SA 18 (A)  
 
S v Esterhuizen 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) 
 
S v G 2004 (2) SACR 296 (W) 
 
S v Gough 1980 (3) SA 785 (NC)  
 
S v Gqabi 1964 (1) SA 261 (T)  
 
S v H 1977 (2) SA 954 (A)  
 
S v Mahomotsa 2002 (2) SACR 435 (SCA)  
 
S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)  
 
S v Muggels (unreported CPD decision) case number SS 3/2002 
 
S v O 2003 (2) SACR 147 (C) 
 
S v Pieters 1987 (3) SA 717 (A)  
 
S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) 
  
S v Sassin 2003 (4) All SA 506 (NC) 
 
 
 
 
 
   159 
S v Solomans 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) 
 
S v Yengeni 2005 (3) SACR 1306 (T)  
  
S v Van Rensburg 1968 (2) SA 622 (T) 
 
S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A)  
 
Vanderbijlpark Health Committee v Wilson 1950 (1) SA 447 (A)  
 
Vlok & Others (unreported TPD decision) case number SS 15/2007 
 
 
B. International Human Rights Instruments 
 
United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power General Assembly Resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985 
 
 
C.  Statutes and Regulations 
 
Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969  
 
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965  
 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B50 - 2003 Government Gazette 
No. 25282 of 30 July 2003 
 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 62 of 2001 
 
Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Bill Government Gazette No. 22582 of 17 
August 2001 
 
 
 
 
   160 
Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Bill Government Gazette No. 22933 of 14 
December 2001 
 
Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (repealed) 
 
Judicial Matters Amendment Act 55 of 2002 
 
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
 
Immorality Act 5 of 1927 (repealed) 
 
South African Law Commission Act 19 of 1973  
 
National Instruction No.22/1998, Sexual Offences: Support to Victims and Crucial 
Aspects of the Investigation 
 
Directives of the National Director of Public Prosecutions issued on 14 March 2002 in 
accordance with section 105A(11) 
 
Minimum Standards on Services for Victims of Crime 
 
Service Charter for Victims of Crime in South Africa 
 
 
D. Supreme Law of South Africa  
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   161 
Secondary Sources 
 
E. Books and Chapters from Books 
 
Artz L, Smythe D (2005) „South African Legislation Supporting Victims‟ Rights‟ in 
Davis & Snyman Victimology in South Africa Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria 
 
Batley M (2005) „Restorative Justice‟ in Davis & Snyman Victimology in South 
Africa Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria 
 
Bekker P, Geldenhuys T, Joubert J, Swanepool J, Terblanche S, van der Merwe S, 
(2003) Criminal Procedure Handbook (6
th
 edition) Juta and Company Ltd: Cape 
Town   
 
Bruce D (2005) „Challenges of the Criminal Justice System in Addressing the Needs 
of Victims and Witnesses‟ in Davis & Snyman Victimology in South Africa Van 
Schaik Publishers: Pretoria 
 
Burchell J (2005) Principles of Criminal Law (3
rd
 edition) Juta and Company Ltd: 
Cape Town   
 
Classen R (1997) Dictionary of Legal Words & Phrases (2
nd
 edition) volume 4 issue 
10, Lexis Nexis (loose leaf compilation): Durban   
 
Combs N (2007) Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law: Constructing a 
Restorative Justice Approach Stanford University Press: Stanford 
 
Currie I, De Waal, J (2005) The Bill of Rights Handbook (5
th
 edition) Juta and 
Company Ltd: Cape Town   
 
Davis L (2005) „Victimology in South Africa: the Way Forward‟ in Davis & Snyman 
Victimology in South Africa Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria 
 
 
 
 
 
   162 
Davis L, Snyman R (2005) Victimology in South Africa Van Schaik Publishers: 
Pretoria 
 
De Ville J (2000) Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, Interdoc Consultants: 
Cape Town 
 
De Waal J, Currie I, Erasmus G (2001) The Bill of Rights Handbook (4
th
 edition) Juta 
and Company Ltd: Cape Town   
 
Du Toit E (1981) Straf in Suid-Afrika, Juta and Company Ltd: Cape Town   
 
Du Toit E, De Jager F, Van der Merwe S, Paizes A, Skeen Q, (2006) Commentary on 
the Criminal Procedure Act (bi-annual revision service) Juta and Company Ltd: Cape 
Town   
 
Fletcher G (1995) With Justice for Some: Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials Addison-
Wesley: Massachusetts  
 
Hawkins K (1995) The Uses of Discretion, Clarendon Press: Oxford 
 
Hawker S, Cowley C (1996) The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus Oxford University 
Press: Oxford 
 
Karmen A (1994) Crime Victims: An Introduction to Victimology (2
nd
 edition) 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company: California 
 
Kriegler J, Stafford E (1993) Hiemstra: Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses (5
th
 edition) 
Butterworths: Durban  
 
Louw B, Pretorius Z (2005) „Victim Empowerment and Support in South Africa‟ in 
Davis & Snyman Victimology in South Africa Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria 
 
Olmesdahl M, Steytler N (1983) Criminal Justice in South Africa: Selected Aspects of 
Discretion, Juta and Company: Cape Town 
 
 
 
 
   163 
Schurink W (1992) „Introduction: Victimology as a New and Evolving Field‟ in 
Schurink, Snyman & Krugel Victimisation: Nature and Trends HSRC Publishers: 
Pretoria  
 
Schurink W, Snyman I, Krugel W assisted by Slabbert L (1992) Victimisation: Nature 
and Trends, HSRC Publishers: Pretoria 
 
Schwikkard P, van der Merwe S, in collaboration with Collier D, de Vos W, Skeen Q, 
van der Berg E (2002) Principles of Evidence (2
nd
 edition) Juta and Company Ltd: 
Cape Town   
 
Snyman R (2005) „Overview of Concepts in Victimology‟ in Davis & Snyman 
Victimology in South Africa Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria 
 
Snyman R (1992) „Victim Support Schemes and a Proposed Model for Rendering 
Services to Victims of Crime in South Africa‟ in Schurink, Snyman & Krugel 
Victimization Nature and Trends HSRC Publishers: Pretoria 
 
Strijdom (1983) „Factors Influencing a Victim‟s Decision to Report an Offence‟ in 
Olmesdahl & Steytler Criminal Justice in South Africa: Selected Aspects of 
Discretion, Juta and Company: Cape Town 
 
Van Wyk D edition (1994) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African 
Legal Order, Juta and Company Ltd: Cape Town   
 
Wiebe R (1996) „The Mental Health Implications of Crime Victims‟ Rights‟ in 
Wexler & Winick Law in Therapeutic Key Caroline Academic Press: Durham 
 
Williams B (1999) Working with Victims of Crime: Policies, Policies & Practices, 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers: London 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   164 
F. Electronic Articles 
 
Alschulser A (1979) „Plea Bargaining and its History‟ (1) Columbia Review 
<http://www.jstor.org/journals/sic> [accessed on 8 October 2007] 
 
 
Ashworth A (1986) „Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and the 
State‟ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies <http://www.jstor.org/journals/nwu.html> 
[accessed on 15 November 2007] 
 
Camerer L (1996) „A Victim Movement for South Africa?‟ 
<http://www.ecelle.com/pubs/monographs/no3/victimmovement.html> [accessed on 
10 January 2008] 
 
 
Carmerer L (1997) „Crime, Violence and Punishment-Putting Victims on the Agenda‟ 
<http://www.iss.co.za/ASR/6No3/Camerer> [accessed on 6 February 2007] 
 
Camerer L (1997) „Victims and Criminal Justice‟ 
<http://www.iss.co.za/Mongraphs/No12/Camerer> [accessed on 31 October 2007] 
  
Camerer L (1999) „What about the Victims?‟ 
<http://www.ecelle.com/pubs/monographs/no3/victimmovement.html> [accessed on 
27 August 2007] 
 
Erez E (1991) „Victim Impact Statements‟ Australian Institute of Criminology No.33  
<http://www.aic.gov.au> [accessed on 19 April 2009] 
 
Erez E (1999) „Who‟s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as 
Victim Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice‟ (July) Criminal Law Review 
<http://www.westlaw.uk> [accessed on 30 October 2008] 
 
 
 
 
 
   165 
Fattah E (2000) „Victimology Past, Present and Future‟ 33(1) Criminologie 
<http://www.erudit.org/revue/crimino/2000/v33/n1/004720ar.html>  [accessed on 6 
February 2007]   
 
Garkawe S (2003) „The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A 
Suitable Model to Enhance the Role and Rights of the Victims of Gross Violations of 
Human Rights?‟ 27(2) Melbourne University Law Review 334. 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MULR/2003/14.html [accessed on 17 August 2007] 
 
Gittler G (1984) „Expanding the Role of the Victim‟ (11) Pepperdine Law Review 117 
<http://www.jstor.org/journal/links> [accessed on 8 August 2007] 
 
Goldstein A (1982) „Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecutions‟ 52 
Mississippi Law Journal 515 <http://www.jstor.org/journal/links>[accessed on 15 
November 2007] 
  
Goldstein A (1984) „The Victim and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Federal Victim 
and Witness Protection Act of 1982‟ 14(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 225 
<http://www.jstor.org/journal/links> [accessed on 2 June 2007] 
 
Hagan J (1982) „Victims Before the Law: A Study of Victim Involvement in the 
Criminal Justice Process‟ 73(1) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 317 
<http://www.jstor.org/journals/nwu.html> [accessed on 2 June 2007] 
 
Heinz A, Kerstetter W (1979) „Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a 
Reform in Plea Bargaining‟ 13(2) Law & Society Review 349 
<http://www.jstor.org/journals/lawsa.html> [accessed on 19 November 2007] 
 
Hubschle A (2007) „South Africa‟s Victims‟ Charter of Rights- Realistic or 
Aspirational?‟ <http://www.iss.co.za/index.php> [accessed on 30 October 2007] 
 
Kennard K (1989) „The Victim‟s Veto: A Way to Increase Victim Impact on Criminal 
Case Dispositions‟ 77(2) California Law Review 417 
<http://www.jstor.org/journals/00081221.html> [accessed on 2 June 2007] 
 
 
 
 
   166 
Kgosimore D (2000) „The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa and its Application within the Criminal Justice System‟ unpublished MA thesis  
available electronically at <http://www.crisa.org.za> [accessed on 13 September 2008]  
 
Leggert T (2005) „Victims‟ Views: Insights from an Inner-City Victim Survey‟ 
<http://www.iss.org.za/monographs/no111/chap4.htm> [accessed on 7 October 2007] 
 
O‟Connor P (2004) „Victimology Theory‟ <http://www.faculty.ncwc.edu> [accessed 
on 21 March 2007] 
 
Piccinato M (2004) „Plea Bargaining: Criticisms of the Practice‟ 
<http://www.canada.justice.html> [accessed on 16 August 2004] 
 
Verdun-Jones S, Tijerino A (2002) „Victim Participation in the Plea Negotiation 
Process in Canada‟  <http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/vppnpc> [accessed on 30 
October 2007] 
 
Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women (2005) „Submission to the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development in Response to the Evaluation of 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997‟ 
<http://www.ghjru.uct.za/parlsubmission/Memorandum-Mandatory Minimum-
Sentencing> [accessed on 15 June 2008] 
 
Women & Human Rights Project, Community Law Centre, UWC and the Institute of 
Criminology UCT (1999) „Legal Aspects of Rape in South Africa‟ Discussion 
Document Commissioned by the Deputy Minister of Justice 
<http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/gender/publications/violence> [accessed on 
18 November 2008] 
 
Zedner L (2003) „Social Dimensions of Crime and Justice‟ <http://www.oup.com> 
[accessed on 18 March 2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   167 
G. Governmental Publications  
 
Department of Justice & Constitutional Development (2005) „Introduction to the 
Victims Charter‟ 
<http://www.doj.gov.za/southafrica.info/publicservices/yourrights/update/  [accessed 
on 27 June 2007] 
 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group Constitutional Review Committee „Public 
Submissions on 2008 Constitution Review: Consideration‟ Minutes of a meeting held 
on 15 August 2008. <http://www.pmg.org.za> [accessed on 21 November 2008]. 
 
The National Centre for Victims of Crime (2007) „About Victims‟ Rights‟ 
<http://www.victimlaw.info/victimlaw/pages/victimsRight.jsp> [accessed on 6 
January 2008] 
 
Victims‟ Charter Consultative Draft of 2001 
<http://www.doj.gov.za/docs/draftvictimcharter2001> [accessed on 23 February 2007] 
 
 
H. Journal Articles 
 
Anderson A „Step by Step Formal Plea and Sentence Agreements‟ (2005) Issue 445, 
August De Rebus 28  
 
Ashworth A „Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing‟ (1993) Criminal Law Review 
498  
 
Bekker P „Plea Bargaining in the United States of America and South Africa‟ (1996) 
29(1) Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 168  
 
Bekker P „American Plea Bargaining in Statutory Form in South Africa‟ (2001) 34(3) 
Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 310 
 
Christie N „Conflicts as Property‟ (1977) 17(1) The British Journal of Criminology 7 
 
 
 
 
   168 
Clarke C  „Message in a Bottle for Unknowing Defenders: Strategic Plea Negotiations 
Persist in South African Criminal Courts‟ (1996) 1 Comparative and International 
Law Journal of South Africa 141  
 
Clarke D, Davies L, Booysen K „A Silver Era for Victims of Crime: Reassessing the 
Role that Victim Impact Statements can Play in Improving Victim Involvement in 
Criminal Justice Procedures‟ (2003) 16(2) Acta Criminologica 43 
 
Combrinck H „Positive State Duties to Protect Women from Violence: Recent South 
African Developments‟ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 666.  
 
Combrinck H „The Dark Side of the Rainbow: Violence Against Women in South 
Africa After Ten Years of Democracy‟ (2005) Acta Juridica 171   
 
Cowling M „Criminal Procedure‟ (2006) 2 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
239. 
 
Davies R, Kunreuther F, Connick E „Expanding the Victim‟s Role in the Criminal 
Court Dispositional Process: The Results of an Experiment‟ (1984) 75(2) Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 491  
 
De Villiers W „Negotiated Pleas: Notes About and Towards Effective Assistance by 
Counsel‟ (2000) 5 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 153  
 
De Villers W „Plea and Sentence Agreements in Terms of Section 105A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act: A Step Forward?‟ (2004) 37(2) De Jure 244 
 
Du Toit S, Snyman E „Plea-bargaining in South Africa: The Need for a Formalized 
Trial Run‟ (2001) 26(3) Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 144  
 
Edwards „Victim Participation in Sentencing: The Problem of Incoherence‟ (2001) 40 
Howard Law Journal 39  
 
Henderson L „The Wrongs of Victims‟ Rights‟ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 937 
 
 
 
 
   169 
Henderson J, Gitchoff G „Using Experts and Victims in the Sentencing Process‟ 
(1981) 17 Criminal Law Bulletin 226  
 
Isakow N & van Zyl Smit D (1985) „Negotiated Justice and the Legal Context‟ April 
De Rebus 173  
 
Meintjies-van der Walt L  „Towards Victims‟ Empowerment Strategies in the 
Criminal Justice Process‟ (1998) 11 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 157  
 
Pieterse M „The Right to be Free from Public or Private Violence after Carmichele 
(2002) 119 South African Law Journal 27 
 
Roberts J „Victim Impact Statements and the Sentencing Process: Recent 
Developments and Research Findings‟ (2003) 47 Criminal Law Quarterly 365 
 
Snyman E „The Victim Impact Statement as a Means of Addressing the Victims‟ 
Needs for Right‟ (1999) 8 Acta Criminology 30  
 
Snyman E & Du Toit S „Defining and Evaluating Plea Bargaining‟ (2000) 13 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 190  
 
Steyn E „Plea-bargaining in South Africa: Current Concerns and Future Prospects‟ 
(2007) 2 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 206  
 
Trichardt L, Krull W „A Confession for a Concession‟ (1987) Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 409 
 
Uphoff R „The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic 
Approach‟ (1995) 2 Clinical Law Review, Oklahoma 73 
 
Van der Merwe A, „Judicial Perceptions of Harm in Child Sexual Abuse Matters: A 
Compelling Case for Impact Statements‟ (2007) 8(1) Child Abuse Research in South 
Africa 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
   170 
Van der Merwe A, Muller K „Recognising the Victim in the Sentencing Phase: The 
Use of Victim Impact Statements‟ (2006) 22(4) South African Journal on Human 
Rights 647  
 
Watney M „Judicial Scrutiny of Plea and Sentence Agreements‟ (2006) 1 Tydskrif vir 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 224  
 
Welling S „Victim Participation in Plea Bargains‟ (1987) 65(2) Washington 
University Law Quarterly 301 
 
 
I. Publications by Organisations  
 
 
Democratic Alliance Address at the Victims of Crime Imbizo held in Durban on 2 
August 2008 <http://www.da.org.za/?p=4>  [accessed on 28 September 2008] 
 
Democratic Alliance „Discussion Document on the Rights of Victims of Crime‟ 
<http://www.da.org.za> [accessed on 28 September 2008] 
 
John Howard Society of Alberta (1999) „Sentencing in Canada‟ 
<http://www.johhoward.ab.ca/PUB/C33.html> [accessed on 13 July 2008] 
 
Law Reform Commission of Canada (1975) „Criminal Procedure: Control of the 
Process Working Paper 15‟ <http://www.lcc.gc.ca> [accessed on 5 January 2009] 
 
SAHRC (2001) „Submission to the Justice & Constitutional Development Portfolio 
Committee, National Assembly, 12 October 2001‟ <http://www.sahrc.org.za> 
[accessed on 20 December 2006]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   171 
J. South African Law Reform Commission 
 
SALRC (1997) Project 82: Sentencing: Restorative Justice (Compensation for victims 
of crime and victim empowerment) Issue Paper 7  
 
SALRC (2000) Project 82: Sentencing Restorative Justice Issue Paper 7  
 
SALRC (2000) Project 82: Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Discussion 
Paper 91 
 
SALRC (2000) Project 82 Report: A New Sentencing Framework Report  
 
SALRC (2000) Project 82: Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) The Draft 
Sentencing Framework Bill 2000  
 
SALRC (2001) Project 73: Simplification of Criminal Procedure (Sentence 
Agreements) Discussion Paper 94  
 
SALRC (2001) Project 73: Simplification of Criminal Procedure (Sentence 
Agreements) Fourth Interim Report 
 
SALRC (2001) Project 107: Sexual Offences Process and Procedure Discussion 
Paper 102  
 
SALRC (2003) Project 107: Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102  
 
 
K. Websites 
 
Department of Justice & Constitutional Development www.doj.gov.za  
 
Law Reform Commission of Canada www.lcc.gc.ca  
 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group Constitutional Review Committee www.pmg.org.za 
 
 
 
 
   172 
South African Human Rights Commission www.sahrc.org.za   
 
United Nations www.ohchr.org  
 
Victims‟ Rights Working Group website www.vrwg.org 
 
 
L. Other material 
 
Ashworth A (1998) „Victims‟ Rights, Defendants‟ Rights and Criminal Procedure‟ A 
Paper Presented at the International Conference on Integrating Victim Perspectives in 
Criminal Justice, in York (17 July 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
